

OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

Bennot de Mably

G R E E K S.

FROM THE FRENCH

OF THE

ABBÈ DE MABLY.

RERUM COGNOSCERE CAUSAS.

Virg.

The second EDITION



L Y N N:

Printed by W. WHITTINGHAM, and sold
by R. BALDWIN in *Pater noster-Row*, LONDON,
MDCCLXXVI.



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DEDICATION.

TO THE

*Abbè de R * * * * **

I cannot, my dear Abbé, deny myself the pleasure of giving you a publick testimony of my esteem and regard; but be not apprehensive that I shall abuse the privilege of a dedicator. However delightful it is to expatiate on the virtues of a friend, I will be silent, and sacrifice to your delicacy all the encomiums due to your merit. The work addressed to you is only a series of reflection upon the GOVERNMENT, POLICY, and MANNERS of the *Greeks*; and an endeavour to investigate the causes of their rise, and declension.

History

DEDICATION.

History, considered in this light, is a school of philosophy. It teaches us the knowledge of the world; expounds, and enriches our reason, by discriminate observations on the wisdom and folly of past ages.

The Romans excepted, no people in all antiquity have acquired a greater share of reputation than the Greeks, nor has any country given birth to men of more extraordinary excellence in every branch of science, arms, or philosophy, than theirs. A sufficient reason for believing, that no part of history affords a more agreeable

DEDICATION.

ble entertainment to laudable curiosity. Should my efforts to please the publick meet with approbation, it will be a flattering consideration to me that this monument, sacred to our friendship, is placed in the front of a work not destined to oblivion; but calculated to commemorate those sentiments which inviolably unite our souls.

DEDICATION

the excitement of the
moment. Should the efforts to
please the public meet with
approbation, it will be a fitting
contribution to the cause of
humanity, and to the friendship
is placed in the front of a work
not destined to oblivion; but cal-
culated to commemorate those
sentiments which inviolable
our souls.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE GREEKS.

BOOK THE FIRST.

SUMMARY OF BOOK I.

Concerning the manners of the ancient Greeks.

Republican government substituted in the room of monarchical. The general form of government in Greece, of which Lacedæmon becomes the capital. Observations on that form. The affairs of Greece involved with those of the neighbouring powers. Xerxes carries the war into Greece.

HISTORY represents the first inhabitants of Greece as wandering at large from one part of the country to another; unconnected by social intercourse, their mu-

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tual distrust obliged them to appear constantly armed. They resembled those uncivilized nations of America who have had no commerce with the Europeans. Force decided all controversies, and the stronger oppressed the weaker; they subsisted entirely by rapine, inattentive to the cultivation of the soil; and had no eager desire to amass wealth, which must have been defended against plunderers whose intrepidity increased in proportion to the richness of the booty. For whatever injuries the Greeks endured from each other, they had still more dangerous enemies to contend with. According to the report of historians, the natives of the adjacent islands, a people of still greater ferocity of manners, made frequent descents upon the coasts of Greece, ravaged the shore, and were often tempted by the lust of plunder, or rather of devastation, to penetrate into the heart of the country.

SOME writers have extended their enquiries to a more distant period than this barbarous age; and Dicaearchus (who, according

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ing to Porphyry, is the only philosopher that paints the original manners of the Greeks in their true colours) delineates fages whose lives were calm and contented; whilst the earth, attentive to their necessities, was spontaneously prodigal of her blessings, without tillage. The golden age, which ought to be regarded only as the poets dream, was an established principle in ancient philosophy. Plato, in his *Common-Wealth*, describes Aftrea's empire over the first men: but we know not what degree of credibility is to be given to tales of mossy carpets, flowery garlands, mellifluous concerts, and all that sweet enthusiasm of indolence, which constituted the charm of a society where the more turbulent passions were unknown.

UNDER the reign of the second Minos, Greece was delivered from part of the calamities that afflicted her. From the time the grandfather of this prince had taught the Cretans to be happy in obeying laws whose wisdom made them one of the wonders of the world, that nation became puff-

ed up with its acknowledged superiority in sagacity and strength, and could not forbear despising the ignorance and imbecility of its neighbours. A sentiment of ambition was soon awakened. Minos the second, still more aspiring than his subjects, took advantage of this favourable disposition; constructed ships of war, exercised his people in the art of navigation, reduced the neighbouring islands, and planted colonies.

INTERESTED to maintain a free communication between the different parts of his dominions, he cleared the sea of the pirates that infested it; and the security he procured his people proved beneficial to Greece. There is no improbability in supposing this first effect of civil society might give the Greeks an idea of still more inestimable benefits: but whether apprehension of danger was the motive that first associated families, and instructed them to guard against insults, by defending the approach to their habitations; or whether this wise institution is to be attributed to one of those heroes or demi-

demigods, so frequent in the time of barbarism, remains uncertain. So far we know, that pillage from that æra became a more difficult and dangerous employment. The banditti, disappointed in their expectations, relied less upon the prowess of their arms; and finding themselves often at the end of their resources, were at length reduced to the necessity of providing subsistence from manual labour. This gave birth to society, till by degrees all Greece was divided into districts, and the novelty of this arrangement occasioned a revolution in genius.

THE Athenians, says Thucydides, were the first people who renounced the itinerant state. The want of fertility in the soil of Attica was a reason that the Greeks, who took refuge there, were less molested by foreign invasions. Their poverty, which stimulated to labour, was more useful to them, than that plenty and repose which might have attracted the envy of strangers. The passions, which now began to unfold, opened a path to industry and legislation:

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acquisitions in knowledge encreased as necessity indicated the want of them; and became gradually diffused throughout Greece.

HISTORIANS are either totally silent upon this second æra of Greece, where each hamlet was an independent community; or, if they do mention it, relate such marvellous events as surpass all belief. The siege of Troy seems to have united these detached parties in one common enterprize; and by the lights we may draw from Homer, an opinion prevailed that they originally sprung from one common source. They appear to have been unskilled in war, but to have made a considerable progress in the principles of natural liberty and government, tho' their manners were as yet exceedingly unpolished.

GREECE experienced various revolutions on the close of the Trojan expedition. Many of her people had perished by the sword, or were driven into exile from what they began to call their country. Thus the Beotians, forced

forced from Arne by the Theſſalians, eſta-
bliſhed themſelves in Cadmeis, to which
they gave their name. The face of Pello-
ponneſus became entirely changed by the
reſtoration of the Heraclidæ. The inhabi-
tants, vanquiſhed or intimidated, abandon-
ed their country; and the very men who
appeared incapable of defending their old
poſſeſſions, ſhewed ſufficient reſolution and
bravery in the conqueſt of new. Greece
was overrun by wanderers eager to gain aſy-
lums by violence, and to maintain them-
ſelves in them by plunder. Military ſkill
in ſubduing theſe invaders reſtored ſome ap-
pearance of order; but at the ſame time
encreaſed the cauſes of enmity among the
Greeks, and accuſtomed them to liſten only
to the tranſports of reſentment, and to ſeize
the moſt frivolous pretexts for plundering
the territories of their neighbours.

THE more fatal the conſequences of theſe
diſſenſions, the more Greece became ſenſi-
ble of the weight of that barbariſm into
which ſhe was relapſing. A people unin-
fluenced

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fluenced by motives of ambition, necessarily becomes disgusted with those misfortunes of which war is the source. Cities began to enter into treaties of alliance; and interest taught them to be just in their performance. They cultivated the lands they regarded as an inheritance, less reluctantly, and consequently with less fatigue; and the more the enjoyment of a temporary tranquillity led them to consider the value of a durable peace, the more indefatigable were they in the study of methods for its establishment.

BUT the incorporating of the soldiers with the citizens, opened to the Greeks a source of interests and necessities of a new species. Sensible of the insufficiency of their ancient institutions, they saw the propriety of making improvements in the laws; and any material change in the interior principles of a constitution naturally occasions domestic revolutions. Accordingly their kings, whose authority, as generals, had been very extensive, finding it reduced by peace to the limited functions of civil magistracy, abused their

their credit with the people, in order to aggrandize their power; and were tempted to despoil them of their chief privileges, by converting their own employment of dispensers of the laws, into that of legislators. Ambition, cloathed in rusticity of manners, had not then discovered the secret of disguising its designs with address, and borrowing the mask of moderation, in order to work its purposes by imperceptible steps. Never did ambition want the assistance of *art* more than on this occasion; when its machinations were opposed by indigent and resolute men, whose lofty spirits were unsubdued by that train of passions, and by those imaginary gratifications, which have enslaved the minds of their descendants.

SCARCELY had a few cities set an example, by throwing off the yoke, than all Greece panted for liberty. People, who just begin to breathe the air of freedom, are not satisfied with enjoying it selfishly. Whether from a persuasion that their own liberty is interested to extirpate the dangerous example

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ple of tyranny in their neighbourhood; or whether it is the result of that enthusiasm with which the mind is animated in the first moments of any great revolution; these cities were no sooner free than they offered their assistance to all who were inclined to abolish monarchical government. The love of independence became, from that period, the distinguishing characteristic of the Greeks. The very name of monarchy was odious; and had any one of their cities groaned under the oppression of a tyrant, it would have been considered by the rest of Greece as a kind of national insult.

THE reciprocal services rendered by the Greeks to each other, in the course of these revolutions, extinguished the hatred which had formerly divided them: whilst the common interest of liberty kindled in their breasts the principles of a union they were already prepared to confirm, by the revival of several ancient ceremonies. These were *general assemblies*, where the people offered the same sacrifices to the same Divinities.

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ON THE GREEKS. 11

The Olympic, Corinthian, and Nemæan games, were solemn meetings of the separate provinces of Greece; each being a kind of congress, for the consideration of their general and particular political interests, subsequent to an exact and respectful performance of the duties of religion. Some districts, alarmed with apprehensions of their respective weakness, had entered into defensive alliances; but when they beheld the happy situation of the cities which composed the Amphiſtyonic league, they were eager to be admitted into it; thinking their liberty and laws best secured under the auspices of that powerful and respectable confederacy. Thus the interests of the states of Greece became in reality inseparable, and formed one great republick.

THIS league, one of the most ancient establishments of Greece, was founded by Amphiſtyon, the third king of Athens. By this institution he united, in the strictest bonds, the neighbouring states, who every year sent deputies to Delphos and Thermopylæ,

pylar, [a] to deliberate on the general and particular state of their affairs. They engaged, by a solemn oath, never to violate the rights of the temple of Delphos; but on the contrary, to revenge in concert all sacrilegious attempts on its privileges.

THE council of Amphictyons, so commendable for piety to the Gods, prudence in preventing, or terminating disputes among the several members of the league, as well as for disinterested justice, in regard to differences with foreign powers, undoubtedly communicated a share of its spirit to all Greece, and was considered as the general assembly of her states. It did not seem credible, however, that affairs could be conducted with an equal degree of wisdom, as when fewer cities were included in the association.

[a] We have no precise account who were the first states that composed the council of Amphictyons. The most ancient list come down to us, enumerates the Ionians, Dorians, Magnesians, Phthyotæ, Phocians, Melians, Thessalians, Beotians, Perrhæbeans, Locrians, Oetheans, and Dolopians.

ciation. How many political institutions do we meet with, whose advantages are entirely lost by extending them beyond their original bounds? The commonalty of Greece formerly caught somewhat of the upright and gentle manners of the council of Amphictyons, the latter, now, adopted more of the severe and ferocious genius of their countrymen. The avenues to the council of Amphictyons, when contracted within a small circle, were inaccessible to intrigue and cabal; but became [b] open to both when the enlargement of the circle admitted a vast number of republicks, unequal in strength and reputation. Their authority consisted

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[b] At the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, the Lacedæmonians demanded that the Amphictyons would banish from their council, the deputies of those cities which had deserted the interest of their country, to embrace that of Persia. Themistocles opposed this demand; apprehending, says the historians of that age, that if the Argives, Thessalians, and Thebans, nations stedfastly devoted to the welfare of Athens, were excluded from the council, the Lacedæmonians would have the advantage in plurality of voices, and become masters in every question.

in their unanimity; but the excessive increase in the number of deputies rendered this unanimity in a manner impracticable.

If the character of simple mediators was altogether sufficient, for imposing their influence on allies who were fond of peace, and had no separate interest to pursue, this was not the case when the league grew more multifarious. It then became necessary that the council of Amphictyons should be regarded as a tribunal, [c] from which there was no appeal; and whose uncontroverted decrees should arm all Greece, in opposition to any rebellious power.

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[c] The *oath* administered to the representatives who composed the council of Amphictyons, clearly proves that each city in the league preserved an entire independence: and that this council, very nearly resembling the *general diet* of the Swiss Cantons, had no right to make laws for each city in the association, or to pass sovereign decrees relative to their particular differences. Had it enjoyed such a privilege, the deputies would, doubtless, have been engaged to render justice without regard to particular interests, and have promised, in the name of their respective cities, to submit to the determinations of the council.

FORTUNATELY for Greece, a concurrence of circumstances had hitherto preserved that spirit of concord which the council of Amphictyons inspired; but which, from the nature of her constitution, could not be permanent. One reason against it was, a custom of long date practised by Greece, of disencumbering herself of those [d] super-
 C 2 numerary

[d] Politicians have, not without reason, condemned this custom; since colonies were never of any utility to the countries from whence they derived their origin. Besides, the remoteness of situation, which necessitated them to regulate their conduct in conformity to their new interests, these emigrants frequently forgot the mother country; or maintained no other intercourse with it than by ambassadors, authorized to participate in the sacrifices offered at certain solemnities. It is a known fact, that the Greeks established in Italy and Sicily were uninterested in the affairs of Greece; who, in her turn, neglected and suffered them to fall a prey to the Carthaginians and Romans. It was impossible that the cities of Greece, in delivering themselves from the burthen of their citizens, should be able to retain them in obedience. These colonies must either form a government totally independant, or be degraded from the rank of citizens into that of subjects of Greece; since their distance
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numerary citizens she was unable to support, by planting colonies abroad, instead of employing their force in the conquest of territories for the public emolument. A custom that retained each republick in its primitive debility, and, in admonishing it not to undertake any foreign enterprize, made it every day more sensible of its incapacity, by the diminution of people, in defensive wars. The Greeks, restrained by the council of Amphietyons, from forming schemes to enrich one republick at the expence of another, wanted the necessary resolution to execute plans of ambition; and though their dissentions sometimes occasioned slight disorders, they never broke in upon the fundamental principles of their union.

WHILST the weakness of Greece was instrumental in supporting the reputation of the Amphietyons, their authority acquired additional strength from the intestine divisions that disturbed the tranquillity of each republick.

would not admit of their having any share in the publick administration.

republick. It may be proper to recollect, that at the annihilation of monarchy in Greece, chance alone had decided the species of government that succeeded. Laws were hastily and inconsiderately made. Every individual fought his own advantage in this revolution; studious to invest himself with authority; and, in examining his situation comparatively, appeared equally dissatisfied. Here, an imperious nobility wished, under the sanction of liberty, to become the tyrants of their country. There, an insolent populace sported with laws and magistrates. Every where the avidity and injustice of rich and poor, afforded matter for reciprocal complaint. The universal attention began now to be employed in the compilation of salutary laws; in fixing liberty on a more permanent basis; in the division and distribution of power among the different orders of citizens; and in ascertaining their rights and privileges. The republicks, entirely occupied with these objects, of a far more interesting nature than any foreign enterprize, confined their attention entirely to

domestick affairs. They feared, courted, and respected each other; and this reciprocation of sentiments, favoured their growing conjunction of interests.

PROBABLY there was no reason to apprehend a renewal of the former ravages of war among the Greeks; but there was, however, a necessity that the present confederacy of her states should be established on principles as wise as the most enlightened policy could devise. Instead of that subordination which maintained order, which taught the different republicks a regular arrangement, which gave them a chief, without giving them a master, the extreme equality that then prevailed, could not fail being productive of new contentions, and of exposing them to all the unhappy consequences of anarchy. Greece required a more infallible *dictator* than the council of Amphictyons; whose authority was liable to suspension, from diversity of opinion in the members. It wanted, in one word, a master spring to regulate the movements of the whole machine, and
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either to procrastinate, or accelerate its operations.

THIS deficiency was supplied by Lycurgus. The government he founded in Sparta rendered that city, in a manner, the arbitress of Greece. When this celebrated man found himself at the head of the administration, with the title of *regent*, during the minority of the king his nephew, Lacedæmon was not in a more advantageous situation than other Grecian republicks. Her laws were treated with contempt; her two monarchs would rule despotically; and their subjects, not contented with liberty, abused it by running into licentiousness. Proportionably to the address or courage of the preponderating power, Lacedæmon aspired, by turns, towards tyranny, or degenerated into anarchy.

LYCURGUS reasoned on different principles from other Grecian legislators; who, by striving to accommodate matters and oblige all parties, contrived schemes of reformation
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that satisfied none; and left the rancorous weeds of dissension unexterminated. A skilful legislator, before he compiles laws for a *great state*, will study the manners, and prevailing disposition of the people; because the national genius will always overbalance the legislative authority. But when he is only to influence a *small body of citizens*, who may be said to compose one family, enclosed within the walls of the same city, less address is requisite. Lycurgus opposed the strength of his single genius to that of the Spartans united; nor did he believe it impracticable to interest them, either by hope or fear, to an immediate concurrence in the revolution he meditated; whilst his courage prompted him to form the daring project of moulding them into a new people.

To accomplish this, Lycurgus did not think it necessary to set aside the conjunctive authority of the two branches of the family of Hercules, who swayed the sceptre of Lacedæmon; but whilst he indulged her kings
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in the enjoyment of absolute power, at the head of their armies, he reduced them, within the walls of Sparta, to the rank of private citizens, submissive to the laws. It was with the *people* that this legislator entrusted the sovereign power; that is to say, the privilege to make laws; to decide war or peace; and to create magistrates. And, in order to remove their apprehensions, and prevent any jealous distrust of infringements on their rights, which might introduce an oppressive democracy, Lycurgus appointed magistrates [e] who were to free them from the solicitude of watching over their own interests. He also created a senate, composed of the wisest and most experienced citizens [f] in the

[e] Plutarch is of opinion that King Theopompus, 130 years after the death of Lycurgus, created the Ephori, in order to reduce the too exorbitant power of the senate. An opinion that does not seem very probable.

[f] Sixty was the necessary age for a seat in the senate, the number of senators was twenty-eight, and their seats for life. Their nomination was in the people, and every citizen had an equal claim to that honour.

the republick. This respectable body exercised the offices of the civil magistracy, formed a council for the kings, who were prohibited from undertaking any enterprize without its approbation; and had only the right of proposing in the publick assemblies such points as were necessary to be debated.

THE republick of Lycurgus was composed of all the excellencies in the different modes of political government. Here democracy was exempt from those defects which are natural to it; because that part of authority which a free people does not know how to exercise, and always abuses, was delegated to select magistrates; leaving the Spartans to enjoy, without alloy, the advantages arising from the union of liberty and patriotizm in a popular government. Irresolution, caprice, rage, violence, with the rest of the evils that disturbed the tranquillity of other Grecian states, subject to the will of the people, were unknown in Sparta. On the other side, the regal power,

er, and the senatorial authority, were so equally balanced, and both so subordinate to those of the people, as left no room to fear any encroachments; but, on the contrary, enriched that republick with the advantages peculiar to monarchy and aristocracy. The establishment of a senate rendered the popular part of the constitution able to discuss and comprehend its real interest, to distinguish the most eligible principles of action, and to persevere in them invariably. In the field, their kings, then absolute princes, procured the Spartans that celerity and diligence in martial operations, which is the soul of enterprize, the foundation of military success, and is scarcely ever attainable by the generals of a free people.

HOWEVER great the wisdom of this political system might be, Lycurgus regarded it as a tottering edifice, till his regulations had strengthened its foundation in the morals of the people. Laws are calculated to form the manners, but manners must likewise protect the laws; and from the reciprocal action
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of both parts, this judicious legislator expected the perfection of his work.

WHAT indeed availed the establishment of order, if avidity for riches, and its inseparable companion luxury, the sources of inequality among citizens, making some tyrants, others slaves, were suffered, by insensible degrees, to interrupt the harmony of the state? The populace, debased by indigence, too abject to dispute their supremacy, would have flattered the vanity of the *great*; and the reigning princes, augmenting the channels of corruption, would have panted for arbitrary power. In order to render his countrymen worthy of liberty, Lycurgus established a perfect equality in fortune; but he did not confine his views to a new division of land, only.

THIS had been but a temporary advantage: Nature undoubtedly, neither bestowed on every Lacedemonian the same passions, nor the same industry in the improvement of his paternal inheritance: consequently the
avaricious

avaricious must very soon have accumulated possessions, by taking advantage of the indolence or prodigality of their fellow citizens. Sparta, so circumstanced, must have sought for remedies; but not finding, perhaps, another state-physician like Lycurgus, to restore the vigour of her constitution in this critical conjuncture, she had undoubtedly sunk under the tumultuous disorders of anarchy, or at least have been necessitated to abrogate her salutary institutions, and submit to a new system of government.

To prevent such consequences, Lycurgus prohibited the use of gold and silver, and circulated iron money in his republick. He prevailed with the Spartans to dine at publick tables, where every citizen was obliged to give a constant example of the strictest temperance. No other tools were to be used by mechanics, in the furniture of houses, but the saw and the hatchet. In a word, he bounded all desires by the indispensable demands of nature; interdicting all commerce with foreigners. [g] From this period

[g] This law was entitled *Xenelasia*. The Lacedæmonians

riod the luxurious arts fled from Laconia; the inutility of riches rendered them contemptible; and Sparta might be considered as a fortress inaccessible to corruption. Her children, educated by the state, were habituated, from infancy, to emulate the heroism of their ancestors. The women, who introduce effeminacy of manners into most other countries, were formed, here, to animate and support the virtue of the men. Trained to the most athletic exercises, their temperament became strong and robust, superior to the native delicacy of the sex; their souls were formed for the reception of patience, courage, fortitude, and the train of heroic virtues. The love of poverty necessarily inspired the Lacedemonians with an indifference for plundering an enemy, or rendering him tributary. Their sole subsistence:

demonians were not to go out of their own territories, unless to execute some commission of the republick. When they were under the necessity of admitting a foreigner, they appointed a Proxenos, a kind of inspector to attend him; who watched his steps. It was not till after the Peloponnesian war, that they relaxed in this article.

sistence arose from the produce of their lands; and, having no publick funds to have recourse to, it was impossible for them to maintain a foreign war. They had likewise a law which, restrained them from giving the freedom of their city to foreigners; [b] which, of course, disabled them from supplying that loss of citizens, which even victories are attended with; whilst their inability to avail themselves of any of the advantages of war, made them singularly attentive to the preservation of peace. But notwithstanding the propriety and efficacy of these motives for retaining the citizens in moderation, Lycurgus feared least ambition of conquest (which always degenerates into avarice, and by enriching a state causes a subordination of rank,) should undermine the principles of his republick. He therefore enacted a law, expressly forbidding the Lacedemonians to take arms, unless in their

[b] Herodotus remarks, that the Spartans never enrolled but two foreigners in their list of citizens; Tisamenus, and his brother Egias, during the Persian war. Commentators say this is a mistake, and that they granted this honour to four or five other persons.

their own defence; and enjoining them never to be tempted, by the advantage of victory, to the pursuit of a flying enemy.

SUCH a precaution, in appearance extravagant, was yet necessary; for, to supply the deficiency of number in the Lacedæmonian army, Lycurgus had given Sparta more the resemblance of a camp than a city. Perpetually occupied in martial exercises, all other employments were held despicable. Every citizen was a soldier, in whom not to have been eager to lay down his life for his country, had been infamous. Possibly without the wise restrictions already mentioned, the Spartans, transported by valour, might have made an improper use, for their own aggrandizement, of that excellence in the military art, recommended for self defence. The love of fame was an illusion, under which passions of a different nature might artfully lurk; and, absorbed in sinister and lucrative views, that moderation had soon disappeared, which was maintained in Lacedæmonian for near six hundred years.

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THE description I have given of this republick, will make it easily conceived, that all Greece must regard it with respect, or rather with admiration. Hercules, says Plutarch, traversed the globe, and with his club, alone, exterminated its tyrants and robbers; Sparta, armed with virtuous poverty, acquired an equal empire over Greece! her justice, moderation, and courage, were so universally evident, that, without the necessity of arming her troops, and appearing in the field, she frequently composed the domestic insurrections of Greece, by the mediation of a single ambassador, constrained tyrants, to a resignation of usurped authority, and terminated differences between particular cities.

THIS mediative power, always favourable to order, facilitated the acknowledged superiority of Sparta; as the other Grecian republicks were continually obliged to have recourse to her protection. Experiencing, by turns, the advantages of her friendly interposition, none of them refused to be directed by her advice. What a noble consideration for human nature, that a nation should

should owe its greatness solely to its love of justice! The neighbouring states became accustomed to obey the decrees of the Spartans, because not to respect *their* wisdom, had been an impeachment of their own. Sparta insensibly arose to be considered as the *capital* of Greece, and enjoyed the incontestable right of commanding its confederate forces.

THE security of Greece appeared solidly established under the auspices of Lacedæmon; nor could we be too lavish of encomiums on this political arrangement, supposing the interior strength of Greece had been adequate to the repelling an invasion from a formidable enemy; or that the situation, and systems of her neighbours could have been rendered immutable. In other words, if the provinces of Asia Minor had always remained inactive, under the nerveless imbecility of princes, captivated more with pleasure than with glory; and if the petty principalities on the European side had continued distracted with those intestine divisions that rendered them contemptible. But, unfortunately,

fortunately for Greece, this state of inaction among the neighbouring powers was not permanent; whilst the original principles of her own constitution confined her within the bounds of her primitive mediocrity. The universal genius of the nation, a composition of that of particular cities, unaccustomed to covet foreign possessions, had banished from their imagination, all desire of conquest. Amongst the *barbarians*, on the contrary, those passions implanted by nature in the human heart, which stimulate mankind to the acquisition of new territories, were unrepressed by political institutions, and consequently paved the way to revolutions. The advantage of some, must occasion the ruin of others; and Greece, without suffering the least diminution in her natural force must yet have become every day comparatively weaker, from the augmentation of strength in the nations round her.

Let us suppose a Themistocles at the head of the Grecian councils; one of those men whose prescience pierces into futurity, and who, to use the expression of an ancient writer,

writer, "anticipates events," What could his political penetration have discovered to remedy the evil I am pointing out? Would he have taught the Greeks to blush at their inertia; have flattered their courage, and, by expanding their views, have tempted them to engage in foreign enterprizes; Prudence must have opposed such a measure. How great the probability that an attempt to inspire them with ambition, would have proved destructive to the very essence of their government, and by embroiling the several republicks with each other, the newly awakened rage of conquest, had been attended with a diversity of interests, and jealous suspicions, terminating in hatred, which would have rendered their country an easy prey to some foreign prince. But, taking it for granted that such a conduct might not have been productive of the consequences I have deduced, can it be supposed that a man sufficiently enlightened to discern that the incapability of Greece to extend her empire, from the nature of her political constitution, must one day be the cause of her destruction, should at the same time be so blind as to make

make a fruitless effort to engage her in conquests, which, though they might conduce to the encrease of power in the community at large, could not have enriched every particular state; A distant prospect of advantage never strikes the multitude; and schemes of general utility make but faint impression on men's minds. Could the impetuosity of his eloquence even have convinced the publick assembly of Amphictyons, of the necessity of this extension of territory, the obstacles inseparable from the undertaking had very soon disgusted them with it; and they would have quickly reverted to their original principles. A confederated republick may maintain a *defensive war* with advantage; because when liberty is attacked the grand point, "how to defend it?" is superior to all other considerations, and reconciles every jarring interest. Such a war may be conducted with that deliberate wisdom which is the result of combined opinions; besides that an apprehension of impending danger precipitates men into action, and forces them to overlook a thousand ceremonious forms that are generally regarded

as indispensably necessary. An *offensive war*, on the contrary, is so far from conciliating the sentiments of a people, that it almost ever divides them; great activity and celerity are requisite in its prosecution; whilst the secret springs that give motion to a confederated body, act with that dilatory circumspection so peniculous to enterprize.

LET us examine the constitution of Greece in this point of view, and we shall estimate as an advantage these remains of jealous discord, which, in spite of the Spartan authority, and the council of Amphictyons, sometimes interrupted her repose. Without such a fermentation, her citizens, enervated by a long cessation of military toils, had not been in a capacity to defend their country against foreign invasions. It was to domestick jealousies, suspicions, and controversies, that Greece was indebted for commanders and soldiers, whose courage, ability, and martial discipline repaired the disadvantages arising from the weakness of her constitution.

CONTRACTED

CONTRACTED within her own narrow circle, Greece remained inactive, whilst vast empires were already established in Asia. She was, perhaps, even ignorant of the successful progress of the Medes and Assyrians, when the rapid victories of Cyrus presented at her very door the powerful neighbour destined hereafter to be her conqueror.

THE history of Cyrus, as transmitted to posterity, is either too much disfigured with puerilities related by Herodotus, or too much embellished by the pen of a philosopher, who attended less to the authenticity of facts, than the conveyance of instructive examples, of future monarchs, how to deserve a throne. According to Herodotus, Cambyfes was a Persian of mean extraction, chosen by Astyages to be the husband of Mandana, from a superstitious regard to a dream, that foretold he should be dethroned by his grandson. The obscurity of Cambyfes, and the interval of time before Cyrus could be capable of disputing the crown, were, however, insufficient reasons for dispelling the fears of his timid grandfather:

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he therefore commanded that Cyrus should be *exposed*, but he was most miraculously preserved; and the conqueror of Asia was educated like a simple shepherd. Yet, in that occupation, his greatness of soul burst through the cloud that enveloped it. Destined for a throne from the extraordinary elevation of his genius, his playfellows in all their little sports resigned to him the the command. By gradual steps he became monarch of a nation whom the Medes had enslaved; his remonstrances made the Persians blush at their chains, and still more at the patience with which they suffered them to be imposed. He taught them the use of arms, and inured them to military hardships; raised the standard of resistance, declared war against Media, and after defeating Astyages despoiling him of his kingdom.

XENOPHON represents the story in a very different manner. The Persians, he agrees, were not a numerous race, but then they were laborious, active, vigilant, and excellent soldiers. Surrounded with nations enervated by luxury, Persia alone continued invulnerable

vulnerable to the arrows of vice. Cambyfes, equally fubmiffive to the laws of his country with the meanest fubject, reigned over this respectable nation. Cyrus received from his father an education equal to the rank he filled, and in his early years he began to unfold the bloffoms of thofe virtues which constitute a hero. Aftyages died peacefully on the throne, and was fucceeded by his fon Cyaxares; whilst Cyrus, far from acting as a chief of banditti, or an ufurper, carried on a war to eftablifh the crown upon his uncle's head, and crush the enemies of Media, where, by right of fucceffion, he afterwards became legal fovereign.

ON which ever fide truth may be, thus far is certain, that Cyrus, in defervedly attracting the admiration of all Afia, had the fate of moft extraordinary perfonages, whose lives are crouded with a train of marvellous fictions, in proportion as the real grandeur of their actions ftands lefs in need of falfe embellifhments. This prince led an obfcure people into the full blaze of glory. The conquest of Lydia threw into his hands the

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wealth

wealth of Crœsus and of all Asia-Minor. He carried the war into Syria, reduced that kingdom to a province, as well as Arabia; overturned the empire of the Assyrians, besieged and took Babylon; and extended his conquest over those immense tracts of country which are bounded by the Indian ocean, the Caspian, Euxine, and Ægean seas, Æthiopia, and the Arabian gulph.

THE Greeks situated on the coasts of Asia-Minor, contemplated with pleasure the defeat of Crœsus, whose tributaries they were and suffering revenge to cast a mist before their eyes, were insensible that a far more formidable power had arisen from his ruins. Their presumption even tempted them to believe, that the ardent expressions of zeal they testified for entering into an alliance with Cyrus, would induce him to re-establish them in their ancient independence. But this hero, not finding his vanity flattered by the homage of cities already on the verge of slavery, would not treat with them as allies, but as subjects.

FROM

FROM henceforth the interests of Greece would have been connected with those of Persia, if Cyrus, who was a stranger even to the name of Sparta, had not resented [i] the haughtiness of her interposition in behalf of these colonies. He treated their temerity with contempt, and would not bestow on the Asiatic Greeks the honour of subduing them in person; but, leaving the care of their reduction to his lieutenants, was occupied in different quarters with more important enterprizes. It was time Greece should begin to be sensible of her own weakness, and that her liberty was endangered, though not destroyed: the conqueror of Asia was obeyed by the Lydians, and Persia was become too formidable to the neighbouring powers, to give reason to expect she should restrain her views within the bounds of mo-

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[i] The Grecian colonies having implored the assistance of Lacædemon, that republick treated Cyrus as she would have done one of the states of Greece. She sent ambassadors to inform him, that the descendants of the Greeks, whatever part of the world they inhabited, had a natural right to freedom; and menaced him with a declaration of war, if he committed any hostilities against them.

deration. Conquerors, in all ages, thirst after universal dominion; because ambition is, in its nature, incapable of enjoyment, and therefore can never be satisfied; winged by prosperity it flies in pursuit of new conquests. Cambyfes, who succeeded Cyrus, though deficient in talents proper to support the splendor of a crown, was not permitted to indulge his natural indolence of temper. Compelled by the prevalent influence of the people to attempt, however reluctantly, great actions, he found himself obliged to appear in arms; and the ruin of a powerful monarchy was an enterprize alone worthy the successor of Cyrus. If Cambyfes spared Greece, it was because he thought it too inconsiderable to excite his ambition; whilst Egypt opened a more brilliant career of glory. After completing the conquest of that kingdom, the Persian monarchs could only extend their empire in Africa, or Europe; this last quarter of the globe was most adapted to their taste; Greece was the key to it; and a combination of circumstances threatened the Greeks with an invasion from the Persians.

At this critical period, the colonies established on the borders of Asia-Minor, groaning under the yoke of slavery, flattered themselves with the hope of recovering their freedom; and their extreme confidence in this hope, unfortunately spurred them on to hazard every thing for its attainment. Aristagoras, a man whose vain temerity equalled his ambition, beheld with delight this spirit of independency kindling and diffusing itself among the colonies; but before he gave motion to its fire, he was desirous of interesting Greece in the success of his scheme. Though the Spartans had at length comprehended, how much it imported them to manage with policy so formidable a neighbour as the king of Persia, and therefore were deaf to his solicitations, Aristagoras found the Athenians more pliant and accessible.

ATHENS held the second rank in the estimation of Greece, distinguished by courage, wealth, and industry, but still more peculiarly by an elegance of manners, and a singular gracefulness of behaviour, which the Greeks could not forbear regarding with

admiration, though they were wise enough to give the preference to more essential qualities. Naturally vain, impetuous, volatile, and inconstant, she believed herself, I know not on what foundation, destined for universal empire. Every citizen engaged by oath to regard as the property of the republick, whatever country produced corn, vines, and olive trees. Athens no sooner tasted the sweets of domestick tranquillity, than she was eager to interrupt it by engaging in foreign dissensions. Impatient for action, she could not endure the lassitude of repose; and her restless ambition must much earlier have overturned the political system of Greece, if the form of her own government had admitted of pursuing an enterprize with constancy. But this republick is compared by Polybius, to a ship without a pilot, where every man steers the helm as he pleases: " One party, says he, is for continuing the voyage; another is for landing
" at the nearest shore; these lower the top
" sails; those put on all the sail they can:
" and amidst this scene of confusion, the
" ship, driven at the mercy of the winds,
" without

“ without any regular destination, is
 “ every moment in danger of splitting upon
 “ a rock.”

THE Athenians had freed themselves from the yoke of Pisistratus; and Hippias, the last of their tyrants, had found an asylum and even a distinguished protection, from Artapharnes, governor of Lydia, at the very time Aristagoras was soliciting their assistance in favour of the Asiatic Greeks; of whom the greater part derived their origin from Attica. The intoxication of recovered liberty, warm with resentment against Persia, precipitated the Athenians into a step which led to their own destruction. They complied with the request of the colonies, who revolted from the Persian government, laid siege to the city of Sardis, and reduced it to ashes. Darius, who after putting the impostor Smerdis to death, had taken possession of the throne of Persia, would not suffer this rashness to pass with impunity; after reducing to obedience the islands on the borders of Asia, he resolved to extend his resentment to Greece itself; where he dispatch-

ed heralds to demand in his name, *Earth and Water*. Far from repenting of their procedure, the Athenians refused to do him homage, and prepared for war; marching with the utmost confidence to meet the Persians, whom they defeated at Marathon. Such was, I will not say the foundation of the Persian war, carried on some years afterwards by Xerxes, but the first instance of a rupture between the two nations; unavoidable, if we consider the ambition and situation of Persia, opposed to the arrogance of Greece; and which, if the Athenians had equalled the Spartans in prudence, would not have been so rashly commenced. Xerxes employed four years in preparing for his expedition, in which the whole force of Asia was collected. His land army, according to Herodotus, consisting of seventeen hundred thousand soldiers; and his naval troops amounted to five hundred thousand men. Twelve ships of war were appointed for the convoy of three thousand transport vessels. Probably this enumeration is exaggerated; but other writers agree, that the army of Xerxes was sufficiently considerable

to

to have aspired to the conquests of Europe.

IF I am not singular in my opinion, it appears less astonishing that the Greeks, after an advantage over Darius, in a battle where victory or ruin was the alternative, should then form a resolution of future resistance, when they must perceive the distant storm that threatened, and had it in their power to divert its fury by soothing him with respectful submission. But the native loftiness of their souls; their enthusiastic love of liberty; their inveterate aversion to monarchy, induced them to prefer death to the Persian government.

WE are unable, in the present age, to form an idea what it is to conquer a nation of free men. Since the general establishment of monarchial government in Europe, the people are no longer citizens, but subjects; they are more occupied with the acquisition of wealth for themselves than for the state; war is kindled in provinces, accustomed to

obedience, and it would be an absurdity to expect to meet with men, who, to avoid exchanging one monarch for another, would fall a sacrifice beneath the ruins of their country.

SEVERAL writers, I know, have fancied they have given a satisfactory explication of the extraordinary conclusion of the Median war. Sparta, say they, was then devoutly attached to the severely rigid institutions of Lycurgus; and all her citizens were equally brave with those three hundred heroes, who fell voluntary victims at the straits of Thermopylæ. Athens, I agree with them had never been in so flourishing a situation; though cherishing within her bosom the seeds of those divisions which were formerly the bane of her tranquility. She had few other laws than those of Solon, a legislator so [k] unenlightened that he himself lived but to a witness

[k] Solon, says Plutarch, only palliated the disorders in his republick. Some of his laws are wise, but there is no correspondent relation between the principles on which they are founded, and the end they are to attain

witness of the tyranny which overturned his republick. In a word, though the popular power was extended far beyond the bounds of regularity and decency, it is certain the multitude, at that period, acted with wisdom; which may be accounted for, by an extraordinary change in the manners of the people during the usurpation of Pisistratus, sufficiently forcible to supply the defect of their laws. The restoration of liberty had been the sole object that engrossed their at-

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attain; nay, frequently there is a manifest contradiction. For instance; Solon disobliged the rich by his law for the abolition of debts; and the poor, by rejecting their petition for a new division of lands. In order to gratify the nobles, he confined the officers of magistracy to such whose estates produced two hundred measures of corn, oil, or wine. This enraged the populace. The nobles, on their side, could not brook the privilege the people enjoyed of appeal from the sentence of the magistrates. The task would be endless to enter into a particular examination of every law of Solon. His democratical system was monstrous, in one instance; that the people, as supreme legislators, directed the execution of the laws abroad and at home. After the fall of Pisistratus, Aristides got a law passed by which every citizen might arrive at the magistracy.

tion; they disregarded every other consideration, and, enflamed with redoubled love for their country, when they emerged from slavery to freedom, the magistrates conducted the affairs of the republick with a zeal that excited universal emulation; and which, in banishing intrigue and cabal, rewarded only talents and magnanimity.

HISTORIANS have undoubtedly reason to affirm, that nothing was impossible for Athens to accomplish, after the glory she had acquired at Marathon; but they are to be credited when they represent the rest of the Greeks as so many citizens rendered desperate by their zeal for liberty? warriors enured to the regular severity of military discipline? whilst the foldiers of Xerxes are painted less like men, then women, effeminated by luxury and sloth; Whereas the fact was, that several republicks, taking it for granted that opposition was in vain, abjectly courted his favour. In regard to the troops of Persia, it is certain that Cambyfes, by his expedition against Ethiopia,

pia- [1] and Ammonia, and Darius in his Scythian war, had lost the choicest of them. One must nevertheless agree that a nation always engaged in war could not be long deficient in soldiers. The warlike regulations of Cyrus still subsisted, and Darius, the successor of Cambyzes, was a prince of distinguished merit. Herodotus informs us, that the Persians esteemed virtue; and that valour served as a *degree*, towards the attainment of honours. In their wars, many individuals gave examples of uncommon bravery, and the whole regiments were excited to emulation. Impartially speaking, though the empire of Cyrus was evidently immersed in lethargic corruption, when it fell under the

[1] In order to pass from Egypt to Ethiopia, it was necessary to traverse vast deserts; and Cambyzes had taken no measures for the subsistence of his army, during its march; the soldiers, says Herodotus, having fed upon their beasts of burthen, and horses, were driven to the extremity of devouring each other. A second army, sent to subdue the Ammonians, was overtaken in the plains of Africa by a whirlwind, that buried it under mountains of sand. Darius says the same writer, lost a great many men, likewise in his Scythian expedition.

the dominion of Alexander, there is little probability of its being infected, so early as the reign of Xerxes, with any of those vices with which Xenophon reproaches it in succeeding times. [m]

NOR do the first successes of the revolters prove any thing derogatory to the Persian courage. The reason the country was unfortified on their side, was because Persia had, naturally, no cause to apprehend an attack from its own subjects.

BUT after Darius marched his forces to punish the Asiatic Greeks, did he not wash away with their blood the affront he had received? grant that the battle of Marathon decided the superiority of the Grecian soldiery, and the incapability of the Persians to conquer, unassisted, why must this conviction render the expedition of Xerxes unsuccessful? He had all the Greeks of Asia, and the islands to reinforce his army, excepting the Seriphians, Scephnians, and Melians.
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[m] See the Cyropadia, last chapter of the last book.

Several European nations joined him; and although the general assembly of Greece had sentenced those who enlisted under the standards of the barbarians to decimation, yet did not the inhabitants of Dolopia, Perrhæbia, Theffalia, Magnesia, Achaia, Locris, Thebes, and the greater part of Beotia, enter into alliance with the court of Persia.

By a resolution to sacrifice men to success, Xerxes gained the pass of Thermopylæ: the same system, in similar circumstances, would always have been productive of the same advantages. The more accurate our observations are upon the inequality of strength between the two nations, the inconveniences Greece was exposed to from the nature of her constitution, and the few resources she had to confide in, the more we must be convinced of the improbability she should escape the impending ruin! What saved her, then, was the superior genius of Themistocles and Pausanias, to that of Xerxes and Mardonius. A comparative view

view of the characters of these great men can alone explain the unexpected conclusion of the Median war.

THEMISTOCLES was born with an insatiable thirst for glory; and so impatient was he to signalize himself, that his emulation to rival the fame of Miltiades, after the battle of Marathon, is said to have broken his rest. In Themistocles were collected all the qualifications that constitute the hero, and the great man: and according to the eulogium of Thucydides, none ever deserved, in a higher degree, the admiration of posterity. With courage proof against surprize, he had prudence in removing obstacles, adequate to penetration in foreseeing them; and the united influence of these qualities rendered him superior to all events.

WHILST Greece revelled in joy for the humiliation of Darius, Themistocles regarded the battle of Marathon, only as the prelude to an approaching storm. A democratical republick is always too much occupied with the present moment, to attend to futurity,

rity. Themistocles was particularly careful
 of interrupting the temporary intoxication
 of his countrymen, with apprehensions of
 future vengeance, on the side of Persia;
 elated with victory as the Athenians then
 were, they would have ridiculed his precau-
 tion, or perhaps have pronounced it crimi-
 nal: he therefore determined to take advant-
 age of the popular prepossession in his favour,
 as well as of the arrogance prosperity is apt
 to inspire, in order to exasperate them against
 Ægina, then the most powerful maritime
 state in Greece. He insensibly led the
 Athenians into a war, and under pretence
 of prosecuting it vigorously, he formed a
 powerful marine, capable not only of de-
 fending his own republick, but the rest of
 Greece from invasions.

SUPPOSING the court of Persia absolutely
 resolved on avenging its disgrace at Mara-
 thon, Greece had no way to avoid destruc-
 tion but from the assistance of a powerful
 fleet; to convince ourselves of this, it will
 be sufficient to recollect the situation of a
 country, divided into districts, bordering on
 on

on the sea shore. So long as the coasts of Greece remained defenceless, Xerxes was at liberty to make descents wherever he pleased; in these circumstances, equally at a loss where to assemble their forces, or make the strongest resistance, every republick would naturally have confined its attention to repelling the enemy in its own territories. The Greeks, instead of being warmed with that glorious emulation which produced such prodigies of valour, from the united efforts of a numerous and regular disciplined army, must have been drawn out in separate detachments through necessity, when, conscious of inferior strength, despairing of assistance, and abandoned to timidity, Xerxes would have gained an easy conquest. This Themistocles foresaw and prevented. A man of less enlarged conceptions would have been contented with providing for the security of Attica; with establishing her fortifications, arsenals, and military stores, on solid foundations. But, more extensive in his plan, Themistocles regarded Greece itself as the true bulwark of the Athenians. The *whole* must be defensible, or Athens is
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no more! In seeming to sacrifice his republic to the general interest, he instructed the Greeks how to preserve it by naval armaments.

I do not know whether mankind has enough attended to the magnanimity of the Athenians in this instance; when resigning their city to the fury of the *barbarians*, they removed their wives, their children, with the aged and decrepit citizens, to Salamin and Trœzene; voluntarily quitting their paternal seats to take refuge in ships, constructed with the rude materials of their houses. A resolution so unexampled of which few persons were capable of comprehending the wisdom, presented to the multitude, nothing but a terrible and mortifying prospect of flight, or inevitable ruin. To be able to form a competent judgment of the obstacles Themistocles had to surmount, ere he could prevail with his fellow-citizens to abandon their habitations, their temples, their Gods, and the tombs of their ancestors, it is necessary to carry our thoughts back to the remote ages of antiquity, and to be conversant

versant in all their national prejudices.

That universality of genius, which Themistocles was endowed with, could alone have saved Greece, at this period, from destruction. His discriminating mind fraught with the most elevated ideas, knew how to arrange all the various combinations of refined policy. He had recourse to address, insinuation and intrigue, to gain the concurrence of men incapable of conviction. To raise the multitude to his own scale of reason was impracticable; authority must, therefore, be employed, religion must be interested, the Gods must interpose, and Greece become prolific of oracles favourable to his designs:

AFTER forcing the pass of Thermopylæ, the Persians dispersed their troops over the country: subduing all before them as far as the Peloponnesus. Xerxes purposed forcing an entrance through the isthmus of Corinth. The Greeks collected all their strength on that side. Animated by despair, they formed a plan of defence worthy of their military genius. But how vain had been resistance,

sistance, if the enemy's fleet had made powerful diversions along the coasts of Peloponnesus and by that means encouraged those nations to appear in arms who held private intelligence with Persia? [n] Corinth I grant, still resisted the attacks of the Persians, but that city, acting only on the defensive, crouded with citizens, surrounded with innumerable invaders by sea and land, must very shortly have experienced all the horrors of famine.

To oppose the Persian navy, Greece had no more than three hundred and fourscore vessels; the commander, appointed by the Lacedemonians, was a man incapable of supporting the rank assigned him. Whether Eurybiades, conscious of his inferiority in number, and listening to the suggestions of fear, thought himself always too near the enemy: or whether he absurdly apprehended the safety of Peloponnesus would be less endangered, by hovering with his fleet upon the

[*] These, Herodotus tells us, were the Dorians, Etolians, Dryopians, and Lemnians.

the coast, he came to a resolution to abandon the straits of Salamin. Themistocles opposed this design with extreme earnestness, endeavouring to convince him, it was only within this arm of the sea that the Greeks were able to bid defiance to the superiority of Xerxes; clearly demonstrating that his advantageous situation gave him an opportunity of disturbing the operations of the enemy, without the least hazard to himself. These remonstrance proving ineffectual, Themistocles, as is generally known, found it impossible to frustrate the project of timid and foolish Eurybiades, any other way than by assuming the character of a traitor to his country, in giving secret information to Xerxes, that the Greeks meditated an escape, and his attack must be sudden, if he was desirous to cut off their retreat on the Peloponnesian side.

XERXES fell into the snare; and the Eurybiades was compelled to fight. The Grecian ships, which from the narrowness of the strait, could not be surrounded by the enemy, were at liberty to act in concert; whilst

whilst the Persians lost the advantage of their naval strength, as only a small number of ships could engage at a time; and the first line of battle being defeated, communicated disorder and confusion to the rest of the fleet, which was quickly dispersed by the Greeks.

WHAT gave a decisive turn to the fortune of the day was the dastardliness of Xerxes. His loss, it is true, was considerable, but, in collecting the scattered remains of his fleet, were there not still ships enough to render him master of the sea? why was he so intimidated? his land army still unrepulsed, and almost the whole country of Greece reduced! and, had not this prince been the most inattentive and infatuated man breathing, could have been a second time the dupe of Themistocles? Common reason had informed him, that the Greeks would never act so impolitically, as to break down the bridge he had thrown over the Bosphorus; which by cutting off all possibility of retreat, must reduce a powerful enemy to the alternative, either to conquer or die! However innumerable

rable the armies of such a general as Xerxes may be, they are but impotent shadows, when opposed by a Themistocles! The most formidable troops under an unskilful leader, are like the massy club of Hercules in the hand of an infant, unable to wield it. Xerxes had recourse to flight; and in leaving Mardonius in Greece, at the head of three hundred thousand soldiers, exclusive of the allies, he thought less of subduing the country, than of securing his own retreat, and preventing the Greeks from pursuing him into Asia.

THE army of Mardonius was yet strong enough to have intimidated the Greeks, had they been less elated with their recent escape from one far more tremendous; the Persians became despicable, in their eyes, after the retreat of Xerxes; they thought themselves assured of victory, whenever they engaged; and their dismayed enemies, on the contrary, began to despair of success. But this confidence on the one side, and the despondency on the other, being alike founded in imaginary strength and weakness, it required uncommon

mon prudence in the Greeks to prevent their engaging in rash and extravagant skirmishes; the want of success in any of which, might, by degrees, have revived the drooping courage of the Persians, and taught Mardonius to recollect that superiority in number, he seemed totally to have forgot. The preservation of Greece *entirely* depended upon military judgment; and in this particular Pausanias, who commanded in chief, infinitely excelled Mardonius.

I am not ignorant that Pausanias, dazzled, afterwards, by the presents and promises of Xerxes, not only betrayed the interests of his country, but even aspired to become the tyrant of it; I will even add, that, discouraged by the difficulty of the enterprize, and unfurnished with mental resources, the first step he engaged in was followed by repentance: destitute of steadiness to determine him, either to relinquish or pursue his designs, this weak irresolute, cowardly disposition puts the finishing stroke to the ignominy of his character as a politician.

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He fought to confirm his wavering purpose by the help of accomplices; and, as if he wished to divest himself of the fatigues of acting a first part, he tempted the fidelity of Themistocles; without discerning, that should this great man be infamous enough to become his associate, he would infallibly ravish from him all the fruits of his treason.

YET, however despicable Pausanias appears as a statesman, he was one of those complicated, and not uncommon characters, who are great or little, regarded in different points of view, and merit a pretty equal share of our admiration and contempt. If nature had been niggardly to him of the sagacious talents of a great politician, she was lavish in the military ones of a complete general. Whilst Mardonius was puzzled which way to act, negotiating when he should have fought. and totally ignorant of the art of employing his forces to advantage, Pausanias was active, vigilant, and intrepid, at the head of his army. He penetrates

trates the designs of Mardonius, surrounds him with ambushes, presses him on all sides, and reduces him at last to the necessity of engaging the Greeks at Plataeæ, a confined spot of ground, where numbers were of little advantage, and from whence forty thousand Persians only escaped, of that mighty army, under the conduct of Artabazus, leaving the rest of their country-men on the field of battle.

UPON the very day that Pausanias was victorious at Plataeæ, Leotychides, king of Sparta, and Xantippus, an Athenian general, gained a complete advantage over the Persians, at Mycale. The Spartan chief unacquainted with what passed in Greece, artfully propagated a report along the coasts of Asia, that Mardonius was defeated; and that, as the Greeks were preparing to free their country from barbarian bondage, they expected the colonies would second so generous an attempt. Diodorus remarks, it was neither the valour of the Greeks, nor their skill in war, which gained them the victory at Mycale; the event was doubtful,

till the Samians, and Milesians decided it, by going over to the Greeks. The Persians were alarmed by this defection, which was immediately followed by that of the Asiatic Greeks, who joined their European countrymen, to defeat the common enemy.

XERXES, who had proceeded no farther than Sardis, no sooner was informed that his army was intirely routed, than alarmed for his own safety, he retreated to Ecbatana; communicating the contagion of his fear to all his subjects. After aspiring to universal monarchy, this prince now despaired of retaining possession of his hereditary dominions. In proportion to the immensity of their preparations, for the reduction of Greece, the Persians felt the impotence of their arms after this defeat. Salamin, Plataea, Mycale, recalled the remembrance of former disgraces in the Ethiopian, Ammonian, and Scythian expeditions. Those sentiments of grandeur and courage, which Cyrus bequeathed as an inheritance to his successors, were totally effaced, and Xerxes had

had nothing to leave to posterity but an example of the most abject cowardice.

THERE never happened in any nation, but particularly in a confederated republick, an event of equal importance with this I am now relating, without occasioning some revolution in its political system. The more the Greeks were sensible of the advantage of concord during the war with Xerxes, the more closely should they have drawn the bonds of alliance and amity after his overthrow. But, unhappily, success gave birth to new passions in the breasts of the Spartans and Athenians; and new interests arose amongst the other states of Greece; till by degrees the hatred of the two rival republicks grew more inveterate; their dissensions laid the foundation of their ruin; and in some measure revenged the ashes of the Persian empire.

END OF BOOK I.

A

S U M M A R Y

O F

B O O K II.

Of Revolutions in the general system of Greece, consequent to the Median war.—Athens becomes the ruling power.—Reflections on its interests.—Examen of the administration of Cimon and Pericles.—Of the Peloponnesian war.—The supreme power of Athens overturned by the Spartans.—The authority of Lacedæmon, incapable to support itself.—Of the Theban glory under the auspices of Epaminondas.

G R E E C E entirely confined her attention within the circle of domestic affairs, precedent to the rupture with Xerxes; had little or no intercourse with her colonies, nor was her tranquillity

quillity interrupted with apprehensions of foreign invasions. The differences arising between adjacent republicks, required only regular land forces to determine them; and having no commercial interest to support, she was consequently inattentive to maritime preparations. But scarcely did the Greeks begin to breathe, after the close of the Persian war, than an apprehension naturally arose, that the court of Persia would not be tardy to revenge its disgrace. From that instant they regarded a close connection with their colonies, in the islands of Asia-Minor, as a most interesting object: to defend these was, in other words, to form a barrier for their own defence. Their naval strength, importantly signalized in the engagement at Salamin, was now become of infinitely greater consequence than a land army. A formidable marine would not only raise a constant bulwark against the barbarians, and extend the reputation of Greece to distant shores, but it was, also, considered as a necessary chain of connection with the colonies, the links of which might hold them

them united, though separated from the mother country by the ocean.

It is undoubtedly obvious to every rational mind, that this novelty in politicks pointed strongly at the fundamental principles of the constitution, since Sparta felt an immediate degradation, for this reason alone, her known deficiency in ships, seamen, and the funds necessary to maintain a superiority at sea. Whilst on the contrary, Athens, from the preponderancy of her maritime strength, attracted universal attention, and seemed already to have snatched the laurels from the brow they had so long encircled.

Lacedæmon might have avoided this indignity to her fame, had she been attentive to her interest; but, enraged at the influence of Attic pride, she consulted only her passions. The Spartans had formerly given demonstrations of their jealousy of the dawning splendour of Athens, by their attempt to reinstate Hippias in the tyranny, after the banishment of Pisistratus. Hence, it may be easily supposed, they could not pardon

don her the victory at Salamin, which ravished from them the glory of being the deliverers of Greece. With a secret satisfaction they contemplated the ruin that threatened their rival; and when her citizens led their wives and children through the territories of Laconia, in their return from Salamin and Trœzene, they would have prevented them from rebuilding the walls of Athens. “The Lacedemonians, says Diodorus, asserted it was for the interests of Greece that Athens should remain unfortified. If Xerxes, continued they, attacks us a second time, the Athenians must again be reduced to leave their walls, whilst the Persians, instructed by experience, would not fail to convert the city into an impregnable fortress, from whence it would be impossible ever to dislodge them; and whose advantageous situation would command all the country.” As a recompence of that generosity, with which the Athenians devoted themselves to the preservation of Greece, their city had been left open and defenceless, a place of no consideration, if Themistocles, as is univer-

fully known, had not succeeded in restoring the grandeur of his country, by deceiving the Lacedemonians.

FAR from discovering visible marks of restless jealousy, Sparta's only method, now, was to have inspired an implicit confidence in the hearts of the allies, and to have strengthened the foundation of an union with the colonies, from whence the principal advantage was to result to herself. The first attention of a power who holds the chief rank in a confederacy like that of the states of Greece, ought either to be a real insinuation of its own sentiments into the breasts of others, or an apparent adoption of theirs.

THE Lacedemonians, attentive to all the movements of their allies, should have eagerly embraced that system which new interests inclined them to pursue. By taking the lead in courting an alliance with the colonies, who, in general, were powerful at sea, the proud republick of Athens, without suspecting the artifice, would have remained

mained contented with her second degree of rank. But, taking advantage of that dilatoriness, or rather torpitude, with which history reproaches her rival, she offered her protection and alliance to the Greeks, established in the islands and coasts of Asia-Minor; and, with their assistance, divided the supreme authority, assuming the naval command of the combined fleets, as the Spartans did the military of the land armies.

WHILST a concurrence of circumstances favoured the Athenian ambition, Lacedæmon, by a fresh instance of imprudence, accelerated her own declension. Pausanias had been entrusted with the command of the army in Asia, and that general, whose integrity was corrupted by the gold of Persia, behaved with equal severity to his own troops, as tenderness to those of the enemy; a general mutiny ensued, and complaints were lodged against him. The Lacedæmonians, judging it necessary, that the greater the struggle for relaxation from military discipline was, the more strictly it ought to

be observed, rejecting their petition for redress. This manner of treating the soldiers appeared to great disadvantage, when compared with the Athenian administration, where Eristides and Cimon had the principal weight; who, by the rectitude and generosity of their conduct, rendered the government respectable. The Grecian troops, excepting those of Peloponnesus, implored the assistance of Athens against the oppression of Pausanias, and entered into a voluntary association, to serve only under the banner of that republick.

I have confined myself to speak of the depression of Sparta, but it is evident, that the very attempt to subvert the established form of government in Greece, was a symptom of its approaching dissolution. Sudden and unexpected revolutions in states are always attended with intemperate disorders; the laws, manners, customs, and interests of a people are at variance; nor was it possible for Greece to avoid receiving some shocks in her political constitution, still
more

more severely felt, as her cities became more independent. Supposing Athens, at this period, to have been even better calculated than her *rival*, for pre-eminence of station, the Greeks and the colonies were nevertheless guilty of an egregious mistake in drawing her from the secondary rank she had always been considered in! ought they not to have foreseen the impossibility that Lacedæmon (irrevocably attached to the ancient system, and whose military reputation had been lately augmented) should submit to be no longer regarded as the capital of Greece; Surely her pride was an insurmountable obstacle! Yet Athens, inflated with success, devoured by ambition, grasping at power, fond of hazardous enterprizes, tired of advantages in possession, and hunting after such as were unattainable, Athens, I say, invested with supreme authority by her allies, ought indefatigably to have pursued those measures that tended to the stability and security of this new born influence. A rupture between the two principal states was inevitably to involve Greece in all her former distresses.

WAS

Was it not to be dreaded, in a contest instigated by ambition, that, which ever side proved victorious, their country would find an oppressor? and that the colonies must be exposed, by the discord that raged in the mother country, to arbitrary impositions from the Persians? [a] The original texture of the Grecian government was so strongly wrought, as to produce in the minds of the Spartans and Athenians (notwithstanding their interests were become separate) a variety of efforts to avoid the appearance of hostilities, which the circumstances of the times, darkened with suspicion, necessarily rendered inevitable. They confined their measures to the secret interruption of each others tranquillity, ashamed openly to confess the want of that boasted unanimity so long held up as an example to other cities. These two republicks commonly

[a] In a treaty made by the Athenians with the Persian monarch, the latter agreed that the Greek cities of Asia Minor should continue to be governed by their own laws. After Sparta entered into a war with Athens, she invited the Persians into an alliance, and resigned the colonies to their discretion.

monly stiled themselves the feet, arms, and eyes of Greece; expressions which so thoroughly imposed on the minds of the citizens, that they concluded, should any disaster befall either, Greece must be instantly reduced to a state of inactive blindness.

SPARTA had weighty reasons to have engaged her to suppress the first emotions of jealousy. She was too weak to subdue a power supported by the rest of Greece, under the conduct of men whose extraordinary talents had planned the Persian war, and whose success had increased the public confidence and courage. Her former influence was only to be regained by the steps that originally created it; that is to say, by perseverance in her accustomed moderation: whilst Athens, debauched by prosperity, might quickly have furnished a favourable opportunity of conquest.

THE real source of grandeur in a government, arises from the wisdom of cementing a firm union amongst the citizens; inspiring them

them with reverence for the laws; instructing each individual, to seek his particular interest in that of the publick, and by an emulation of the virtues of his countrymen, display his own talents to advantage! whilst he finds in himself the source of that æquanimity necessary to support the sunshine of *Fortune* undazzled, or, by a manly resistance, is enabled to rise superior to her caprices. The model of the Athenian government was far beneath this scale of perfection. If the tyranny of Pisistratus, and the terrour of the Persian arms had improved their virtues, prosperity had likewise engendered new vices. An absolute democracy is the worst of all institutions; and this was the established mode of government in Athens. It was impossible for the republick to draw any advantage from magistrates, who had no regular juridical code to direct them, whilst the populace, open to deception and bribery, had a power vested in them, of revising every decree, and frequently gave opposite decisions! Solon could never, consistently with reason, flatter himself with regulating the conduct of his countrymen, by determine

minate maxims; because he had appointed a senate to [b] prepare such matters as were proper to lay before the assembly of the people. He destroyed his own purpose by giving permission to every citizen of the age of fifty to harangue them. Eloquence will ever form a party superior to that of magistracy;

[b] Athens was divided by Solon into four tribes; each of whom chose a hundred citizens, who composed the senate. The number of inhabitants being greatly increased, Clisthenes divided them into ten tribes, each of which selected fifty, who formed the senate. These senators had the precedency in the senate for 35 or 36 days. They drew lots for their rank; those tribes who had the four highest numbers governed affairs during 36 days, the others only 35. This term was called the *Prytanie*, the presiding senators, the *Prytanes*, and the senate itself, the *Prytanæum*. The publick assembly of the people was held in a place called *Pnyce*, or the Theatre of Bacchus. The ordinary days of meeting were the 11, 20, 30, and 33d of every *Prytanie*. As there could be no fixed days for extraordinary meetings, the people were then convened by the general or magistrates. Some days before, bills were posted, to inform them of the subject of deliberation. The assemblies were opened by the *Prædies*, who declared the question in debate, and the sentiments of the senate.

stracy; and, by a transition familiar to his art, the orator could divert the imaginations of his audience to distant objects, and dictate decrees to which the senate was obliged to submit. The council of Areopagus, restored by Solon to its ancient rights, exercised the useless privilege of *Censor* in such a republic! How impracticable to regulate the manners of a people, accustomed, through a defect in the legislature, to indulge a spirit of licentiousness, which properly formed the principles of that character, and rendered them incapable of controul. From hence arose those vicissitudes of virtues and vices among the Athenians, at different periods, and even in so eminent a degree, as necessarily to exclude their opposites. This nation, reproached with flagrant instances of iniquity, is sometimes just as Aristides. Elevated to the sublime views of Themistocles, we see it, afterwards, the dupe of the intriguing Pericles. Behold it brave with Cimon, timid with Nicias, insolent with Cleon, rash with Alcibiades!

THE factions that formerly interrupted
the

the repose of Athens, were not of a nature to remain long inactive. A law of Aristides, that permitted every citizen to aspire to the senatorial dignity, inspired the populace with an immoderate degree of pride, that continually stimulated them to shake off the yoke of the nobles, who, on their side, being accustomed to govern ever since the banishment of Pisistratus, regarded possession as the legitimate and incontestable right of their order. If an expectation of seeing the Athenians soon immersed in their darling vices tempered the jealousy of Lacedæmon, the disorders which threatened her rival, ought to have been, on the contrary, a very urgent motive to impel her to a speedy rupture. It was the interest of the Athenians to rush into a war, to prevent having two such formidable enemies to encounter, as the Spartans, and depravity of manners.

INDEPENDENTLY of these considerations, which their native haughtiness would not suffer them to perceive, they ought to have been

been sensible that the only method to give permanence to their newly-acquired greatness, was by augmentation. That the authority they claimed could never be solidly established, till Sparta was reduced to the necessity of renouncing her pretensions, and burying in oblivion the remembrance of her ancient glory.

IN a conjuncture so critical, if the Athenians failed of success, it was not for want of a leader equal to the enterprize. Never statesman was better qualified for unravelling the subtlest distinctions of political interests than Themistocles; nor more excelled in a wonderful facility of discerning the consequences of events. Had he even wanted penetration, his inveterate hatred to the Lacedemonians would have supplied that deficiency. But the seeds of corruption began to be apparent amongst the Athenians. Misapprehending the real cause of its prosperity, this republick expected to be gorged with flattery, not instructed with counsel; and Themistocles had a soul too elevated to condescend

descend to play the artful courtier, with a capricious multitude. A contrast was drawn between the rigid reserve of his behaviour, and the pleasing and popular manner of Cimon: the profusion of the latter, made the œconomy of the former pass for sordid avarice. In a word, the Athenians abandoned Themistocles, whose merit was, that he had saved the republick, to attach themselves to Cimon, who had revenged her quarrel with the Persians. In order to conceal, or rather justify this ingratitude, they listened to the malicious suggestions of his enemies, feigned apprehensions from his vengeance, and condemned him to banishment.

In Cimon were collected all the virtues of a good citizen, with the more uncommon, and most desirable talents of a great general. Active, vigilant, indefatigable, he enjoyed the singular honour of triumphing, on the same day, by sea and land. But, notwithstanding the authority of Plutarch, whose judgment in this point is fallible, I will venture to affirm, he wanted
many

many requisite qualifications to place him on a level with Themistocles, in political science. If the relief of the colonies from foreign garrisons was a rational scheme, Cimon gave no proof of sagacity in being so far misled by popular prejudices, as to consider the Persians as the most dangerous enemy Athens had to fear. Perhaps unconvinced himself of the propriety of such an opinion, he resolved to carry the war into Asia, as the certain means of procuring the Athenians a considerable booty, and his own aims an easily-acquired reputation.

YET, supposing there was no imprudence in irritating, to the last degree, a power, only weak from the indolence of monarchs, whose timidity checked the exertion of her natural strength, it was at least a step that could be productive of no advantages! Of what avail to pursue through Asia and Egypt, the common enemy of Greece, inattentive to a private adversary, ready to enter their gates? or of what importance to Athens were victories, which could not augment her power on either element; and which

which, by bestowing too great a degree of security on her new allies, would consequently render an alliance with her less necessary?

THE administration of Cimon appears extremely defective in many particulars. If he thought the quarrel between Athens and Sparta irreconcilable, and that all efforts to prevent its becoming publick would be ineffectual, why did he omit taking advantage of so favourable an opportunity to humble the Lacedemonians? instead of turning the resentment of the people towards Persia, and spurring them on to an inconsiderate enterprize, the first step he ought to have taken, in assuming the direction of publick affairs, was to cherish their rising indignation against Sparta, and against Pausanias. Laconia had been depopulated of more than twenty thousand persons by an earthquake; Cimon made no use of that event! The Helotes, at the instigation of the Messenians, had revolted; Cimon was still silent, whilst the orator, Ephialtes, harangued the people, to suffer Lacedæmon to
perish!

perish! A more steady and skilful politician would have pointed out the necessity of encouraging and assisting these rebellious slaves; nor would have wanted arguments to set their rebellion in the fairest point of view, by representing the Spartans as tyrannical monsters, who trampled on the laws of social humanity; and in whose extirpation mankind ought to associate! But Cimon, far from discerning the interest of his country, avowed himself the protector of the Lacedæmonians, whose virtues he admired and respected. He prevailed with his countrymen to [c] support them; and to pardon the injustice with which their zeal had been repaid, in suspecting them of clandestinely abetting the insurrection.

IF

[c] The Helotes were a people of Peloponnesus, whom the Lacedæmonians had vanquished, and made their slaves. In all writers, details are to be found of the cruelties exercised on this unfortunate race. Their masters regarded them as their most inveterate enemies, and when they multiplied too fast, a certain number were exterminated. Plutarch observes, it was not long after the time of Lycurgus that the Spartans began to treat their slaves with this excess of inhumanity.

If, on the other side, this general apprehended it not impracticable to restore the ancient amity of the two republicks, and extinguish their present animosities, by appropriating to one the sovereign command at sea, to the other at land, why did he not act correspondently to this apprehension? It seems evident, his genius was contracted; he proceeded, as supposing the interest of his country had suffered no alteration; a conduct that will ever make him be regarded as a man driven along by the gale of popularity, who made war like a great soldier, but a moderate politician. Cimon would, on some occasions, venture to expostulate with great freedom, in opposition to the opinion of the people; and as he was frequently absent on publick business, his enemies made use of those opportunities to sap his reputation. Secretly attached to the nobility, whose pretensions he favoured he endeavoured at the reestablishment of their influence; and neglected nothing that could contribute to support the dignity of the magistrates. Whilst Pericles, perhaps still more an enemy to democracy, flattered the

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multitude

multitude into suspicions of a man, to whose fall he was to be indebted for his own elevation. Capable of assuming sentiments the most foreign to his heart, of comprehending at the same instant a multiplicity of objects, and of combining them with the most accurate precision, his exquisite propriety of understanding always directed him to a choice of the most infallible means for the attainment of his end. A great captain, a great statesman, and a still greater orator; Athens had never yet beheld a citizen, in whom such an assemblage of talents were united; but all these accomplishments, subservient to ambition, proved fatal to his country.

It had not escaped the observation of Pericles, that inconsistency of conduct in his predecessors in power laid the foundation of their destruction. The same men at different periods were disinterested, resolute, avaricious and timid. Far from pursuing their example of being partially virtuous, or vitious, sometimes agitated with zeal for the publick,

publick, at others for their private emolument, now irritating the populace, then fervilely courting their applause, Pericles made it an invariable maxim to sacrifice every thing to his ambition.

IN order to render the prodigality of Cimon less striking in the eyes of the multitude, expence was necessary: and, as the fortune of Pericles was then not above mediocrity, he saw the necessity of availing himself of the riches of the state. He lavished donations on the populace, to enable them to be present at the publick assemblies, as well as theatrical representations. Possessed with the frenzy of political knowledge, their curiosity to hear the pleadings of the orators, only gave place to their passion for the theatre. Eager to decide, where individuals were concerned, and to hear all that passed in the tribunals of justice, they left Pericles an unbounded authority in the general administration of affairs.

This master of the affections of the people was too skilful to rely upon the stability of

their favour, on any other terms than invincible complaisance to their caprices. He became the very soul of the republick. He held the great in subjection, by throwing the council of Areopagus, and the rest of the magistrates, into contempt; deciding every question according to his will. Yet, however persuasive his eloquence, a reverse of fortune might invalidate all the flourishes of the rhetorician, shake the very foundation of Athens to its centre, and, in awakening her from a state of lethargic intoxication, prove the destruction of her idol. Pericles saw the danger, and displayed the superiority of his genius in never embarking the republick in any enterprize, without an apparent certainty of success. On these principles, it was impossible for him to repair the mistake I have pointed out in Cimon. So far was he from meditating an attack on Lacedæmon, that he beheld with vexation the encrease of that jealousy of the Athenian glory, which was but too apparent. His apprehensions were alarmed, lest the Spartans, seconded by their Peloponnesian auxiliaries, should

should come to an open rupture; when the distinction of commander in chief against a people hitherto deemed invincible, would be attended with greater embarrassment and fatigue than he was able to encounter. The only resource left was, to introduce corruption in Lacedæmon. To accomplish this, he maintained pensionaries, [d] who, under the mask of extolling the moderation of their ancestors, the laws of Lycurgus, and the love of their country, declaimed against the calamities of war, the better to secure a continuation of pacific measures. But peace itself became a new inconvenience. The Persian war began to be considered as unfashionable; this was a real evil, as it gratified at once the compound taste of the Athenians, for glory and magnificence, by assuring them an easy conquest, with

[d] Pericles distributed ten talents annually amongst the principal Lacedæmonians. See *Plutarch*. A talent weighed sixty pounds, Troy weight, about ninety marks of French money, or 2062*l.* sterling. See *Arbutnot*. When we know the value of a mark of silver, it is easy to make the computation.

with a considerable booty. The danger also was great, of suffering them to sink into too great inactivity. To decide critically on the merit of a theatrical piece, a picture, statue, or edifice. were insufficient employments to occupy their minds. The Athenians must have enemies, armies, campaigns, and victories, or their native restlessness, excited by political cabals, then warmly renewed, would soon have rendered the task of guiding them too difficult for the art of man to accomplish.

FORTUNATELY for Pericles, the allies were not equally satisfied with his administration. They had no objections to the luxury or pleasures in which the republick was immerfed, but they thought it unreasonable to pay the expence of feasts and publick shews; and that Pericles should levy more than six hundred talents, by way of contribution, to procure his citizens frivolous amusements, when Cimon was contented with sixty to carry on a foreign war. The perfidy of Pericles reduced to despair a people, whose weakness made resistance
their

ON THE GREEKS. 91

their inevitable ruin. Besides their being entirely unconnected with each other, so that it was impossible for them to act in concert, the colonies were void of ambition; they were satisfied with the restoration of liberty, and had obtained of Cimon an exemption from farther assistance, than furnishing ships and money, to support the war commenced with Persia, on their account. Accustomed, by this indulgence, to the tranquillity of a life of leisure, they became ignorant of martial exercises; and, according to the judicious observation of Thucydides, finding themselves exhausted by the taxation to which they had submitted, they were no longer capable of opposing the will of Athens, whenever it was her choice to treat them rather as subjects than allies. By representing the murmurs of these unfortunate men as an insufferable offence, tending to destroy all kind of subordination, Pericles easily rendered them odious to the Athenians, whom he persuaded to engage in a war that must necessarily advance his own reputation, from the certainty of uninterrupted success;

whilst the republick, pleased with gaining battles and taking cities, no matter at what price, was too ignorant of her real interest to discern, that advantages over allies were indications of an approaching decline; and that a revolt of her colonies would lead Athens back to the same point of imbecility, in which she appeared at the commencement of the Asiatic war.

The political influence of Pericles still appeared immutable, notwithstanding the declension of that of Athens; but the customary time to account for the disposal of the publick money arrived. This was a delicate affair to transact. Not that Pericles had enriched himself at the expence of the state; yet, either from his own negligence, or the dishonesty of the subaltern officers of the treasury, who acted under his commission, a very considerable sum remained unaccounted for. He was also unwilling the Athenians should be acquainted with the exhausted state of their finances, as such a discovery was evidently to decry the prodigality of expence in feasts, sports, and theatrical representations;

presentations; and a tacit confession, that the final tendency of these amusements was the ruin of the republick and her allies. The well [e] known witty reply of Alcibiades, in this extremity, served for counsel to Pericles. Instead of thinking how to make a plausible estimate of his disbursements, his sole study was, how he should avoid making any at all. To accomplish his purpose, it became necessary to transfer the attention of the Athenians, from domestic concerns, to some important foreign enterprize. Not one of the colonies had courage to appear in arms. Intimidated as they were by the severity of their bondage, they confined their resentment within their own breasts till some favourable opportunity should give it vent. Pericles was tardy in remittances to his Laconian pensionnaires; F 5 who,

[e] Alcibiades, wanting to speak with Pericles, knocked at his door, and, requesting an audience, was answered, he could not be interrupted; being busied in considering how to prepare his accounts, for the inspection of the Athenians. Would it not be more judicious, said Alcibiades withdrawing, for him to consider how to prevent their inspecting them at all? (*Plutarch's life of Alcibiades.*)

who, instead of revenging his omission, by expitiating still more largely on the blessings of peace, injudiciously gave up the argument. From that moment the republick of Lacedæmon, having no longer any impediment to the indulgence of her natural inclination, embittered by the complaints of her allies, passed a decree, by which she agreed to take Corinth, Potidea, Ægina, and Megæra under her protection.

PERICLES, to whom every thing succeeded according to his wishes, took advantage of this alliance, to irritate the pride of his countrymen. “ The controvertible point
 “ is not, said he, whether we ought to pay
 “ a shameful complaisance to the will of
 “ Lacedæmon, in her injunction to abandon Potidea, to enfranchise Ægina, to
 “ revoke our decree against Megæra! Our
 “ own moderation might have instructed us
 “ to steer between lenity and justice: but
 “ when Lacedæmon presumes to command,
 “ resistance is the part of Athens! If, influenced by the threat of an invasion, you
 yielded

“ yielded to the opinion of the Spartans,
 “ pusillanimity would be deemed the only
 “ motive. A succession of new demands
 “ would, at length, either force you to
 “ refuse compliance, or submit to abject
 “ slavery! To day, by a vigorous exertion
 “ of publick spirit, you may remove the im-
 “ pending danger, impose laws on your
 “ allies, and give an everlasting example to
 “ Lacedæmon, that overbearing intolence
 “ can never be crowned with success. To-
 “ morrow, perhaps may be a day too-
 “ late.”

The affairs of the Athenians, however re-
 duced, were not yet in a situation so despe-
 rate as to render it impossible for Pericles to
 have formed a plan of action capable not
 only of aggrandizing, but of confirming
 their power at the expence of their rival.
 Pericles possessed talents adequate to the
 undertaking, but, ever attentive to the
 selfish advantage of governing, or rather
 enslaving his countrymen, he was fearful lest
 an enlarged, and extensive plan of operati-
 ons should terminate in the contraction of

his private views. He was apprehensive, that if the Athenians should turn the whole weight of their arms against Sparta, with a resolution to exterminate her; as a people, it would render the enterprize hazardous and bloody; nor could he decline the post of commander in chief without forfeiting his honour and reputation. On the contrary, in proposing to the Athenians an indeterminate and defensive war, bounding all military exploits to the pillage of Laconia, he was left entirely at liberty to regulate his conduct by circumstances, to retreat or advance, varying his machinations with the turn of events, and constantly acting the part most adapted to his particular advantage.

BUT, if the misguided Athenians commenced hostilities, by seeing objects through a false medium, the Lacedemonians, on their side, were equally ignorant of their real interest. They seemed to imitate the example of their adversary, in bestowing all their attention on the circumstance which served as a pretext for a rupture; regarding *that* as the sole cause, and ultimate end of war

war. One could scarce have believed them actuated by ambition, so remote were their thoughts from the proper object of its pursuit.

Since jealousy of the Athenian glory, and desire of recovering their ancient superiority in Greece, were the motives that armed the Lacedemonians, it was necessary they should reduce the Athenians to their original standard, or rather below it. The most probable means to effect this, was granting freedom to the tributary nations, availing themselves of the discontent of the allies, to win them over to their party; and, by the general tenour of their proceedings, to have inspired the rest of Greece with a boundless and unreserved confidence. Sparta, however, acted on principles diametrically opposite. She solicited the friendship of Persia, and sacrificed to that court the Asiatic colonies. She even granted her protection with reluctance to those cities who waited for her assistance to shake off the Athenian yoke; and instead of treating with gentleness such allies of her competitor as remained faithful

faithful to their first engagements, she equally extended her severity to all.

HAD the Athenians comprehended their true interest, they would have been satisfied with a marine force, powerful enough to intimidate their allies, and secure the publick revenues. Very far from exhausting their strength in the useless augmentation of a naval armament, they would have applied with diligence to increase the number of their land forces. No advantages could accrue from building fleets to awe Peloponnesus: this could only injure the allies of Lacedæmon; whereas the reduction of that republick was the great point in which all military preparations ought to have centred.

HISTORY transmits to us few wars conducted with a less degree of intelligence than that of Peloponnesus. The two principal powers seem so equally blind to the main purpose, that all their movements are rather deviations from it. Whilst Archidamus attacks the Platæans, and falls on Acarnania, the Athenians make an irruption
into,

into Calcidæ and Bœtiæ! Does an ally revolt? the attention of both parties is turned immediately on that side! Sometimes the theatre of action is in the isles of Lesbos, or Corcyra, in the territories of the Megareans, instantly it is transported to Ætolia, Bœotia, or Thrace! Thus by a division of their forces, both republicks were rendered incapable of coming to a decisive engagement. Fortunate and unsuccessful by turns, their losses and advantages were so equally balanced that Athens and Lacedæmon, after fruitlessly exhausting and enfeebling each other, were less in a state of imposing laws, and more remote from attaining the main object of their ambition.

THE war had now continued ten years; whilst both republicks suffered greater injury from the mistaken system pursued by their own citizens, than from the devastations of the enemy; when, still more inveterate in resentment, as debilitated in strength, necessity obliged them to sign an amicable treaty for themselves, and animosity instigated them

them to a prosecution of the war by their allies.

NOTWITHSTANDING that neither Cimon nor Pericles, in their ministerial capacity, had conducted the Athenians in the path most conducive to the glory of their country, yet the one, whose views always tended towards utility, had not degraded its consequence; and the other preserved its reputation by the happy success of his enterprizes, however detrimental to the welfare of the state such enterprizes might be, whose false splendour imposed on persons guided only by appearances. But after the death of Pericles, who banished merit from his presence, and employed only such persons in the administration as were incapable of exciting his jealousy, Athens of course became a prey to a set of men whose ambition was of the most groveling species. Deficient in talents, knowledge, integrity of heart, and elevation of sentiment, they believed a blind servility to the will of the multitude the only requisite qualification in the leader of a republick.

THE

THE Athenians who regarded [*f*] *Ostracism* as the security of that liberty restored by the exile of the Pisistradae, must have continued under the influence of their most obscure and despicable citizens, had not several of their institutions, calculated to inspire a taste for glory and patriotism, awakened the ardour of emulation in men of talents; and

[*f*] *Ostracism*, practised before in several states of Greece, owed its origin in Athens to the banishment of the Pisistradae. It consisted in a decree of exile for ten years; unattended with disgrace, as such citizens were, alone, its objects, whose eminent merit and services rendered him too formidable in a republican government. The people assembled on these occasions to pass sentence; and each citizen wrote upon a *shell* the name of him he believed most capable of circumventing publick liberty; and if the suffrages amounted to six thousand, he was banished. *Petalism* (banishment for five years) a similar custom in Syracuses, occasioned the most virtuous citizens to act with timidity. Those whose purity of manners and enlargement of understanding recommended as proper to reside at the helm, withdrew from the hazardous elevation, to the security of private life. So that the direction of publick affairs devolved on the most contemptible persons. Aristotle says, that *Ostracism* was the guard of liberty, but wishes it might owe its preservation to some other method.

and even conquered that [g] indolence, the result of retirement, which the fear of banishment from an ungrateful republick, had plunged them into. As political knowledge was necessary to render a man respectable in Athens, it was also necessary for him to erase the idea of *Ostracism* in some degree from his remembrance. During the administration of Pericles, the republick had imbibed so passionate a degree of fondness for philosophy and the fine arts, as induced it to bestow equal esteem and consideration on their professors, as on magistrates and generals. This was an inducement to men of sense to pursue the less dangerous paths of glory, now opened to their view, and pre-eminence in sciences and arts began to incite the

[g] We read in Plutarch, that the father of Themistocles, observing with concern that the son aspired to the highest employments in the state, in order to moderate that propensity, led him to the sea shore; and pointing to the disabled galleys of the republick, which were rotting in the docks, compared them to statesmen grown old in the service of their country, who are always neglected when no longer of use.

the ambition of men of the most excellent political talents.

THIS, or some other cause, occasioned such a dearth of political merit in Athens, at the death of Pericles, that Cleon, a man mentioned by all historians with the utmost contempt, assumed a predominant influence over his competitors. Fortune endows all men of intrigue with confidence. To accomplish the violent removal, or ruin of an adversary, they indiscriminately employ knavery, calumny, with the residue of those detestably mean artifices, which must ever terminate in the destruction of those who have recourse to their assistance. The people, distracted by faction and cabal, dreaded that culpable indolence which gives up every thing to the citizens who engaged their esteem. They distrusted every one; were constantly on their guard; struggled for freedom; and experienced all those tumultuous agitations which are destructive to the constitution of a state.

THE prevalence of Cleon, and his rash
system

system of politicks; had led the Athenians to the brink of ruin, when the principal citizens, of whom, to conciliate favour with the multitude, he was the declared enemy, raised him up a competitor; but had nothing better to oppose than Nicias, whose excessive timidity made him tremble at the public nomination. One may imagine, from this circumstance, how ill calculated he was for the part allotted him to act. He was not deficient in good qualities, was generous, and eloquent; but, by an unaccountable pusillanimous diffidence in his own abilities, he wanted resolution to appear publickly virtuous. Cleon, with his noisy insolence, silenced the modest virtues of Nicias. The people excused the rapaciousness of the one, and could not distinguish the disinterestedness of the other. A brave soldier, but an irresolute commander, every enterprize appeared impracticable to Nicias. Whenever procrastination suffered him to act, the favourable moment for action was already past. Involved in doubts and deliberations, scarce has he made an effort of decision, when a more advantageous idea starts up
which.

which his imagination pursues, and quickly abandons for some new chimæra. Cleon, on the contrary, was insensible to difficulties. Whether an enterprize were rash or prudent, a measure rational or absurd, was just the same to Cleon. At length the Athenians, perplexed and divided between the inactive talents and virtues of the one, and the undaunted folly and impudence of the other, either wanted courage to come to any determination, or made choice of the worst measures that were offered.

ALCIBIADES now began to appear on the theatre of publick affairs. He was not a man of ambition, but of vanity; which he indulged in making himself the principal object of discourse and admiration in Athens. His courage eloquence and every circumstance of his behaviour were embellished with peculiar graces. Devoted to the voluptuousness of love, and the excesses of the table; conscious of his superior powers of pleasing, and a certain insinuating ductility of manners, which seldom fails to ruin the possessor, he, now, seemed to engage in politicks,

politicks; only as a relaxation from pleasure. His genius was admirable, but the springs of action in his soul, having lost their force, were incapable of unremitting attention. He could be great only by starts. I find it difficult to believe, that a character so flexible and pliant as that of Alcibiades, who assumed the manners of every country, in Sparta ruggedly and severely virtuous, in Ionia refined and delicate as a native, who could give examples of rusticity in Thrace, and in Asia be envied by the Satrapes, for his luxurious elegance, ever was intended by nature for a *great man*. Notwithstanding his being the pupil of Socrates, he was little disposed to consider good and evil in in any other lights than as conducive to his personal interest. The saying of Timon, the misanthrope, is well known: "Courage, my dear friend, said he, shaking Alcibiades by the hand, I am obliged to thee for acquiring so much reputation. Be but once the idol of the people, and thou wilt do me justice on the absurd Athenians."

IN

In the fact, the ruin of a state cannot be far off when a man of this character is intrusted with supreme command. The graces give sanction to a depravity of manners that draws after it a stagnation of legislative authority: Agreeable talents alone are honoured and encouraged, and the government, destitute of principles, becomes the sport of caprice.

Guided by such *rulers*, the courage of the Athenians grew torpid, and seemed absolutely sinking under the war with Laconia; when, seized with a kind of frenzy, they unexpectedly made a vigorous exertion of strength, and collected a formidable force for the invasion of Sicily. That island had long been a flattering object to their ambition; and Pericles, with all his persuasive powers, could scarcely restrain their impetuosity. The complaints of the Leontines, and Aegestians, against Syracuse, roused these subsiding ideas. Already they enjoyed, by anticipation, the reduction of Sicily which was regarded as a military fortress,

treas, or arsenal, from whence they might extend their empire over Italy, and Africa itself. The plan concerted, as Thucydides tells us in the speech of Alcibiades, was to fall upon Peloponnesus with the additional forces of this subdued kingdom. But what ignorance in the Athenians, to imagine that distant territories ever produce an accession of wealth equivalent to the expence of maintaining them! Could they be insensible of the unequal proportion of strength between the republick of Athens and the kingdom of Sicily? Suppose even that the terror of their arms had thrown the Syracusans into a sudden panic, and facilitated their defeat, authority attained by violence could never have acquired a firm establishment! Sicily must soon have discovered the weakness of the conqueror, and confidence succeeding to despondency must soon have occasioned a revolt! What infatuation, not to discern that an attempt of this nature would only irritate the Lacedemonians, and, at the same time, be regarded by them as a material advantage! Was it not evident that a separation of its forces exposed Athens to the hazard

hazard of repulses, both in Sicily and Peloponnesus? In a word, since that republick could assemble an army strong enough to besiege a city so considerable as Syracuse, would it not have been more eligible to attack the capital of Sparta; and then, crowned with success, have turned the combined armies of Greece against a foreign power, rather than to avail itself of foreign assistance in attempting the conquest of Greece?

In proportion to the absurdity of the enterprize, the measures pursued were extravagant. Percedent to the departure of the fleet, the Athenians gave instructions to their commanders, that when they had made themselves masters of Syracuse, and Selinuntum, they were to sell the inhabitants, and levy contributions on the other cities of Sicily. This was, by reducing them to a state of desperation, to invite the Saracusi-ans and Selinuntines to defend their liberties to the last extremity; and to render them *invisible*, should any possible means of resistance exist. It was to alienate the hearts

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of

of the rest of the inhabitants, and cut off all expectations of assistance, by convincing them their own interest and that of those two cities were inseparable.

As Athens could no longer boast of a Themistocles, whose perspicacious sagacity might have struck out some latent means of repairing the folly of a war commenced under evil auspices, there could be no probability of success, but from leaving the conduct of it to Alcibiades, whose genius and intrepidity were calculated to give birth to romantic events; to those strange, unexpected turns of fortune that sometimes confound reason, and change the very nature of things. But scarcely was he landed on the coast of Sicily than his enemies conspired his destruction; and, by securing religion and the priests in their interest, contrived to have Alcibiades recalled, to answer a criminal process before the people. Nicias, who had considered the war as a species of delirium in his fellow citizens, shared the command of the army with Lamachus, an enterprizing soldier,

soldier, who thought courage and perseverance ensured success. With him, the most favourable situation for attacking an enemy, was always that wherein he found himself. This *general* being slain, Nicias found his apprehensions encrease with his honours. Whilst he opposed the ardent impetuosity of his colleague with calm deliberation, he was obliged to have an opinion; but his incertitude returned the moment he was left alone in the military command. He wrote to Athens for re-enforcements, and new coadjutors; and in expectation of their arrival, he remained inactive, meditating an honourable retreat. Demosthenes and Eurymedon were appointed his associates: men whose dissimilitude of character rendered it so impossible for them to think or act in conjunction, as must alone have overturned the most practicable and best concerted operations.

WHOEVER recollects the considerable losses sustained by the Athenians in Sicily, will easily comprehend the impossibility of restoring their republic to its original splendour.

splendour. Its finances were totally exhausted; its navy so reduced as to render the difficulty of being supplied with the necessaries of life by sea very urgent; whilst the fields of Attica lay uncultivated. For the Lacedemonians, pursuant to the advice of Alcibiades, who had taken refuge among them, fortified Décelia, from whence they ravaged the country with impunity. No longer in a state to impose laws on her allies, Athens every day experienced fresh instances of defection: whilst Lacedæmon, on the contrary, gained additional vigour from the alliance of cities disgusted with the haughtiness of her rival. Revenge induced the Syracusians to furnish a numerous fleet, that vested in the Spartans the empire of the sea; and the ambassadors of Tisaphernes, a Persian Satrape, governor of the maritime provinces in Asia, offered assistance, and solicited them to endeavour the total extirpation of the Athenians.

THE fate of this people might probably have been decided, had the Spartans attacked

ed the Pyræum. " An impression there, " says Thucydides, would have augmented " the confusion that reigned in the govern- " ment; the Athenians would have sunk " under their timidity, without coming to " any resolution; and their dominion would " infallibly have been circumscribed within " the limits of their walls. But, continues " the historian, this is not the first time that " the circumspection, natural to the Lace- " demonians, has occasioned their losing " apparent advantages." In reality, no circumstance could appear decisive to a people who never had had any fixed object in view during the course of the war! An accumulation of strength was, to Sparta, an accumulation of perplexity.

Her superiority was, however, of short duration. Syracuse was necessitated to recall her troops to defend her against the Carthaginians; and Alcibiades, who found himself treated with contempt from the time his country declined in reputation, to avoid being crushed in the impending ruin, resolved to enlighten Tissaphernes in regard to

the real interest of Persia. He made him sensible that, far from desiring to terminate the war that depopulated Greece, or lending the Spartans assistance against the Athenians, he ought to hold the two republicks in equilibrium. That, by computing their respective advantages, destroying the one by the other, and fomenting their rooted emulation, he might lay them equally under the necessity of flying to the Persian monarch for protection, who consequently would become the mediator, or rather arbiter of Greece.

THE return of Alcibiades to Athens, at this critical juncture, seemed to revive its former courage. That general gained an advantage over the Lacedemonians considerable enough to induce them to sue for peace. Both republicks had felt all the evils of war, whilst neither could boast the smallest advantage from it. Fallen as Athens was, one would imagine every spark of ambition that incited the jealousy of Sparta should have been extinguished. Yet some essential articles in the treaty met with insurmountable

mountable opposition; and Athens had very soon reason to repent having rejected the advantageous conditions offered by her rival. Alcibiades, it is true, was victorious in the field, but the brilliancy of his enterprizes shed a lustre on the conduct of the general, without contributing, in the smallest degree, to the good of the publick. Besides, the inconsiderate behaviour of Alcibiades always furnished his opponents with arms to subdue him. He was a second time disgraced, precisely at the moment when Persia renounced the politicks adopted by Tissaphernes, and declared openly in favour of the Peloponnesians. [b]

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[b] Cyrus, distinguished in history by the appellation of Cyrus the Younger, had been appointed governor of Asia-Minor by his brother Artaxerxes Mnemon. The ambition of this prince was unbounded; and, desirous to execute a long meditated scheme of usurping the throne, he contracted a strict league of amity with the Greeks, particularly those of Peloponnesus. His design was to gain them to his interest; judging, with reason, that his scheme could never succeed, unless he united a body of Greeks with his provincial forces. With this view he supplied Lacedæmon with a considerable naval armament.

A war conducted by corrupt commanders who betrayed the interests of their country, or by men of shallow intellects incapable of discerning it, seemed likely to terminate in the total ruin of Greece, when Lysander appeared at the head of the Lacedemonians. The face of affairs soon wore a different aspect, under an ambitious *chief*, whose genius, disengaged from the maxims and prejudices of the times, opened itself an untried road to glory, and traced a plan of action whose importance his republic had hitherto been unacquainted with.

DESPOILED of that pre-eminence so long enjoyed, embittered by a tedious war, solicited at once by the Greeks and Asiatics to pursue the destruction of Athens, the Spartans still retained their original principle of moderation; an evident proof of the wisdom of Lycurgus's institutions. [i] As if they

[i] If I am not mistaken, this observation is a sufficient reply to the reproaches thrown out against Lycurgus, both by Polybius and Aristotle. The latter accuses that legislator of frustrating his own intentions, by making moderation the basis of a military republic.

they were persuaded that by mortifying the insolence of their rival, she would be reduced to fall voluntarily into her subaltern rank in the political scale, they seemed satisfied with her depression. But Lyfander taught them to comprehend, that after so long and obstinate a war, there remained one only prudent, secure, and vigorous part to act. That a peace, whatever were its terms, ought always to be considered as precarious in its duration, whilst the Athenians had the least hope left to reinstate themselves. That Sparta ought to avail herself of her present superiority in the termination of a quarrel which might, otherwise, break out with fresh ardour, when the circumstances of affairs were less favourable. Lyfander regarded every victory as a nearer step to the ruin of Athens. Every advantage gained over the remains of her maritime force, was with a view of blocking up the harbour by

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sea,

lick. The former blames him for suffering the Spartans to aspire to the conquest of Grece. Surely these writers must have been inattentive to one circumstance; *viz.* that six hundred years had intervened between Lycurgus and Lyfander.

sea, to facilitate the movements of Agis and Pausanias, who conducted the siege by land. The moment, fatal to Athens, arrived. Reduced to the last extremity, she supplicated for peace—agreed to demolish her fortifications, and the walls of the Pyræum. She emancipated the tributary cities; recalled her exiled citizens; delivered up all her galleys, except twelve; and engaged not to enter into any war but as subordinate to Lacedæmon. Lyfander gave the mortal wound to the glory of the republick by subverting its political constitution. He put a period to democracy, and vested the supreme authority in thirty citizens.

No impediment longer remained to the re-establishment of the original system of policy in Greece; and, in all probability, Lacedæmon would have been satisfied with the restitution of her former rank, had she been permitted to indulge her natural moderation. But, in the very moment of triumph, when prosperity rendered her less attentive to danger, she was deceived by the
hero

hero who had crowned her with laurels; by that Lysander, who ungenerously and basely sacrificed his country to selfish gratifications.

NEVER did a Spartan possess less of the manners of Sparta than Lysander. Oaths, compacts, publick spirit, honour, perfidy, were with him mere words, unaccompanied with ideas. In his estimation, virtues and vices were equal: he considered them only as more or less instrumental to the purposes of his ambition. The rank of citizen appeared too groveling. He aspired to that of king. Not in the character of a tyrant, who wants to subvert the government by violence, but in that of a refined politician, who undertakes a reformation of its abuses. According to the historians, his plan was to decry hereditary right, as a barbarous custom, that frequently entrusted the reins of government to the hands of an infant, or a man scarcely capable of performing the duties of a private citizen; but that the happiness of a nation required royalty should be the reward of merit. In order

to prepare the minds of the people for so important a revolution, it became necessary to undermine the general constitution of the state; to weaken the authority of the laws; flatter the passions; and, above all, to instil into the Spartans, a taste for novelty. This subtle politician was not yet satisfied. Under the sanction of supporting the reputation of his country by new enterprizes, he introduced the use of gold and silver, with a view of corrupting the morals of the people, and winning them over to his designs with greater facility. The better to impose on the world, he determined to have the general concurrence of Greece when he assumed the sceptre. With this view he attempted, and succeeded in the abolition of popular government in her cities, substituting in his stead councils of regency, devoted to his will, because incapable of supporting their new dignity without his protection.

THE death of Lyfander saved Sparta from impending ruin, but left a perplexed authority impossible to be maintained. Very far, in reality, from preparing their way to elevation

elevation with that artful address which an investigation of the policy of Philip will, in the next book, enable me to explain, he omitted instructing the Lacedemonians to conceal their ambition; and to endeavour at inspiring their neighbours with that confidence in their integrity which might interest them in their prosperity. Dupes to Lyfander's cunning, they became haughty and insolent as the Athenians. All Greece meditated revenge; and Lacedæmon had no other friends than the tyrants established by Lyfander, whose death paved the way to the ruin of his creatures.

HOWEVER just the encomiums I have bestowed on Lycurgus's institutions may be, the were not calculated to maintain his republick in that newly-acquired empire she owed to the policy of Lyfander. That great legislator taught her to govern Greece by that ascendancy which superior virtue and merit will always create; the tyrannical usurpation of the other was only to be supported by force and oppression. Nothing could

could be more essentially repugnant to the laws of Lycurgus than those ambitious pursuits in which the Spartans were now absorbed: indeed, ambition was so incongruous to their national character, and system of government, that the republick, whenever it aspired to conquest, must be on the brink of dissolution. “ In all our actions, “ says one of the most celebrated politicians, “ let us endeavour to imitate nature: as she “ never produces large branches upon small “ stems, let not a little republick attempt “ the subversion of states more powerful “ than her own. If, by the singular favour of providence, such enterprizes are “ crowned with success, experience soon “ convinces us, that a tree whose trunk is “ too weak to support its branches, must be “ rent in pieces by the first blast of wind. “ This was exemplified, continues he, in the “ in the fate of Lacedæmon, after the reduction of all the cities of Greece: no “ sooner did Thebes appear in arms than “ her example was followed by the rest of “ the states, and the withered trunk was “ suddenly

“ suddenly stripped of all its branches.” Poverty, it is true, ceased to be an obstacle to the aggrandizement of Sparta, from the time Lyfander enriched his country with the spoils of the vanquished, and levied regular tributes upon its allies. The republic was, by this means, in a situation to support foreign wars, and undertake great designs. But, in giving the Lacedemonians riches, did Lyfander instruct them that their true use was to promote the glory of the republic? Did he not rather suffer the tide of corruption, that ever accompanies them, to overwhelm the laws and manners of Lycurgus, and prove an additional cause of its declension?

ONE very important observation relative to Sparta ought not to be omitted; which is, that the assistance of Persia, and not their own proper strength, impowered the Spartans to subdue the Athenians. Nor were they indebted for that assistance to Artaxerxes Mnemon, but to Cyrus his brother; whose ambitious designs they had favoured; and who, after an unsuccessful attempt to
 feat

feat himself on the throne of Persia, was entirely defeated, and lost his life in the field.

DEPRIVED of the protection of a prince to whom she owed her grandeur, Sparta was considered in the most odious light, by the Persian court, whilst Greece was contriving how to shake off her fetters. Few instances are to be met with, in history of a more truly deplorable situation. I do not blame the Spartans for falling a prey to calamity, but for not taking the most eligible methods to prevent it. They ought to have rendered Greece their best bulwark against the barbarians, by a display of the duties of humanity in restoring to the cities their government and laws, and restraining their own ambition within its former bounds. Or, if this triumph over the passions was too sublime for their attainment, they should have courted the friendship of Artaxerxes, disavowed their approbation of Cyrus and his Grecian auxiliaries, and particularly have applied themselves to gain the Satrapes of Asia-Minor to their interest,

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THE republick of Sparta, on the contrary, treated the Greeks with greater severity than ever: and though the Persian monarch extended his vengeance no farther than the Asiatic colonies, she picqued herself on a foolish project of generosity in rescuing them from slavery.

AGEFILAUUS no sooner began to make a formidable appearance in Asia, than Artaxerxes fitted out a considerable fleet, giving the command to Conon, an Athenian, who had taken refuge in his court. He also dispatched Timocrates, the Rhodian, into Greece, to distribute large sums of money amongst the leading citizens of Thebes, Corinth, and Argos; these formed a powerful league, which so intimidated the Spartans that they recalled Agefilauus. From that moment their empire shook to its very centre, and soon after the Thebans completed its ruin. Since the time the Spartans became masters of Cadmæa and placed a garrison there, the supreme authority in Thebes had been vested in a small body of the nobility. Historians tell us to what an excess

excess they abused their power, and with what dexterity and courage Pelopidas exterminated them, and regained the citadel of Cadmæa, before the Lacedemonians had time to assist the garrison. This act of hostility was the prelude to several inconsiderable skirmishes, in which the Thebans had frequently the advantage. The conduct of Agesilaus in this war, would lead one to conjecture, that the success which attended him in Asia was less to be attributed to his military capacity, than to the ascendant so remarkable in the Grecian, over the Persian arms; unless his advanced age had extinguished that ardour, that activity, that intuition of which Xenophon has left us so animated a description, far from undertaking any great or decisive action, he is, not unreasonably, reproached with making a progressive march through the Theban territories, in order to essay the courage of the inhabitants, and initiate them in the art of war; Polybius expresses a just contempt for the Theban government; and indeed that republick, decried though all Greece for the stupidity of

of her citizens, and her alliance with Xerxes, was alone indebted to the personal merit of Epaminondas and Pelopidas for the glory she acquired.

THERE must have been a natural competition between two men so equal in talents, had not a similar equality in virtues united them in zeal for the publick good. Nursed in the bosom of affluence, Pelopidas despised its allurements. Epaminondas feared the bounty of fortune should interrupt his philosophick poverty. The first, impetuous and enterprizing in war, master of every branch of military knowledge, held reputation less dear than his country! What a rare example! He resigned the command to one whom he thought better qualified to immortalize the Thebans than himself. Epaminondas, on his side, seemed unconscious of his superior abilities. He had been reluctantly drawn from the school of philosophy to the government of a nation. In him, the penetration, courage, and prudence of Themistocles, were blended with the virtues of Socrates.

PELOPIDAS

PELOPIDAS gained a victory at Tegyra; a day, says Plutarch, that gave the world a specimen of what was afterwards completed at Leuctra; where the arms of Lacedæmon were no longer found invincible, and her empire received its mortal blow. In that action, Epaminondas displayed his amazing extent of genius; or, in other words, that combination of talents which constitutes the character of a finished general. Nor is he less worthy of admiration as a politician, in his plan for preserving to his country her lately-acquired superiority. With a view of totally crushing the Lacedemonians, he placed two implacable enemies at their gates; by the re-establishment of Messina [*k*] in her ancient rights; and building the city of Megalopolis. [*l*] His conduct was as upright

[*k*] Near three centuries were elapsed since the city of Megara was destroyed by the Lacedemonians, who reduced one part of the natives to a state of slavery, and banished the other from Peloponnesus, under pain of death should they return.

[*l*] Magalopolis was a strong and powerful city, inhabited by a colony of Arcadian emigrants, till then dispersed in small hamlets; who by this union were capacitated

right and humane as that of the Spartans, and Athenians, had been cruel and tyrannical. Instead of razing the conquered cities, selling the inhabitants for slaves, or altering their laws, he treated them as allies. Orchomenæa, Phocidæa, Locrida, and Ætolia, experienced this proof of the clemency of Epaminondas.

As all the provinces of Greece bordered upon the sea, their inhabitants, in conjunction with those of the adjacent islands, and the Asiatic colonies, were properly to be considered as one people. Epaminondas, therefore, justly concluded, that whatever republick confined its application to the acquirement of either naval, or military superiority, without seeking to unite them, could only enjoy a precarious degree of power. From this conclusion, he was desirous the Thebans should have a formidable marine. He represented to them, that in occupying the place and adopting the politicks of Lacedæmon,

capacitated to impose laws on Lacedæmon, and revenge the injuries their ancestors received from that republick.

Lacedæmon, they would soon find another Athens, proud of her maritime strength, start up; perhaps, to their destruction; or, at best, victory over such an enemy must always be dearly bought. In a word, the designs and enterprizes of Epaminondas flowed from one source, *supreme dominion*, the principle and end of all his actions.

THE Spartans, defeated at Mantinea, were destitute of resources, and lost to all hopes of recovering the blow. This engagement had compleated the glory of the victorious Thebans, but Epaminondas was killed, and at that instant, says Xenophon, his army believed it self vanquished: the infantry became motionless, and the cavalry, ready to seize the flying enemy, checked the ardour of pursuit. All that remained to Thebes was a reputation she was incapable of supporting; her power fell with the great man who raised, and maintained, but did not live to establish it on a solid foundation.

THOUGH

THOUGH the Thebans were attached to their own customs with an invincible obstinacy, that prevented them from comprehending the importance of the reformation projected by Epaminondas, they had so little discernment as to attribute their late victories to their own conduct, and fancy it easy to preserve their acquired empire; a vain conceit, that accelerated their ruin, by impelling them to undertake enterprizes above their abilities. " Athens is in a
 " state of humiliation, said Jason, the tyrant of Pheres, to the Thessalians;
 " The grandeur of Sparta is no more.
 " The Theban glory is founded on their
 " ruins, but I foresee its declension. Consider then, in your turn, how to possess
 " yourselves of that reputation which they
 " are capable of preserving."

THERE is no stronger proof how much the conquerors of Sparta was inferior to their fortune, than this circumstance, related by Xenophon. The evening says this judicious writer, that Epaminondas gained the battle of Leuctra, he was in expectation

expectation of an attack from some of the Boeotian cities, who were ripe for revolt; so that Thebes, in the very moment she grasped the sceptre of Greece, was a prey to intestine divisions.

END OF BOOK II.

A
S U M M A R Y
O F
B O O K III.

SITUATION of Athens, Sparta, and other states of Greece, at the accession of Philip to the throne of Macedon. Of that monarch's political system.—Of Demosthenes, and Phocion. Account of Persia at the commencement of the war with Alexander.—Reflexions on the conduct and depravity of that hero.

SO long as the Athenians were supported by allies whose taxation contributed towards the expence of their military expeditions, and indulged their taste for indolence, luxury, and pleasure, they continued insensible to the dangerous consequences of that corruption introduced by Pericles, in gratifying the indigent part of the citizens with salaries to enable them to

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frequent the publick spectacles, and courts of judicature. But when their dominion became circumscribed to Attica alone, it seemed a necessary alternative, either that the whole revenues of the state should be expended in these kind of donatives, or that the populace, whose sole property they were, should make a noble renunciation of them, and, reassuming their ancient manners, obey the institutions of Solon, and seek in labour and the fatigue of industry, the means of subsistence.

THIS was an effort of self-denying resolution, impossible to be expected from a people intoxicated, even to madness, with a passion for publick feasts and shews: whom their late reverse of fortune had sunk in despair; and in whom the love of glory, and of their country seemed annihilated. The wealthy part of the community, and the magistrates, dreaded that, by endeavouring to rouse the people from the lethargy, and persuading them to relieve the republick from this oppressive burthen, they might be tempted to a renewal of their claim to the

the abolition of debts, and a division of lands. Sacrificing, therefore, publick good to private avarice, they were indefatigable in devising means of perpetuating this abuse of government. Under these circumstances Eubulus got a decree passed, by which the funds destined for military operations, were appropriated to the support of publick spectacles: of which decree whoever, only, proposed a revocation, was to be put to death.

From this period degeneracy of manners became fashionable in Athens; merit of every species was degraded; military talents, as well as civil virtues, were no longer held in estimation; whilst poets, musicians, comedians, and decorators of the theatre, filled the departments of state.

“ Your Panathénæa’s, and Dyonisia’s,
 “ says Demosthenes to his fellow citizens,
 “ are always celebrated with astonishing
 “ magnificence. You calculate your busi-
 “ nels with the utmost regularity, surmount
 H 2 every

“ every difficulty with ease, that nothing
“ may interrupt the festivity of the destined
“ day! Is a new theatrical piece to be exhibi-
“ bited? the disposition of the parts is an
“ affair which you discuss with eager atten-
“ tion! nor is any person so ignorant as to
“ be uninformed of the names of those citi-
“ zens selected by each tribe to preside at
“ musical, or athletic entertainments! But
“ is the publick safety the point in agitati-
“ on? Is an enemy to be opposed, who
“ openly threatens your liberty? all men
“ are inattentive! political debates are un-
“ interesting and dull! Ye are incapable
“ of penetrating into futurity! and if you
“ are, with reluctance, prevailed upon to
“ pass a decree, it is only executed in part
“ and that too late,”

WHILST national poverty wrought this scandalous depravity in the morals of the Athenians, and confirmed their declension, wealth, introduced by Lysander into Sparta, prepared as deplorable a revolution in the laws of Lycurgus. “ It was decreed, says
“ Plutarch, by the Spartans, that money
“ should

" should be appropriated, solely, to ex-
 " igencies of state; and that those citizens
 " convicted of having gold or silver coin in
 " their possession should be punished with
 " death. But, adds the historian, very
 " sagaciously, how could this republick
 " flatter itself that individuals would despise
 " money when the publick revered it! Of
 what availment to lock and bar the doors of-
 their houses against the admission of riches,
 when the avenues to their hearts were open
 to avarice! Money, in a short time, insinu-
 ated itself from the publick treasury into
 private habitations: an outward appearance
 of their ancient austerity still subsisted, but
 within all was venal corruption. The citi-
 zens, at first, amassed wealth without daring
 to enjoy it, waiting with impatience for the
 moment when the number of the guilty, by
 braving and subverting the laws, might li-
 cence their ostentatious parade.

LUXURY, in its first approaches feeble
 and timid, now made gigantic strides towards
 enforcing respect. It would convey a very

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inadequate idea of the disorders produced in Sparta from the introduction of venality, were we to compare them with the effects of the same cause in other countries. The Lacedæmonian rusticity could, only by slow and difficult gradations, accommodate itself to that elegant refinement in pleasure, which softens the heart, and debases the morals. Besides, that the institutions of Lycurgus could not be immediately undermined by riches, there were some which continued immutable; so that his republick, even in its degenerate state, presented a spectacle worthy the admiration of the Greeks, had not their attention been engrossed by considering the virtues it had abandoned more than those it retained.

THE law promulgated by Epitadius, one of the Ephori, which gave permission to sell estates, or dispose of them by will, put the finishing stroke to sanctity of manners in Lacedæmon. When once a door was opened to trafficking away inheritances, avarice soon became predominant. A citizen, despoiled of his patrimony, found himself impelled

impelled by more pressing considerations than the duties he owed to society: he courted the favours of Fortune; wealth, not probity, was now the object of distinction. The vices of the great became necessary to the subsistence of the multitude; and those hands destined by Lycurgus to wield the sword and lance, and manage the buckler, were debased in using the implements of arts which luxury introduced into Laconia.

Such was the situation of those celebrated republicks, a short time after the death of Epaminondas; nor can it be doubted that their declension paved the way to the total ruin of Greece, if we discriminately consider the changes consequent to the Peloponnesian war, in the politicks, interests, and manners of that country.

DIODORUS observes, that by the treaty of peace concluded between Sparta and Athens, in the tenth year of the war, they reciprocally sacrificed to an ill-judged avidity the interests of their allies. Ignorant that ambi-

tion should be concealed, to be rendered successful, they agreed to keep possession of of the conquered towns; reserving (by an express clause) a liberty of changing in concert any articles of this convention, or of adding new ones occasionally, as the exigencies of affairs might require. Nothing more was wanting, adds the same historian, to kindle suspicions amongst the principal republicks of Greece. They apprehended ^{that} the power of Sparta and Athens, so long employed in the destruction of each other, should, when united, make a partition of the rest of Greece.

HOWEVER unreasonable these apprehensions may appear, ambassadors were immediately dispatched from all parties, to negotiate preliminaries of a league against the two states accused of aspiring to tyranny. Argos, Thebes, Corinth, and Elis were the chief in this congress. It must be confessed that these cities, accustomed to a subordinate part, were ill calculated for that elevation in politicks, necessary to conduct a confederacy—and that the want of a leader of superior

rior genius to regulate it, rendered the undertaking abortive; yet, by their example they taught the other Grecian republicks to throw off the shackles of subordination, and from that moment Sparta, and Athens lost the splendour of authority. This commencement of anarchy augmented in proportion as the strength of the Lacedemonians was exhausted, and their situation less respectable; from the time victory declared for the Thebans, there was not a city whose emulation was not excited to aspire to an equal share of glory; and that did not flatter itself with being able, by a more sagacious conduct, to fix the foundations of empire on a firmer basis. This is what Demosthenes reproached them with, in lamenting that the sole effect of his rhetorick had been to raise an ambitious spirit in the neighbouring states who under colour of protecting the liberties of Greece, sought in fact only how to oppress them. “ The Greeks themselves, said he, are actually the greatest enemies of their country! Argos, Thebes, Corinth, Lacedemonia, Arcadia, Attica, every

“ every republick (I except none) has a separate interest!

Nor was selfish ambition the only vice to which Greece was a prey. Thucidides tells us, that in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the growth of envy and avarice gave birth to a multiplicity of divisions amongst the Corcyreans. Under the pretext of defending the rights of the people, and employing none but men of integrity in the administration, the magistrates, whose real consideration was their own peculiar emolument, formed parties in the city, which soon degenerated into factions, impossible to be conciliated; and whose inveteracy was still more embittered by the machinations of Sparta and Athens. One republick favouring the pretensions of the people, the other those of the nobles: whilst both sides availed themselves of the offered protection, in exerting their strongest efforts to crush each other.

THIS disease in the Corcyrean constitution, continues Thucidides, communicated
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its infection through Greece with wonderful rapidity. That alienation of confidence between the nobles, the rich, and the commonalty, which owed its origin to the extirpation of monarchical government, became more apparent under the encouragement of the emissaries of Sparta and Athens, who practised the same political artifices in every city, that had fomented the divisions in Corcyra. Exorbitant demands were made, and supported with obstinacy. Tumultuous clamour was the only reply of the aggressor to the arguments of his adversary; who, reduced to despair, in his turn, broke into furious transports. The citizens came armed into the publick assemblies, and proceeded to the most violent extremities; because none of the factions were satisfied with an extension of power, unless quickened with the gratification of revenge for injuries remembered. Vices suddenly assumed the name of virtues. Rage was called courage, and knavery prudence; whilst, on the contrary, the wise man was branded with the appellation of coward. The for-

ward boaster became a zealous friend; and good policy consisted less in the repulsion of evil than in committing it undetected. No man was permitted, to remain neutral, and preserve his integrity untainted, in a country where the most sacred oaths were perverted into snares to entangle credulity. In a word, according to the report of the same historian, if there could be any consolatory circumstances in such a situation, they resulted from the advantage that men of the dullest intellects and best hearts sometimes had; who, distrusting their acknowledged incapacity, had recourse to sudden and violent remedies, whilst their enemies, conscious of superior abilities. were the dupes of their own subtle intrigues and stratagems. These calamities encreased, says Diodorus, after the decline of the Thebans from that point of elevation in which Epaminondas had placed them. Every day produced instances in one or other of the Grecian states, of the banishment of citizens: these proscribed persons wandered from territory to territory, stirring up enemies to their country. In their most despairing moments they were often suddenly recalled

recalled by the influence of a faction that wanted their assistance in seizing the reins of government, which some new revolution soon snatched from their hands.

DISTRACTED by a contrariety of interests, each republick was a perfect chaos! Some relative to publick happiness, others to the private advantage of ambitious citizens. The oppressed considered only how to obtain relief; every cabal had its separate view; and these distinct interests multiplying to infinity, intersected, interrupted, and overturned each others system alternately. To day a republick regards you as an ally; to morrow treats you as her inveterate foe. Your partizans are banished or massacred, whilst the contending faction has already established its authority on principles diametrically opposite.

SURROUNDED by obstacles so innumerable, the wisest found it impossible to propose any permanent object of pursuit, or conduct the publick affairs on any settled plan. No city had the least pretensions to a superiority
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of character, that might prevail with the rest to associate under the same government, and by a reunion of their scattered forces, enable them to resist the invasion of a foreign enemy.

FORTUNATELY for Greece, the Persians had laid aside the intention of extending their empire on that side of Europe. The Thracians and Illyrians were employed in opposing their ancient enemies; and whoever had then cast their eyes towards Macedon, would never have believed they beheld the power that was to forge chains for the captivity of Greece.

THIS little kingdom had hitherto made an inconsiderable figure, and was at that time very unfortunately circumstanced. Amyntas, the father of Philip, a weak prince, depressed by the arms of the Illyrians, and expecting to be robbed of his crown, could discern no better method of revenging his wrongs, and raising up enemies to his conquerors, than by ceding

ceding his kingdom to the Olynthians. After experiencing the most cruel reverse of fortune, he was re-established upon his throne by the Theffalians, and continued to reign with the timid irresolution of a monarch who has seen himself on the brink of ruin, and owed his safety to foreign assistance. Amyntas was succeeded by his eldest son, Alexander, who was only the shadow of a king. His subjects reluctantly yielded obedience to a sovereign, ignorant how to command; defeated by the Illyrians; part of Macedonia in rebellion; and almost all his territories ravaged by the enemy, death released him from his troubles,

His successors were still more unworthy of their rank. Perdiccas was destitute of every talent necessary to acquire respect from a contented and submissive people, even in the happiest times. Ptolomy, a natural son of Amyntas, had seized on one of the Macedonian provinces, fortified, and rendered himself independant. And Pausanias, a prince of the royal family, under sentence of banishment, took advantage of the

the publick commotions, to return to his country, and put himself at the head of a considerable body of malecontents; men of obscure birth and turbulent spirit, such as are the authors, and instruments in most revolutions. Perdiccas was killed in a battle against the Illyrians; and so peculiarly unhappy was the situation of Macedon, that even this event was regretted as an additional calamity in placing the crown upon the head of an infant.

PAUSANIAS, now, openly aspired to the throne; and Argeas, another prince of the blood royal, actuated by equal ambition, collected an army to oppose his rival. Some adjacent powers, availing themselves of these domestick dissensions, had already penetrated into the heart of the country, when Philip, then a hostage in Thrace, made his escape, and flew to the assistance of the kingdom of his ancestors. No sooner say the historians, did he appear in Macedon, than his influence was immediately felt. He was appointed regent during the minority of the young Amyntas, his nephew; but
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the people, soon sensible how highly it imported them to have such a ruler as Philip, decreed him the crown.

YET, notwithstanding the unhappy situation of Macedon, her misfortunes were not, like those of Greece, irremediable. A free people, once corrupted, becomes familiar with, and then fond of vice. And it seldom happen that a private citizen has courage to contend with the passions, prejudices, and customs which reign with imperious dominion in the breasts of an indocile multitude; or credit enough with his countrymen to persuade them to that voluntary sacrifice of their darling vices, which can alone replace them in their original point of greatness. But if the reformation of a single republick is to be considered as an almost impracticable attempt, what must the general reformation of Greece have been, where every city was a distinct republick? History affords very few examples of free nations submitting the errors and abuses of government to the inspection and amendment of a legislator! could it then be expected an event so rare in the

the world should be common in Greece? Or, if such a change had been wrought in one or two states, of how small utility must it have been to the constitution of the whole, whose confirmed depravity would have opened to their enemies numberless opportunities of accomplishing their destruction.

MONARCHIES are, on the contrary, replete with these kind of revolutions, so infrequent in commonwealths. The citizen, there, does not consider himself entitled to make the laws which are to direct his conduct; and is familiarized to the reception and obedience of whatever impressions his sovereign chuses to impose. A great prince has it always in his power to form a new people: his subjects imperceptibly shake off their inactivity, abandon their vices, and assume a different character from the virtue they are ambitious to imitate.

THE talents which nature had bestowed on Philip had been carefully cultivated by a good education, and accompanied with virtues

virtues imbibed in the adverse school of family misfortunes. Nurtured in a republic where the people constituted the legislature, he saw nothing of that haughty, or abject adulation which besets the avenues of a court? intoxicating princes with the phantom of power, and flattering them into a belief that they are supremely great by birth, and incapable of receiving additional lustre. Accustomed to the refinements of address, by which the magistrates of a democracy guide the passions of the multitude in acknowledging its authority, he preserved upon a throne that moderation, that patience, that respect for individuals, which will ever raise a prince above the laws, and invest him with unbounded power.

A discriminate review of the conduct of Philip is a fertile field of instruction. A minister can recommend no precepts of government to his master's observation but what may be exemplified from his life; and every monarch who acts upon the same principles, will never fail of the same success. Soldiers to whom flight is become familiar,

familiar, must be trained to victory by delicate flattery. In bestowing praise and esteem, hitherto unmerited, Philip inspired his troops with confidence, and taught them to reverence themselves. Formed in the camp of Epaminondas, he transported into Macedon the martial discipline which the Thebans owed to that great man; and Philip himself invented the *Pbalanx*; that admirable military disposition, which appeared so formidable to Paulus Emilius, at a time when its original force [a] was much weakened

[a] The construction of the *Pbalanx* (according to Polybius) was a body of sixteen thousand men, formed into a square sixteen deep, when the Romans first carried their arms into Macedon. It was invincible, continues this author. *Book 17. chap. 3.* whilst it continued united, but it seldom happened that a body which occupied the space of twenty stadia, or a league, found a proper field for action. The intervention of a hill, a ditch, a hedge, a river, or morass, destroyed its arrangement, and afforded easy opportunities to the enemy to disorder its ranks, by penetrating into those openings, the unavoidable consequence of inequality of ground, whilst the soldier could make no evolutions, nor come to a close engagement. Supposing

ended by attempts to improve it. If this prince mingles in the ranks with the common soldiers, and by his example teaches them

posing it even unmolested by foreign obstacles, there is hardly a possibility but that the *Phalanx*, in its march, must suffer some fluctuation from his own movements. And either in a pursuit, or retreat, it entirely lost the advantage of figure. From these remarks of the historian, we are led to conclude that the capital defect in the *Phalanx* was its enormous construction; and that the successors of Philip were injudicious in altering the original institution, from six or seven thousand men to more than double that number. The more such a mass was augmented the more must it be embarrassed in the choice of ground; and its marches must be slow, hazardous, and interrupted. Polybius likewise draws a parallel between the Macedonian manœuvres, and those of the Romans; giving the latter the preference. It must, notwithstanding, be allowed, that at that particular juncture when Philip instituted the *Phalanx* it was the happiest disposition that could have been conceived. The Roman arrangement of troops in three lines, and in small platoons with intervals between, is only proper for well disciplined soldiers, accustomed to brave danger. But this was far from being the case with the Macedonians, when Philip ascended the throne. The only plan to ensure success was such a one as in its nature inspired confidence, and required little experience in the management or knowledge of arms.

them to encounter danger; he first essayed their courage as a *general*, is unwilling to expose it, and avoids to conquer by force of arms those difficulties that are to be surmounted by prudence. He stirs up Argeas to rebellion, a man of restless ambition, who is only to be destroyed in the field—But it is by negotiating he seeks to ruin Pausanias. Whilst the influence of money, and promises, detaches the Thracians from the interest of this rebel, he flatters, deludes with hopes, and retains him in inaction, till his collected forces are ready for the attack.

PUBLICK tranquillity is no sooner restored, than Philip's whole attention is applied to the reformation of domestick irregularities. Fearing to engage till he is sure of success, he feigns ignorance of vices he cannot restrain, and, till he has secured the certainty of obedience, avoids to enforce the reestablishment of order. When he institutes new laws, the minds of his subjects are already prepared for their observance. Impelling the wheels of government with accumulated

cumulated force, all things in Macedonia tend to action and utility. Such was the progress of an ambitious mind extensively occupied in subduing the strong-rooted passions and vices of his countrymen, before he indulges the, otherwise, unavailing expectation, of conquering his neighbours.

PHILIP had scarcely enjoyed a triumph over his most stubborn enemies, I mean the indolence of his people, their timidity, and total indifference to publick good, when he was exposed to the hazard of splitting on a very dangerous rock. This prince had visited the principal republicks of Greece; and, in his retired hours, studied their various genius, interests, strength, and resources. He had been a spectator of the fall of the Spartan, and of the declension of the Theban power; had a thorough knowledge of that depravity of manners already described, and, in a word, that Greece was running voluntarily into the shackles of slavery, and waited only the summons of a master. Whoever had taken advantage of these interior divisions to offer assistance, must

must have been sure of *allies*. What sanguine expectations must such a soul as Philip's conceive from the weakness of a nation, distracted with such a multiplicity of factions! Any other prince had probably ceded to the first instigations of ambition, and fallen a sacrifice to his impetuosity.

LET me be permitted to observe, that history is filled with numerous examples of states either destroyed, or confined within the narrow sphere of mediocrity, by eagerly grasping the first opportunities of aggrandizement that fortune presented. Philip knew that to render success permanent, there was a regular gradation to be observed; that the reduction of Greece, considered as a first object, was a useless and hazardous attempt, whereas in making it a second, the road became level, preceding advantages more confirmed, and future ones ascertained. Probably, had this monarch made an immediate irruption into Greece, the ancient enemies of Macedonia would as immediately have recommenced hostilities. Peonians, Illyrians, Thracians, would have been so many additional

additional auxiliaries, to the Greeks; and Philip must have been constrained to suspend his operations in one place, in order to march to another, and consequently his forces had been divided, and incessantly harassed by alternate progressions from the Greeks to the barbarians; unable to finish any enterprize, whilst the obstacles that opposed his arms, continually encreasing, would have rendered it impossible to subdue the combined strength of enemies, who might with ease have been separately overcome.

THE refined policy of Philip in regard to Argeas and Pausanias, made it evident he would be cautious of creating new adversaries before the old were defeated. The first direction of his forces was against the Peonians; he was victorious; and then successively attacked the Illyrians and Thracians, recovering, by degrees, the conquered places taken from Macedonia. He at the same time destroyed the principal fortresses erected on the frontiers; nor was it till after the barbarians were reduced to such a state of humiliation as prevented every apprehension

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sion of danger, that Philip attempted to render himself the conquerer of Greece.

THE reason why most projects are unsuccessful, is an impatient desire of executing them the moment they are conceived: consequently the intermediate steps are hastily concerted. Eager to plan the necessary operations, men discern the obstacles that oppose their wishes indistinctly, through the false medium of whatever passions impels them. Instead of studying to prevent their measures from being disconcerted, their imagination is bounded to a search of remedies after the event has happened; they fancy resistance unavailing, and from that moment fortune, not intelligence, decides the catastrophe. Most states have very vague and indeterminate ideas of what constitutes their true grandeur. A power deficient in principle, destitute of allies, odious to its neighbours, irresolute where to begin an attack, must consequently be incapable of collecting its views into one point of termination, of making a judicious arrangement of the progress of its arms; or
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of enjoying the natural advantages of its situation. Such a power will always have enemies to encounter, whose strength is undiminished.

PHILIP, great and comprehensive in all things, meditated with deliberate attention his enterprize against Greece, and, before he discovered his intention, was assiduous in augmenting their animosities. With this view he flattered the pride of one republick, promised protection to another, courted the alliance of a third; refused, granted, or withdrew assistance, as most conformable to his interest; under pretext that his finances were exhausted in the war with the barbarians, and that he wanted to build palaces, and adorn them with the most exquisite productions of art, he borrowed considerable sums of money at extraordinary interest, of all the states of Greece: but the true object of his policy was to attach the opulent citizens to his party, by securing their wealth in his treasury. Thus he succeeded in opening a new branch of commerce in Greece, the prelude to a new species of corruption: which, under the ap-

pearance of satisfying the demands of his creditors, created him so many pensioners. In a word, he multiplied the vices of the Greeks as a counterbalance to their military strength.

INSTRUCTED by the example of Athens and Sparta, whose tyrannical ambition destroyed each other, Philip, in projecting the conquest of Greece, sought to stimulate the rage of the inhabitants against each other, seeming to act only as their instrument. Sometimes he gained the affections of a people by becoming their benefactor; as was the case of the Thessalians, whom he delivered from their tyrants, and restored to the privilege of a seat in the council of Amphictyons. At other times, he seemed to execute with regret the very measures he himself inspired. He suffers himself to be entreated before he carries his arms into any Grecian province: Thus he enters Peloponnesus only at the intercession of Messena and Megalopolis, who complained of the encroachments of the Lacedemonians. Is he sensible of the importance of getting possession

sion of a city, instead of endeavouring to irritate the citizens, he makes offers of friendship, and indulges the gratification of his ambition in embroiling it with some neighbouring power. No sooner doth such an unfortunate republick fall into the snare, then playing off all his political engines to bring about a rupture, or feigning to defend the cause of the oppressed, he destroys his enemy without incurring the slightest shadow of suspicion. The Olyntheans were the dupes of these artifices, when relying on the protection of Macedon, they incurred the displeasure of the Potideans,

IMPENETRABLE to vulgar observations, Philip possessed, in a most eminent degree, the art of varying his conduct, without varying his principles. Negotiations, alliances, treaties, peace, hostilities, retreats, and inaction, all had their turn; and all tended to the accomplishment of that end from which they appeared most remote. Skilful in representing objects in new lights, in awakening fears, hopes, and suspicions;

in confounding, or separating the ideas of men, his enemies are always ambitious, his allies ungrateful, whilst he alone reaps the advantage of wars in which he engaged as an auxiliary.

THE master stroke of Philip to arrive at the sovereignty of Greece, was an embassy sent from Thebes, to solicit him to revenge the injuries done to the temple of Delphos, and the rights of the Amphictyonic body, by the sacrilege of the Phoceans. Besides an acquisition of glory in terminating a war that had lasted ten years, the privilege of sending a deputy to the council, forfeited by the vanquished, was perpetually annexed to Macedon; and that crown shared likewise with Beotia and Thessaly the prerogative of presiding at the Pythian games, of which the Corinthians were deprived, as a punishment for assisting the Phoceans.

HOWEVER inconsiderable in themselves these advantages might be, they changed their very nature in the hands of Philip.

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The Pythian games, like other solemn meetings. were regarded, it is true, as public festivals, and spectacles of small utility; but when the minds of the Greeks were become frivolous enough to make them essential to happiness, it was not a matter of indifference to a prince so penetrating as Philip to preside over them, and be in a manner the arbiter of their pleasures. The council of Amphietyons had lost all its authority since the alterations in the original system of government. The people, accustomed to consult their ambition only, and to appeal to their own assemblies for the justification of any acts of violence they chose to commit, no longer carried complaints before the general council; and it was only in points where religion was interested, that the least veneration was paid to its decrees.

NOTWITHSTANDING this degradation of honour, Philip acquired many advantages by mingling in their debates. He ceased to be considered as a stranger; he could without incurring suspicion, enter more

intimately into their affairs; and assist, in some degree, the councils of a people whose liberties he was secretly undermining.

NOR did he find the difficulties insuperable to gain an ascendancy over a body of men who had long been susceptible to the impression of foreign influence; yet, in order to render this council a more useful instrument to his ambition, he endeavoured to revive its dignity, and without ceasing to direct all its motions, restored the greater part of its ancient privileges. Men of real religion, as well as the priests, and devotees of the temple of Delphos, already began to resound the respect and zeal of Philip for the honour of the Gods: his pensioners magnified his justice and moderation, so that the restoration of the golden age was no longer a controvertible point in Greece. Her citizens, wearied with domestick feuds, flattered their imaginations with the prospect of uninterrupted tranquillity; whilst the seditious intriguing heads of factions, congratulated themselves in secret on the reputation

tation they had acquired their protector, foreseeing an approaching revolution, and by extravagant encomiums contributing to the delusion of the multitude. In a word, such was if I may be allowed the expression, the infatuation of the Greeks in favour of Philip, that even Demosthenes, his greatest enemy, suddenly changed his style. Instead of impelling the Athenians into a war by the thunder of his eloquence, peace was now the theme of his orations; he laboured to persuade them to acknowledge the new dignity of Philip, in the decree that admitted a member of the council of Amphictyons.

THIS orator, single and unsupported, had unveiled the ambitious projects of Philip to the eyes of the people; and used every effort to rekindle their military ardour. Had it been in the power of mortal eloquence to inspire the Athenians with vigour, awaken their pristine courage, and cement their divided interests, it must have been that of Demosthenes; the fire of whose orations.

tions still agitate and inflame the passions of the reader! But he spoke to the deaf, and, thanks to the more eloquent liberality of Philip, when the orator declaimed with vehemence on the necessity of levying troops, and equipping galleys, a thousand voices cried out "Peace is the greatest of all blessings." Demosthenes expatiated on the love of glory—of our country—of independency—when those passions had no longer any existence! The Macedonian pensioners, on the contrary, worked upon, and interested the sloth, avarice, and luxury of the Athenians! So that this republic, rooted in indolence, was incapable of exciting the emulation of Greece by an example of spirit and resolution.

BUT was the task more easy for Philip to conquer Greece? to comprehend exactly the situation of the different states, to trace the implacability of their aversions, the diversity of their interests, and that spirit of ambition which incessantly armed them against each other, than for Demosthenes to unite them in one general confederacy against Macedon?

a plan formerly so successful in the Persian war? Let us see what Polybius says on the subject: “ However admirable (he begins) “ the conduct of Demosthenes may in many “ instances appear, he certainly seems inexcusable in stigmatizing with the infamous “ appellation of traitors, the most honourable citizens of those republicks that were “ attached to Philip.” “ Every one of “ these magistrates, whose reputation Demosthenes endeavours to sully, might “ easily have justified a proceeding which “ either augmented the strength and power “ of their respective republicks, or prevented their ruin. If the inhabitants of “ Messenæ and Arcadia apprehended their “ interests to be dissimilar with those of “ Athens—If they preferred imploring the “ protection of Philip, to suffering themselves to be enslaved by the Lacedæmonians—If they neglected to guard against “ remote evils, and turned their application “ to the removal of present ones—ought “ Demosthenes to brand it as a crime? This “ orator was greatly deceived if he fancied

“ that the interests of Athens would be
 “ considered by the rest of Greece as
 “ necessarily enterwoven with their own.”

Not to be too severe in our strictures on that part of the conduct of Demosthenes which discovers an inattention to the change in the political system of Greece, and his attachment to maxims no longer understood, instead of adopting new ones, better calculated to the disposition of the times, an error too common in statesmen, what excuse can be made for his treatment of the magistrates of [b] Messenæ, Megalopolis, Argos, Thebes? The injurious reflections he loaded them with, far from answering his purpose, could only create enemies to the Athenians, and partisans to Philip. After such evident proofs of imbecility, irresolution, and indolence in his fellow citizens, and after know-
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[b] Polybius accuses Demosthenes with having been guilty of the most atrocious abuse to Lercydas, Hieronymus, and Encompidas, citizens of Arcadia: Neon and Thrasyllogue of Messenæ: Myrtis, Teledamus, and Mnasius of Argos: Daogue, and Cineas of Theffaly: Theogelon, and Tomilas of Thebes, &c.

ing from experience the inutility of weary-
 ing Greece with embassies, why did he not
 vary his measures? must not the politician
 and the citizen appear despicable in our eyes,
 at the very moment the orator excites our
 admiration?

As a counterpoise to the fortune of Philip,
 Demosthenes ventured to advise the Athe-
 nians to raise a body of two thousand foot,
 and two hundred horse, of which a fourth
 part were to be citizens; and to put a few
 light armed vessels in commission. "I am
 " moderate in my demand, said he, because
 " our present situation does not admit of
 " an armament capable of attacking Philip
 " in the open field." What then could be
 his design? "We ought, continues he, to
 " confine ourselves to sudden sallies where
 " the enemy is unprepared." A strange
 method of conducting a war under such cir-
 cumstances! Surely a small share of under-
 standing might have discerned the folly of a
 proceeding, which, instead of invigorating
 the courage of the Athenians, could not
 fail to render them ridiculous, by an impo-
 tent

tent rashness. Far from imposing on an enemy, of whose superiority it was a tacit acknowledgement, it must only irritate, and from an impulse of revenge, accelerate the ruin of his country! Polybius also reproaches Demosthenes with being the slave of inconsiderate wrath, and with want or foresight. “ the Athenians, (says the Historian) “ ceding at last to the solicitations of their “ orator, made an obstinate resistance at “ Cheronæa, were defeated, and owed the “ preservation of their houses, their temples, “ and the freedom of their city, to the “ clemency of the conqueror,

I am better pleased with the admirable good sense of Phocion, who was as great a *general*, as Demosthenes was an unskilful *soldier*. He visited all his fellow-citizens to persuade them separately of the superior advantages to be derived from peace, even though the continuance of a war might invest them with the first offices in the republick. “ In my opinion, said he, one “ day to the Athenians, you either ought “ to

“ to exert the most vigorous efforts for the
 “ recovery of the palm of glory, or endea-
 “ your to deserve the amity of those who
 “ have wrested it from you! Do not com-
 “ plain of the treachery of your allies, but
 “ of your own indolence which justifies all
 “ calumny. Complain of the rapine of
 “ your commanders that impells the very
 “ states to oppose you, whose ruin is in-
 “ volved in yours.” I will vote for war,
 said he another time, when our citizens un-
 derstand the duty of soldiers; when I see the
 young nobility support their rank with
 unshaken fortitude; when I see the rich
 contribute voluntarily to the necessities of
 the state; when I see the orators forbear to
 pillage the publick!

Such was the policy of Phocion! That
 great man considered his republick as labour-
 ing under a disease impossible to be eradicat-
 ed; and like a skilful physician sought by
 wise and circumspect steps to prolong the
 life of his country. Enfeebled by a long
 succession of calamities, to have hurried
 things to a crisis by violent remedies could
 only

only have precipitated its dissolution. Had the people been virtuous, Phocion would ^{not} have suffered them to abandon themselves to despair, because despair alone could have wrought their deliverance: but he knew the conduct of a debauched republick must be rash and unadvised, if it ventured to engage in enterprizes that required judgment and penetration. He apprehended the ruin of Greece inevitable—he was sensible resistance would hasten the blow, and that to parry it a while was all human prudence could accomplish.

THE observations I have hitherto made, relative to the situation of Greece and the sagacious policy of Philip, may naturally lead the reader to imagine that Demosthenes is urging his [c] countrymen to undertake impracticable enterprizes; and in encreasing the

[c] Their is reason to believe Demosthenes himself formed a sanguine expectations of advantage from the measures he persuaded the Athenians to engage in, since amongst the great number of exordiums he composed at leisure, and selected as occasion gave them propriety, there are very few that seem calculated for happy events.

the contests of the principal republicks by his arbitrary behaviour, must have premeditated, as well as accelerated the destruction of Greece; acting as an instrument to the ambition of Philip. But we ought to be cautious in drawing a conclusion that does not appear sufficiently well grounded. Philip, on the contrary, considered Demosthenes as an irreconcilable and dangerous enemy, whom he omitted no method to gain over to his interest, or at least to purchase his silence.

PHILIP undoubtedly discerned every advantage he reaped from the imprudence of Demosthenes; but, too skilful a master of intrigue to fear the infallibility of those instructions pursued by his emissaries and allies, for the disturbance of the tranquillity of Greece, it was of little importance to him whether the resistance of particular cities furnished his ambition with an open pretext for subduing them. Disregarding such trivial advantages, he was alarmed with apprehensions lest his glory should be tarnished by the

the energy of that eloquence which represented him as a tyrant—which recalled to the memory of the Greeks the glorious deeds of their ancestors, and their love of independency; conjuring them to act with extreme caution and circumspection. The more artful the machinations of Philip were in the concealment of his design to enslave Greece, and in endeavouring to inspire that confidence in his integrity as might insure obedience when liberty was annihilated the more he must observe with vexation that the Athenian orator unravelled all the mysteries of his politicks: In teaching the Greeks to blush at the approach of that servitude they were unable to avoid, he in some degree rendered the consequence of all his victories uncertain.

BESIDES, in the former contentions of Greece, Philip had seen examples in Sparta, Athens, Thebes, and some other commonwealths, who in their turn implored the protection of Persia, and availed themselves of its assistance to subdue their enemies, the Greeks no longer considered such an application

cation in an odious light; and the supposition was natural that Demosthenes, convinced of the inefficacy of soliciting the Greeks to oppose the yoke of Macedon, might be induced to make a voluntary resignation of his country to the generosity of the Satrapes of Asia. What corroborated the probability of such a step, was a prevailing report that this orator had entered into a strict engagement with the court of Persia, and was even in the list of its pensionaries.

SUCH a revolution in politicks would have defeated all the projects of Philip. The immense wealth of Asia had soon bribed away his partisans, whilst a re-union of the republicks would probably have been the consequence of the gratification of self-interest in the leading men. Thus, instead of vanquishing by dividing, Philip would have been under the necessity of attacking them collectively, and have been deprived of every other road to conquest but through the troops of Persia. The event sufficiently justified the apprehensions of Philip. Demosthenes, in his third Philippic, introduces
the

the propriety of sending ambaffadors to the king of Perfia, to represent the destructive consequences to the interest of that court, should it fuffer the aggrandizement of Macedon at the expence of all the ftates of Greece; and alfo to make preffing remonftrances for affiftance. The orator, who at firft only founded the difpofition of his countrymen, declaimed with redoubled vehemence, in a fecond difcourfe, on the indifpensablenefs of this refolution, and at length obtained the confent of the republick. The negotiation was fucceffful, and Philip, having planned the important fieges of Perinthia and Byzantium, found his operations interrupted by the fuccours fent the befieged by the Perfian court, and the republick of Athens.

Now it was that this prince demonftrated to the world the fuperiority of his political abilities; of that difcernment which enabled him to judge, if he fhould by an obftinate perfeverance continue the fiege, it would irritate the minds of his enemies, ftrengthen the

the bands of their alliance, and force that resistance from resentment, which they wanted both courage and prudence to attempt from any other motive. To avert the gathering storm, he therefore raised the siege of Perinthia and Byzantium, notwithstanding the lines of circumvallation were almost completed; and turned his arms against the Scythians.

THE Athenians, whose vanity encreased with their effeminacy, had not the least doubt but that this new expedition of Philip's was the result of despair. They believed, in the mortification of disgrace, he retired into Scythia to conceal his shame. Abandoning themselves to extravagant transports of joy, they congratulated the return of liberty, and imagined Greece had no longer any thing to fear from a prince who plunged rashly into a war that must terminate in his [d] destruction; or, should this
irruption

[d] The Scythians inhabited that large tract of country betwixt the Danube and the Tanas. A people whose flocks and herds supplied them with sustenance

irruption be unattended with serious consequences against the Scythians, and only retard the progress of his arms in Greece, it appeared to the Athenians, a mark of an irresolute, timid conduct, which they failed not to attribute to consternation and terror. On the other side, the abject servility of the court of Persia flattered and persuaded Oelivus that he had triumphed over Philip. The less this pretended triumph had cost the Persians, the more they thought it useless to raise formidable military armaments to enable them to give laws to Philip. Blinded by vain glory, the exultation of the allies prevented their attention to the necessity of future defensive measures; and, as that monarch had sagaciously foreseen, the bands of alliance insensibly became relaxed. His penetrating eye watched the imbecility of their conduct

nance ^{who} thought it ^{un}necessary to cultivate the earth, and of course had no settled habitation. To make war with them was therefore a glaring absurdity — An enemy no sooner entered their territories than he became in want of every means of supporting his troops, and perished without striking a blow. — The case of all who had made the experiment.

conduct from the wilds of Scythia, and meditated a plan of vengeance.

To facilitate his own designs, by giving a new turn to affairs, that might interrupt the harmony between Persia and Athens, he embroiled the Greeks in a quarrel, which he seemed to regard as an uninterested spectator. - Availing himself of his credit with the council of Amphictyons, he persuaded them to declare war against the Locrians of Amphylia, for seizing some consecrated lands belonging to the temple of Delphos; and to give the command of the army to Cottyphus, a man devoted to the Macedonian interest. This *general* by drawing the war into prolixity, avoiding all decisive actions; and even permitting the Locrians to gain several advantages, alarmed the Greeks lest a scandal should be thrown on the honour of Apollo, in suffering such a violation of his rights to remain unpunished. The spirit of enthusiasm once kindled by the popular clamour of the partisans of Philip, the general voice of Greece united in one grand effort to exterminate the sacrilegious! Similarity
of

of circumstances recalled to memory the Phoceans—" Philip subdued them—why " should he not be equally irresistible against " the Locrians?" Accustomed to this manner of reasoning, his enemies did not dare oppose it, for fear of the imputation of impiety—and the Amphyctions had at length recourse to him for redress.

IN the same proportion that this prince had hitherto imposed upon mankind by avoiding exterior marks of splendour and parade, he now gave the reins to his ambitious hopes. Under the sanction of religion, and with the applause of Greece, nothing could exceed the magnificence of his preparations. The Locrians were no sooner defeated than, taking advantage of that exhilarating flow of spirits which always accompanies success, and impels people to deeds of prowess they never dreamed of, Philip made himself master of Elatea; collected his forces there; and, under colour of punishing Athens for assisting the Locrians, turned the fury of his arms against that city. The appearance of an enemy at their gates affected

ed what the oratory of Demosthenes pleaded for in vain. The citizens, tearing themselves from the enchantment of publick shews, re-assumed their martial genius—they concluded a treaty with the Thebans, whom Philip had treated with indignity, after first rendering them obnoxious in Beotia, and these two republicks defended their liberties with the most heroic valour.

THE battle of Cheronea decided the fate of Greece. Philip, ever attentive to sow dissensions amongst his enemies, and temper, by acts of clemency, that severity which the exigencies of affairs sometimes constrained him to exercise, prepossessed the Athenians in his favour by his beneficence; he returned their prisoners unransomed—offered advantageous terms of accommodation—whilst he pursued the Thebans with inveteracy; refusing them terms of peace, till he had placed garrisons in their citadels. The strong passes of Greece were now guarded by Macedonians: by troops to whom victory was familiar. Every one trembled at the name of Philip, or adored his moderation:

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but

but his new empire wanted stability; and the reduction of the Greeks was a less insuperable difficulty than to render them patient under the yoke of servitude. Their passions had insensibly led them to the brink of the precipice, unconscious of danger—but the appearance of a despotic ruler must infallibly open their eyes; and a nation is never more formidable than in the struggles of expiring liberty, abhorring, and unaccustomed to submission. Encompassed by a number of republicks whose citizens were inconstant, restless, proud, impetuous, and expert in war, the most trifling circumstance might be productive of a revolution, or at least of a series of insurrections that would have reduced Macedon to the necessity of frequent skirmishes, without the least prospect of emolument. But Philip conducted his plan with as much sagacity as he had formed it. I scarce recollect a more striking object of political observation than the behaviour of this monarch after the battle of Cheronæa. The ostentation of conquest was tempered with a desire to win the affections of those whom his victory alarmed. The
government

government and laws of every city were inviolably preserved. By secretly embroiling the Greeks with the court of Persia, he deprived them of foreign assistance against Macedon. In flattering their vanity and teaching their ambition to aspire to the conquest of Asia, Philip became the director of those military preparations, which might have been detrimental to himself—he enslaved them in the midst of their country, and deprived them of the power of resistance. Already had he sent detachments into Persia commanded by generals of his own—already was he prepared to follow them at the head of a formidable army—when he was assassinated! This event was no sooner published than the Thracians, Illyrians, Peonians, and Taulentians appeared in arms. The Greeks, on their side, fancied liberty was again restored; and, concluding the young successor of Philip too much engrossed by the Persian war to have leisure to attend to their reduction, fell into domestick disputes. But Alexander soon convinced them he was invincible every where; Thracians, Peonians,

Illyrians, Taulentians, all returned to their allegiance! This prince appeared in Greece to intimidate her citizens by a terrible example, in the demolition of the city of Thebes—the first that raised the standard of rebellion. Availing himself of the general consternation, he persuaded the Amphycions to confer on him the title of Generalissimo as they had done upon his father, and marched with all expedition to the conquest of Asia.

THE declension of that empire had been apparent ever since the reign of Xerxes. That monarch's successors, discouraged by the affront his arms had sustained in Greece, thought no more of extending their territories; and, from that period, neglected the necessary measures of security. The calm blessings of peace degenerated into sloth and voluptuousness: the pressure of a crown was too heavy a burthen for a monarch, sinking under the lassitude of pleasure. Imprisoned in their palaces, the Eastern princes delegated their authority to rapacious, cruel, ignorant, and treacherous ministers.

THE

THE policy of Artaxerxes, surnamed Longimanus, consisted in fomenting intestine divisions amongst the Greeks; balancing their advantages; cherishing their rivalry; and, by engaging them in civil contests, diverted their attention from decents into Asia. Views thus timid, degraded the empire of Cyrus to a rank inferior to Athens, or Lacedemon, and debased the minds of his subjects to a familiarity with cowardice and contempt.

THE reigns of Xerxes II. and Sogclianus were short, and rendered infamous by debauchery and cruelty. These monsters were succeeded by Darius Nothus. He was a slave decorated with the ornaments of royalty; abject in submission to whoever chose to govern him; he disengaged himself from the shackles of some of his eunuchs, who had made him their instrument of oppression, only to submit more servilely to the imperious authority of his wife.

UNDER Artaxerxes Mnemon, all transactions in Persia were decided by women, and
 K 3 favourites.

favourites. The vices of this prince was not so strongly marked as to render him odious; but the pusillanimity of his character led him to tolerate in the Satrapes and courtiers those enormities he had not courage to commit. His brother was near succeeding in an attempt on the crown; and in the course of frequent revolts, towards the close of his reign, all those disgraceful crimes were perpetrated that are an equal dishonour to the head and the heart.

“ COULD I forget, said Xerxes I. on a
 “ former occasion, the injuries my father
 “ suffered from the Greeks—the conflagration
 “ of Sardis—the depradations in Asia—
 “ the fatal battle of Marathon—do not
 “ imagine that they would be affected with
 “ such moderation! —It would only excite
 “ their pride—my generosity would be
 “ construed fear, or imbecility—and the
 “ very nation I neglected to chastise would
 “ enter Asia sword in hand.—It is an impossibility
 “ that the Persians and Greek
 “ should ever be united—their reciprocal
 aversion

“ averſion and contempt is an inſurmountable obſtacle — Either Greece muſt become a province to Perſia, or Perſia ſubmit to receive laws from Greece.”

THEſe descendants of Xerxes regarded theſe words as the ſtandard of Perſian politicks; particularly after the battles of Salamina, Platea, Mycale, and the progreſs made by the Athenians under Cimon, had demonſtrated their truth in the cleareſt light. Artaxerxes Mnemon ought to have regulated his conduct by the conſideration of thoſe national antipathies which nothing can ſubdue; and every thing augments. The wrongs of individuals are often obliterated by marks of ſincere repentance. The renovation of an interrupted intimacy kindles in the ſoul freſh ſentiments of affection and friendſhip; but rival ſtates are exempt from theſe advantages. Publick alliances are in their nature different from private connections; and ſeldom have power to ſuppreſs national jealousies. Suspicion gives birth to ſecret prejudices, and it is not uncommon to ſee two

nations whom chance has united in the same interest, from the prevalency of custom, indulge a disposition to hate and depreciate each other.

To Artaxerxes it appertained to put a period to the long disagreement between his Predecessors and the Grecian republics: and if the reader recollects the remarks on the situation of Greece at the death of Epaminondas, he will be able to determine the facility of taking advantage of those fortunate circumstances which contributed to the success of Philip. Applications to the court of Persia for redress and protection, were become an established custom. Artaxerxes himself had acquired great reputation in Greece; Several of her cities had submitted their differences to his arbitration. He dictated the terms of peace of which he was guarantee; or, by refusing his assistance to all, rendered them equally incapable of supporting a war. Thus the great obstacle was surmounted; and the Greeks disposed for the reception of Persian bonds, waited only the command of the conqueror. Freed from

from the observation of those wise and prudent precautions which a prince, circumscribed in power like Philip, was obliged to regard, Artaxerxes would have been equally successful, if to a lavish distribution of Persian gold, he had added a powerful fleet. By a sudden invasion of Macedon, he might have been master of the throne, before Alexander could have suppressed the revolts in his neighbourhood, or established himself upon it.

BUT the understanding of Artaxerxes was too contracted for the comprehension of these advantages, and his soul incapable of energy and resolution to soar above the timid policy of his predecessors, and snatch the laurels Fortune offered to his acceptance. The intrepidity of the ten thousand Greeks who followed Cyrus the younger, in his expedition, and whose retreat is undoubtedly the most extraordinary event in ancient history, deceived Artaxerxes in his opinion of a nation, whose military ardour was much diminished since the days of Themistocles.

Impressed with an idea of their irresistible courage, he trembled at their name, and, after experiencing the superior excellence of the troops of Agesilaus, thought himself supremely happy in the removal of so formidable an enemy, by bribing some of the Grecian states to make a diversion in his favour, in Laconia.

THE accession of Ochus to the throne offered an alarming spectacle to the eyes of Persia. This monster put such of his brothers to death as were more worthy of a throne than himself; and afterwards extended his proscriptions to his whole family. Loathsome with their blood, mingled with that of his subjects, he became totally immersed in voluptuousness: The eunuch Bagoas was the only man in Persia superior to him in vice. One shudders at the thought of his inhumanity!—but a wretch so abandoned was a proper instrument to revenge the groans of an injured nation.

ARSES grasped the sceptre of his father with a trembling hand; and Bagoas, who soon

soon caused him to be dispatched, bestowed the crown on Darius Codomanus.

IF one wicked, weak, or luxurious prince is, frequently sufficient to overturn a monarchy established on solid and equitable principles, how was it possible the empire of Cyrus should resist the united vices of his successors? The character of Darius is treated with little less contempt by historians than those of the preceding princes—yet the difference is obvious. Darius had personal courage, was generous, and humane: notwithstanding he possessed an authority without limitation, did not disdain to consult the laws, or to be attentive to the manners of his subjects. But his mind was unlightened and irresolute; nor was he endowed with any of those active qualities whose exertion might have defended his throne against the storm that threatened it. Alexander and Darius began their reigns almost at the same period, and had the latter been a truly great prince, there was not time to reform the abuses, supply the defects of government, or fix the springs capable of giving velocity to so vast

an empire, and enable it to resist a potent enemy. The efforts of Darius to animate his torpid subjects with the fire that glowed in his own breast, were fruitless: he had nothing to oppose the invincible Alexander but men to whom the glory or disgrace of their country was equally indifferent; soldiers without valour or discipline, accustomed to fly before the Greeks; courtiers whose debauched hearts eagerly triumphed over the imbecility of their prince, and the calamities of the publick to gratify their avarice, and ambition, or the mean jealousy of a faction.

ALEXANDER entered Asia with an army of thirty thousand infantry, and five thousand cavalry. Darius was defeated; and Persia subdued by the arms of Macedon. Yet the plan of Philip remained unfinished. It consisted, as I have already observed, in diverting the Greeks from apprehensions of slavery; wasting the national strength that nourished their confidence; rendering obedience familiar; and in constituting an empire,

pire, in which Greece must inevitably be included. This was the foundation of the Asiatic war. His son's motive of action was characteristically different. The rage of conquest urged him to attack Darius—He wished to overturn, not establish empires.—An enterprize, prudent in the hands of Philip, became rash in those of Alexander. The project of the *father* was, to begin his expedition with the junction of two hundred and thirty thousand Greeks; thus re-inforced, the hope of defeating Darius became a certainty, and he might rationally expect more durable success than Agesilaus; when, supported by the whole military force of Greece, he could have no interruptions to dread from attacks upon his hereditary dominions. The *son* demanded only a moderate reinforcement from his allies; an imprudence still more unjustifiable, as he was not ignorant of the jealousy of the Greeks, nor insensible that the Persians might, with little difficulty, engage some of the neighbouring republics to avail themselves of his absence in the commission of acts of hostility.

If

IF Darius had not been intimidated by the rash presumption of Alexander! if he had followed the wise advice of Mnemon, and imitated the policy of his predecessors in a liberal dispensation of money to the Greeks; if he had invited those troops to his banner whom the enemy had neglected, is there not great probability that Alexander, who entered Asia with as little prudence [*e*] as Agesilaus, would have shared his fate? The one was obliged to relinquish his conquests, and renounce the well-grounded expectation of destroying an empire, formerly the terror of Greece, to fly to the assistance of Sparta—The other must have imitated his

[*e*] I have taken notice in the preceeding book of the imprudence the Lacedemonians were guilty of, in commencing a war with Persia, whilst, notwithstanding their advantages over the Athenians, their authority in Greece was far from permanent. Had Agesilaus been as great a politician as he was a general, he would not have neglected to draw a quota of troops from each republick, to complete his army. In a word he had been another Philip—*See the Elogium on Agesilaus by Xenophon—Plutarch—Diodorus Siculus.*

his example for the defence of his hereditary dominions.

THAT insatiable thirst of fame, unquenched with the vast monarchy of Cyrus, which penetrated into India—meditated the conquest of Africa—and, after reducing Spain and Gaul, would pass the Alpes and re-enter Macedon through ruined Italy, was extremely remote from the views of Philip, and substituted nothing rational in exchange. Wherein does the glory of those conquests consist whose sole object is the depopulation of mankind? What appellation ought we to bestow on a hero who sees only the prospect before him—regardless of the dreary waste behind? Who, marching with the fury and impetuosity of a torrent, deluges the earth with blood, is swept away from its face, leaving indelible traces of ruin and devastation? What hopes could Alexander indulge? what advantage could his country reap from victories so extensive? could he be insensible that greatness so extravagant was never permanent? that to preserve acquisitions

sitions so enlarged — so rapidly obtained — so inadequate to the strength of Macedon — was an absolute impossibility? To suppose him incapable of discerning such self evident truths, or even of unraveling the mysteries and ultimate end of his father's politicks, is to confine the understanding of this conqueror to very narrow limits: but if, on the contrary, his acute penetration pierced through every object of ambition, and yet found all too little for its gratification, we ought to consider him as a mad man! as the pest and detestation of society.

DARIUS offered Alexander ten thousand talents, and the half of his empire: terms so advantageous that Parmenio thought it imprudent to reject them. “I would accept them, said the minister, If I was Alexander: So would I, replied the monarch, “were I Parmenio!” This reply, not admirable for its good sense, has been applauded as an elucidation of the character of Alexander, in proving his courage and ambition.

to be equally unbounded. Philip would have thought like Parmenio, and immediately have concluded a peace. The half of Asia under his jurisdiction, his talents would have been assiduously employed in promoting the glory and welfare of Macedon. Attracted within the circle of his power, he would have taught the Greeks to fear and respect its influence. In a word, he would have laid the foundation of a mighty empire; and in establishing order and regularity among the several provinces of his dominions, have left his successors in a state of maintaining and extending their conquests.

AN investigation of the character of these two monarchs, in this point of view, will afford an amazing contrast. In Philip to behold a politician superior to all events, and formed to govern mankind. Fortune can oppose no obstacles which his prescience had not discerned, and which, conformably to their different nature, his wisdom, patience, resolution, or activity will not enable him to surmount. We discover a genius
comprehensive

comprehensive and elevated; that connects an astonishing succession of enterprizes, and executes them with a force proportionate to their magnitude. Every movement is consequential to the original plan, and an introduction to what is necessary for its accomplishment.

IN Alexander we see an extraordinary hero, whose valour, rash and impetuous, impels him, if I am allowed the expression, to cut the *Gordian Knot* his father would have loosed. The excess of his virtues and vices surprizes our reason, and represents him *Great*, because, in contemplating the shining parts of his character, we are sensible of the inferiority of our own; and instead of regarding this singular phenomenon with astonishment, we cannot withhold our applause.

LET fancy transport Philip into Asia, commander in chief of the confederate army: supposing his prudence less calculated to intimidate Darius than the enthusiasm of Alexander,

Alexander, it had nevertheless conducted him to the same end. The intrepidity of Alexander was successful in impressing the heart of Darius with fear, a passion that deprives the understanding of exertion, chills the imagination, and renders all the faculties of the soul vapid and insensible. From Philip that monarch had experienced a different kind of consternation: he would have encompassed him with snares; he would have availed himself of the divisions in the Asiatic provinces, whose inhabitants, disunited in manners, religion, and laws, had not the least connection with each other; and, by blowing up the sparks of rebellion, he would have tempted the ambition of the proud Satrapes to grasp at independency. Philip would have traded in cities; and, according to the sarcasm upon him, carried on the war like a merchant, as well as a general; whilst the Persian empire had fallen a prey to bribery; and Darius, perhaps without any decisive blow, had seen the gradual dissolution of his power.

PLACE

PLACE Alexander in his father's situation, and Macedon (declined from the imbecility of the late princes,) must have fallen a victim to his temerity—no soon does a neighbouring power seek to take advantage of the confusion and weakness of the government, than he flies to revenge the insult, unfurnished with troops, arms, or money! A recapitulation of the delicate conjunctures Philip was engaged in, is superfluous; I confine myself to that refinement of policy which raised the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium.—Was Alexander capable of such a conduct?

THE adoption of the Persian manners, so opposite to those of his country, is imputed by some writers, zealous to support the glory of their hero, to political dissimulation; an effort to conciliate the affections of the barbarians, and establish his new empire on the basis of confidence. If this was his real motive, the fallacy of his judgment surely deserves reprehension! In order to ingratiate himself with his new subjects, was it prudent to appear odious in the eyes of his old ones?

Though

Though greatly inferior in number, it required more caution and address to govern their passions. The Greeks were brave, military, and tenacious of liberty:—the Persians, accustomed to fawn, and submissive to the rod of despotism, were voluntary slaves. It was therefore on the side of Greece, rather than on that of Persia, the kingdom of Macedon could be menaced with a revolution. An opinion verified at the death of Alexander, when the Greeks attempted to break their chains, whilst the Asiatics continued indolently obedient. A celebrated politician assigns a reason for this difference. What advantage, says he, could accrue to Persia from preferring the family of Darius to the successors of Alexander? Whoever dethrones a despotic monarch, has little reason to fear the object of his ambition should he be wrested from him. The leaders of the Persian army were immoral and pusillanimous, over whom Darius had exercised supreme authority; after his fall, not one of them had credit to arm the people in his favour, or lead them on to revenge
the

the death of a master whose life was immaterial to their felicity.

THIS alteration in the manners of Alexander, proceeded from a real depravity of principles. On entering the tent of Darius, adorned with the richest and most magnificent ornaments, that prince's soul, till then wholly engrossed by the love of glory, was so struck with the brilliant appearance of the objects round him, that he could not forbear exclaiming to his attendants, "This is indeed to reign!" The seeds of corruption became matured by the sunshine of prosperity.—Conqueror of the world, he eagerly wished to enjoy its luxuries.

NOTWITHSTANDING the enlarged idea of Plutarch, it is not easy to conceive that Alexander ever thought of connecting the various provinces of his empire under one plan of legislation, whose permanency was to be the wonder of posterity. The more the qualities that constitute the hero were conspicuous, the less room was there to display those of the legislator. So far was Alexander

Alexander from applying remedies to moderate the ambition of his generals, that he foresaw their animosities with a kind of transport, and considered their future wars as *Funeral Games* instituted to his memory. Did he not light the *Torch* himself by his indeterminate appointment of the succession. "To the most worthy?" There is great probability he believed it of importance to his fame, that he, alone, could wield the sceptre of the globe! and that several powerful monarchies should be formed from the ruins of his empire!

END OF BOOK III.

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A
S U M M A R Y
O F
B O O K IV.

CONTENTIONS among the successors of Alexander.—Survey of the Macedonian empire.—What conduct Greece ought to have observed at that period.—Origin of the establishment, and regulations of the Achaian league.—Defence of the policy of Aratus against the accusations of Plutarch.—Injudicious conduct of Philip of Macedon, during the second Punic war.—Vanquished by the Romans.—Progress of the latter in Greece, till its reduction to a Roman province.

NOTWITHSTANDING the servile acquiescence of the Persians, and the nerveless languor of the Greeks, the grandeur of Macedon inclined towards destruction. Empires so vast as that

that of Alexander, seem destined to sink by their own preponderance. Sometimes, this is the effect of that security from foreign invasions which renders men inattentive to prudential measures, and occasions a relaxation in the springs of government. At others, it results from the supineness of the ministers, who have not virtue to resist the licentious temptations which surround them: whilst the people, harrassed with repeated acts of oppression, abandon themselves to lethargic inactivity. Another cause still more predominant, is that imbecility, the infallible consequence of extensive dominion; and totally irreconcilable with the harmony necessary to be maintained in every part. The dilatory execution of orders, unavoidable from distance, and the inadequate proportion between abuses and their political remedies, render it impossible for *prudence*, ever less ingenious than the *passions*, to restrain that torrent of vice, whose force encreases with its rapidity, overwhelming in its course all the duties of society.

THE terror that accompanied the name of Alexander—that admiration for his per-

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son, which a thousand heroic qualities inspired, joined to the enthusiastic fire which animated his troops, was the sole cement that retained so many discordant nations in obedience.

THE reign of that prince was too short, and his monarchy too slightly established at his death, to have given sanction to laws, or authority to customs. His camp was not a school to inculcate moderation and justice. Ambition must have intoxicated the generals of a hero whose maxim it was that courage and force were legitimate titles to a kingdom wherever they could make subjects. Invested with almost absolute power, partakers of the splendour of Alexander—could they be expected to yield a tame submission to the authority of a weak [a] prince, and an infant still in the cradle?

HAD Perdicas, who was appointed regent, possessed all the talents and sagacity of Philip

[a] Aridæus, brother of Alexander, who took the name of Philip on his accession to the throne, in conjunction with his nephew, son of Alexander and Roxana.

Philip, he could not possibly have maintained order and subordination in the realm. The supreme character he appeared in was insupportable to commanders conscious of equality of rank. Instead of dazzling them by the lustre of his situation, he only irritated their pride and pretension. It is true that the fear of publick odium restrained them from open acts of rebellion and defiance, but they paid no deference to the regent's commands. Each lieutenant of the provinces regulated his administration by laws that corresponded best with his own interest—levied troops, erected fortresses at pleasure, and refused to render any account of the publick taxes and tributes. The monarchy of Alexander, though yet apparently united, was in reality already broken into separate, independent districts.

In a situation so critical, Perdiccas had no method to keep the people in allegiance, but by giving remarkable proofs of attachment to the reigning family. He had in some degree preserved his authority if he would have divided it with the council, or concurred in measures with the principal

nobles, after the example of Eumenes, to enforce the fiction of [b] Alexander's *immediate presence*. But whether his vanity was too great for the concealment of his ambition; or that his knowledge of the Macedonian generals convinced him, however irreproachable his conduct might be, their artful insinuations would render it suspected, and their malice supply pretences to justify a civil war; Perdiccas by his marriage with Cleopatra, the sister of Alexander, discovered to the world the extent of his views, and his resolution to support them by arms.

SCARCELY

[b] The ingenious fiction of Eumenes, imposed on the superstitious minds of Antigonus and Teutamus, chief officers of the Ayraspidæ, whose envy and emulation disdained to be directed by him; he pretended that Alexander appeared to him in a vision, and shewed him a magnificent pavillion, richly ornamented with a regal throne, and promised if they would sit in council, there he himself would be always present, to direct and prosper their consultations and achievements, provided they addressed their prayers to him. A splendid tent was accordingly erected, and a throne within it, called *the throne of Alexander*, where the nobles met to deliberate on affairs of consequence. *Plutarch's Life of Eumenes*.

SCARCELY had the regent made the necessary preparations for attacking Ptolomy, who had thrown off his authority in Egypt, when Antigonus, the most politic and aspiring of all Alexander's lieutenants, represented him as an usurper, whose machinations were at work to dispossess the nobles of their governments, plant in them creatures of his own, and, as the completion of his crimes, would sacrifice the two kings of Macedon to his ambition. Less plausible accusations had sufficed to kindle the flame of war throughout an empire, where each individual was eager for its commencement, and every lieutenant of a province flattered his hopes with gaining the principal advantage in its prosecution.

PERDICCAS whom severity and pride rendered obnoxious to the army, fell the victim of an insurrection, by the swords of conspirators. The very troops who were marching against Ptolomy offered him the regency; but that monarch, [c] for we may allow the

L 3 appellation

[c] The lieutenants of provinces, though independent in their governments, did not assume the title of king till after the extinction of the family of Alexander. Antigonus set the example, which was soon followed by Ptolomy and the other generals.

appellation, judiciously refused a dignity whose prerogatives were impossible to be maintained, without exciting the envy and animosity of his competitors; and, in bestowing an ideal, yet contested title to the succession of Alexander, would probably have hazarded the loss of Egypt. The regency was entrusted to Aridaus and Pithon, leaders of the conspiracy that destroyed Perdiccas; but they were unequal to the weight, and resigned it to Antipater, governor of Macedonia, who had led his forces into Asia to make a diversion in favour of Ptolemy, against Eumenes, and those other generals who continued faithful to Perdiccas, and their allegiance to the royal family.

ANTIPATER, not inferior to Ptolemy in political discernment, did not think himself obliged to sacrifice the advantages of his situation to the interest of this new appointment. Whether by his connection with the revolting chiefs he was informed of their designs, and, in consequence of these informations, convinced the Macedonian empire must

must be of short duration, or whether he apprehended danger from the renunciation of his engagements with them, to contract new and precarious ones with the friends of Perdiccas and the crown, he certainly did not hesitate to bring disgrace upon the regency, and precipitate the ruin of the state. In a fresh distribution of the provinces, he displaced Eumenes, and the rest of the loyal generals, and assigned them to the most declared and dangerous enemies of Macedon,

THE consequences of this regulation was a bloody war in Asia, amongst the lieutenants of Alexander. The present possessors shewed no inclination to resign their provinces upon a simple order from the regent, and those appointed to succeed were resolved to support their destination by the sword. Amidst this general tendency towards rebellion, Antipater repassed into Europe with the two kings under his protection, and confined his attention to the government of Macedonia, seemed to forget that her sons had conquered the world.

THE conduct of the Greeks would have been prudent, had they waited the result of the first contentions in Asia, of which I have been speaking as a thing easily foreseen, before they made any attempt for the recovery of their freedom.

PHOCION was industrious to repress the ardour of the Athenians, impatient to take the field, the moment they heard of the death of the Macedonian hero. "If Alexander is dead to day, says he, will he not be so to morrow and the next day?" But Demosthenes, who was recalled from exile, expatiated with his usual eloquence, on the invaluable blessings of liberty, on the disgrace of his country, and, in exhorting it to resistance, strengthened the yoke of servitude.

A complete victory gained by Leosthenes, general of the confederates, over Antipater, could not in its consequences be productive of great utility: and whilst the Athenians and their allies were transported [d] with joy,
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[d] The Phocians, Dorians, Locrians, Atnians, Atissians

did not Phocion say with reason, "That it
 " would have given him pleasure to gain the
 " battle, but shame to be the author of the
 " counsel!"

WHAT advantage could Greece expect from opposition to a monarchy powerful as the Macedonian, whilst united? Without the concurrence of a dissension amongst the successors of Alexander, what could it avail to defeat Antipater? No sooner was it known, than reinforcements were sent him from every corner of the globe, Clitus fitted out a formidable fleet; Leonatus entered Europe with the military forces of Phrygia; Craterus led with him from Cilicia six thousand Macedonians, the better half of whom had accompanied Alexander in all his expeditions; besides these he had a thousand Persian infantry, and five hundred cavalry. This inundation of auxiliaries Phocion foresaw—this was his motive for striving to stem the blind and impetuous ardour of his countrymen. Supposing that,

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instead

Atissians, Dolopians, the Athamantes and Leucadians, some cantons of Illyria and Thrace—the Thessalians—great part of Peloponnesus, viz. the people of Argos, Sycione, Elío, Messenæ and Acæ.

instead of revenging his defeat—imposing heavier chains destroying democratical government in Athens—banishing part of her citizens to Thrace—or garrisoning the fortrefs of Munychia, Antipater had been a second time defeated in an engagement of still greater consequence, he must soon have been recruited by numbers sufficient to overturn the foundations of Greece, before the strength of Macedon had been impaired, or the seeds of civil discord ripened into action.

BUT when Perdiccas declared war against Ptolomy the face of affairs was as favourable to a revolt in Greece as it had been hitherto averse. So far was Antipater from drawing assistance from Asia, that he sent thither the remainder of his troops to oppose the designs of Perdiccas, and support Antigonus and Ptolomy, whose preservation was of infinite importance to all the enterprizing spirits of the empire. Antipater would have offered peace to the Greeks on advantageous terms, as he did to the Ætolians with whom he was, at war; Perdiccas and his adherents would have courted their alliance as zealously as they

they did that of the Ætolians: [*e*] in a word, their situation must have given them consequence, they might have appeared respectable to the successors of Alexander, and have found no obstacle to the restoration of liberty, but the turpitude of their own hearts.

So far was Greece from availing herself of these advantages at the commencement of the disturbances in Macedon, that she fell the earliest victim of the war. Reduced by the fury of Antipater to a state of imbecility that rendered them despicable, the voice of reason was no longer heard among the

L. 6

Greeks

[*e*] When Antipater marched into Asia, Perdiccas concluded a treaty with the Ætolians, by which they engaged to make a diversion in his favour. They accordingly entered Thessaly with an army of sixteen thousand men, possessed themselves of several fortresses, and opposed Polycles the lieutenant of Antipater. Being necessitated to recall a considerable part of their forces to defend them against the Acamanians, they dismantled most of the strong places of Thessaly — Polyperchon, another of Antipater's lieutenants, attacked the Ætolians that remained, and recovered the garrisoned cities.

Greeks. Their country was the theatre of the war—their cities, which 'till then had preserved the shadow of liberty, were a prey to a legion of tyrants; who, under covert of the disorder of the times, usurped the supreme authority. I shall only mention the Macedonian affairs so far as may be necessary for understanding those of Greece.

ANTIPATER enjoyed his honours but a short time; and instead of bequeathing them to his son, he appointed Polyperchon to succeed him in the regency, and in the government of Macedonia. Cassander, enraged at this apparent injustice, thirsted for revenge, and was eager to acquire the possession of a kingdom which he regarded as a lawful right of inheritance. But as he had filled only subaltern posts, he was destitute of money, vessels, troops, and every thing requisite for the execution of his design. He communicated it to Seleucus, governor of Babylon, and to Antigonus, who had conquered Asia-Minor. These men, whose ambition sought means of fomenting and multiplying the general disturbances and rendering the regency contemptible, flattered Cassander's resentment,

ment, in supplying him with an army to facilitate his enterprize.

POLYPERCHON weakly established in his government, was obliged to abandon it on the approach of Cassander, and retreat into Peloponnesus, with that part of the soldiery whose fidelity he could trust, and the treasure amassed by the kings of Macedon. This latter circumstance drew to his standard all those mercenary Greeks, who made arms their profession, and whose venality enlisted under the best pay-master. Of these Philip used to say, war was their time of repose. Polyperchon afterwards endeavoured to interest Greece in his favour, by issuing a decree for the substitution of democratic government, in the room of aristocratic, established by Antipater. He authorized the republicks to banish their magistrates, and engaged them by a solemn oath never to undertake any thing prejudicial to the welfare of Macedon. But vain was the attempt of Polyperchon to reanimate the languid genius of Greece. Overwhelmed with the pressure of disgrace, sentiment was totally annihilated. An alteration in the system of government

government was productive of new disorders, in reviving the customs of proscription, and exile; and Polyperchon, necessitated to act on the defensive, in order to secure the fidelity of several Grecian states, resolved to appoint lieutenants, who abused their power, and soon became real tyrants,

WHILST the regent of the empire was acting the part of an adventurer in Peloponnesus, whilst the race of tyrants multiplied in Greece, and Macedon every day experienced some revolution injurious to the family of Alexander, whose fate at last was truly deplorable, Eumenes, Alcetas, and Attalus were defeated by Antigonus. He destroyed the remaining friends of Perdiccas and the government. This success entitled him, in some degrees, to the sovereignty of Asia, but his insatiable ambition was only to be gratified by the monarchy of Alexander. He considered Ptolomy, Seleucus, Lyfimachus, and Cassander as so many troublesome rivals, whose fortune he could not contemplate without envy and vexation. Whether Macedon, by its acquired reputation under Philip and Alexander, offered a
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more brilliant prize to his ambition, or whether he thought the possession of that kingdom invested her sovereigns with a right to attempt the recovery of those provinces torn from its dominion, it was with Cassander that Antigonus determined to commence the war.

WITH this view he sought an alliance with Polyperchon, cherished his hopes, and furnished him with forces to pursue them; at the same time, to conciliate the favour of the Grecian cities, he published a decree restoring their rights of freedom, and relieved them from the oppression of foreign garrisons. His son Demetrius, surnamed Poliorcetes, made two voyages to Greece, to enforce his father's decree. This young hero, it must be confessed, drove the garrisons of Ptolomy from the greater part of the fortresses, and dispossessed Cassander of the places he occupied, yet the calamitous state of the citizens was not redressed: the armies which ravaged their country robbed them of that liberty granted by inefficacious decrees. Their only advantage, if it could be stiled one, was to change their masters, and to behold

behold their enemies reciprocally dealing out destruction on each other, as the punishment of lust of power.

CASSANDER, on the point of losing every thing, opened the eyes of Seleucus, Ptolomy, and Lyfimachus, to the prospect of impending danger. His remonstrances made them sensible of their imprudence in suffering the extraordinary aggrandizement of a neighbouring potentate, without opposition, convinced them that they must be involved in the misfortunes which threatened Cassander; that his ruin was an introductory step towards their own; that the genius of Antigonus was too aspiring to suffer the conquest of Macedon to terminate his expectations; and that now, if ever, was the moment to form an association against that invader. The four monarchs entered immediately into alliance, and the famous battle of Ipsus finally determined the succession of Alexander: Antigonus was defeated, and lost his life in the field, and his enemies divided the spoil.

GREECE might have had room, for exultation on her deliverance from tyrannical oppressors,

oppressors, or at least have tasted some of the blessings of peace, under the protection of the kings of Macedon, to whose lot she had fallen; but it was the destiny of this unfortunate country to be the scene of the uncommon adventures of a prince, on whom *Fortune* seemed disposed to exhaust all her caprice.

DEMETRIUS Poliorcetes had saved from the wreck of his father's kingdom only the city of Tyre, the Isle of Cyprus, and a small tract of land on the borders of Asia. Since the example of Alexander, whoever possessed ambition, hope, and resolution, thought himself sufficiently entitled to erect an empire. Greece appeared an inviting temptation to Demetrius, who had friends there that supplied him constantly with intelligence, and whilst he marched towards conquest, at the head of an army of adventurers equal to the task, he was deprived of his original possessions. *Fortune* indemnified this young hero, in taking advantage of the contentions among the sons of Cassander, about the right of succession, and seated him on the throne of Macedon. Despoiled of his
sceptre

sceptre in about seven years, his restless spirit sought fresh acquisitions in Asia; leaving his son Antigonus Gonatus some forces for his defence in Greece. A prince who, according to the report of historians, acted on the same political principles as Polyperchon; placed tyrants in some cities, and was the declared protector of such as had usurped sovereign authority in others. Supported by these, he became powerful enough to recover the kingdom of Macedon, on the death of Sosthenes, confirm his regal power, and transmit it to his posterity.

WHILST the slavery of Greece grew every day more rigid, harassed by events which I have slightly touched upon, the Ætolians, 'till then undistinguished by any important enterprize, began to be the subject of discourse. Of all the Greeks, this people alone persevered in the illiberal practice of robbery and piracy, which the rules of civil society had banished from the other states.

THE Ætolians, says Polybius, are rather ferocious beasts than men: justice, rectitude, treaties,

treaties, alliances, are with them empty names, the objects of their derision. Accustomed to subsist by plunder, they spared their allies, only when they could gratify their rapacity on their enemies. When Greece was in a state of keeping them in awe, their depredations were confined to Macedonia, Illyria, the islands least connected with the continent, and to the sea.

THINGS assumed a different aspect when the Greeks were sunk in depravity, rent with divisions, and enfeebled by domestic wars. The Ætolians at first levied contributions on particular districts of the Peloponnesus, by degrees spread desolation throughout that province, and by alliances with one or other of the successors of Alexander; at length extended their encroachments to the rest of Greece.

THE havock committed by this savage race, recalled to remembrance, in some republicks, their ancient associations. Dyma, Trytæa, Patras, and Pharæa, then [f] chief

[f] These cities were twelve in number; Patras, Dyma, Pharæa, Tritæa, Leontium, Ægina, Pellene, Ægium, Bura, Ceraunia, Olenus, Helice: this last was washed away by the sea a little before the battle of Leuctra.

chief cities of Achaia, and most exposed to inroads from the Ætolians, were the first to form an alliance, which was afterwards the basis of a more extensive league, of which I shall trace the progress; as that confederacy placed Achaia in a situation similar to what Sparta and Athens formerly filled in Greece.

*become
a free
nation* ACHAIA, like other Grecian states, had been originally governed by kings. These were the descendants of Orestes, and preserved the crown in his family; 'till the sons of Ogyges, incurring the peoples resentment, were expelled the kingdom. The Achaians became a free nation; each city was an independant republick: enjoying its particular territories, laws, and magistrates. The distinctions introduced by monarchy disappeared, and supreme authority was vested in the people. Democracy, so tempestuous in other republicks of Greece, introduced no disorders in Achaia, because it was tempered by a general system of legislature, or defensive association, to which every city, conscious of its weakness separately, paid a voluntary submission. A circumstance naturally

naturally arising from a perfect uniformity in genius, consequence, measures, laws, and interests.

THESE several republicks renounced the privilege of contracting particular alliances with foreign powers; agreed that the most exact equality should be the basis of their union; and that the power or antiquity of any city should have no superior prerogatives. They created a national senate, appointed to assemble at Ægium at the beginning of spring and autumn.

*Create a
National
Senate.*

THIS congress was composed of an equal number of deputies from each republick, who were the arbiters of peace and war; had the sole privilege of making treaties, establishing peculiar laws relative to the authority of the senate; nominating ambassadors; and receiving thole of foreign powers. If during the senate's recess, some important and unexpected affair intervened the two Prætors were impowered to convoke an extraordinary assembly. These magistrates, annually chosen, commanded the armies; and though not authorized to undertake any thing without the participati-
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on and consent of ten commissioners, who composed a council, yet they appeared, in some degree, the representatives of publick authority, during the prorogation of the senate, wherein they presided.

THE happy result of these political regulations was, that the citizens of Achaia enjoyed liberty without the fear of losing it; and in confining their attention to civil affairs, and avoiding to interfere in the more material concerns of government, they escaped those tempestuous mental agitations, the source of party and cabal, and, almost ever, the destruction of a Democracy.—The Achaians, peculiarly inclined to moderation, neither studied to acquire riches in profusion, or to appear formidable to their neighbours by military fame. The senate, obliged to conform its conduct to the natural genius of the people, was unambitious, and of course, in all its decrees. discovered an invariable adherence to justice. This attachment to virtue rendered the character of the Achaian senate so respectable, as frequently to have the honour referred to it of accommodating disputes in Peloponnesus, and

and other parts of Greece, nay even amongst foreign nations.

THE Achaïans, indulged by Philip and Alexander in the possession of their laws and constitution, I might almost venter to add of their liberty, were no longer exempt from the misfortunes that Greece had experienced from their successors. The cities of Achaïa suffered equal indignities with those of Macedonia: some were forced to admit the garrisons of Polyperchon, others those of Cassander, Demetrius, or Antigonus Gonatus. The rest nourished domestick tyrants, and all the bonds of society were cancelled.

SUCH was the situation of Achaïa when the city of Dyma and the three aforementioned cities laid the foundation of a second league, that adopted the manners, rules, and policy of the first. Five years after this period, the Ægeans, freeing themselves from foreign troops, incorporated with this rising republick, which alone acquired an encrease of strength by the junction of the Carynians and Buriens, who had killed their tyrants. Some cities of Peloponnesus requested to be admitted

*A Second
League*

admitted members of this association, whilst others waited till they could discern their true interest, or till compelled by the appearance of force to embrace a measure, of whose utility they were quickly convinced.

POLYBIUS is of opinion that at the time Macedon was so distracted with civil dissensions, as to be almost inattentive to the affairs of Greece, the progress of the Achaians might have been much more rapid, had their *prætors* excelled in courage and understanding. Nor is it an improbable supposition that the quick succession of these magistrates was for many years an obstacle to the advancement of Achaia—by that inactivity of conduct which generally results from diversity of sentiments. This at least is certain, that the face of affairs was greatly improved when the Achaians, instead of annually electing two prætors confided the administration to the care of one.

Aratus FOUR years after this regulation, *Aratus* delivered Sycione from her tyrant, and made it a member of the Achaian league. The superior talents of this celebrated man raised him to the prætorship, which in his hands becoming

becoming a kind of perpetual magistracy, presented Greece with an altogether extraordinary scene. Uninfluenced by ambition, or the lust of conquest, the Achaians, without noise or ostentation, were the declared enemies of all the tyrants of Peloponnesus. They took several cities by surprize; and, after a re-instatement of their privileges thought it a sufficient indemnification for their hazard and expence, to unite them to a society, where they enjoyed equal independency and prerogatives, with the original members. Many of the tyrants, conscious of inability to support their usurpation, particularly after the death of Demetrius king of Macedon, their protector, made a voluntary resignation of their authority.

THIS sudden alteration in the affairs of Peloponnesus, and the important part the Achaians began to assume, indicated a revival of that aversion to regal government which was the characteristick of the ancient Greeks, and an intention of uniting their various interests in one great indissoluble alliance. But, besides that the jealousy of those cities which had formerly governed Greece, induced them to traverse secretly the designs of the Achai-

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ans, the league itself was not sufficiently powerful to inspire the confidence requisite to invigorate the courage of a people, wearied with wrestling against adverse fortune, and familiar with subjection. The moderation of the Achæians, though it encreased the number of their allies, was a potent obstacle to their greatness, by the pacific sentiments it inspired. Their love of peace inclined them to neglect the cultivation of those active virtues which alone could have given them pre-eminence in Greece, and from a re-union of its parts have established a solid and permanent system of government.

ARATUS who was regarded as the inspiring genius of the second Achæian league, contributed greatly to preserve that moderation, which was the distinguishing mark of its character. "He was, says Polybius, the man in the world best calculated for conducting the affairs of a republick with propriety. An exquisite accuracy of judgement unerringly prompted him to discern the right path in all civil contests. Dextrous in the investigation and direction of the passions of those with whom he conversed—he spoke with grace—knew to make silence eloquent
—and

—and possessed the art of acquiring friends, and rivetting their attachment. He understood the nature of party spirit—when to inflame—when to suppress it—could entangle his enemies in the full exultation of security. His resolution and activity in the conduct and execution of plans were unparalleled—yet Aratus, so superior in political endowments, was below mediocrity as a general. When open opposition was inevitable, the faculties of his soul seemed suspended and lost in consternation: and though Peloponnesus was filled with trophies of his victories, few commanders were more deficient in military talents.”

POLYBIUS should have added, that Aratus was himself sensible of this imbecility, and acknowledged the embarrassment he felt at the head of an army. This uncontroverted fact made it natural for him, in the prosecution of his own tranquillity, to apply his endeavours towards the establishment of publick peace; and, in order to give it permanence, he cherished that principle of timidity to which the league owed its origin; repressing with care those ambitious emotions which might have been consequential to suc-

cess. Besides, this penetrating politician undoubtedly knew that the Achaian cities, from the nature of the confederacy, were incapable of pursuing with perseverance any enterprize that required time to accomplish. He therefore regarded the general restoration of liberty in Greece, and a general political plan of government in its cities, as equally impracticable.

To palliate the danger the Achaians were exposed to, from the vicinity of a king of Macedon, whose formidable enmity only waited for a plausible pretence to subdue them, Aratus skilfully availed himself of the competition that displayed itself among the successors of Alexander—Their ambition would not suffer them to rest satisfied with the division of territory settled after the battle of Ipsus. Mutually the slaves of fear, jealousy, and suspicion, their sole endeavour was to weaken each other. The courts of Syria and Egypt were principally attentive to the progress of the kings of Macedon; who, regarding themselves as lawful heirs of Alexander, thought they had an incontestable right to the provinces dismembered from

from his empire. They flattered themselves with a re-union of these, whenever the entire reduction of Greece should enable them to collect their forces, and resume the grand scheme of conquest that Philip had planned and Alexander executed.

THESE Asiatic powers observed with pleasure that, far from a servile submission to the Macedonian yoke, the inhabitants of Peloponnesus had entered into an association favourable to liberty, which would serve as a rampart against their aspiring neighbour. It was evidently their interest to protect the Achaian confederacy: Aratus was sensible of it; and, by contracting alliances with Egypt and Syria, kept Antigonus Gonatus, and his son Demetrius in awe, and impressed an idea of his own importance. But, however sagacious his political conduct was, much more was still wanting to secure the peace of Achaia. Disagreements might arise amongst her protectors; or, involved in civil discord, they might be too much employed in the redress of their own grievances to concern themselves with the fate of foreign auxiliaries.

A king of Macedon might seduce the Asiatic powers from an attention to their real interest, corrupt their ministers, or construct a navy sufficiently formidable to insure the empire of the sea—and leave his land forces ~~an~~ open field for conquest. Providence might place on the throne of Alexander a martial, active, enterprizing prince, in opposition to Eastern monarchs, distinguished only by their indolence and timidity.

THESE were most of the apparent dangers that threatened the Achaian constitution—but where is security to be found for a republick that wants internal force to fix the wheel of Fortune, in defiance of her inconstancy. The glory of the Achaians was liable to be clouded by numberless and various accidents; one, the most unexpected, totally subverted their constitution and politicks.

AFTER an unsuccessful exertion of courage, at the time Alexander [g] was engaged in his Persian

[g] The Spartans refused to join with Alexander in the Persian war; and formed an alliance against Macedon. Their army consisted of 20000 foot and 2000 horse. Antipater opposed them with a superior force, an engagement ensued. The allies of Sparta deserted, part of the Lacedemonians were left dead in the field, the rest saved themselves by a shameful flight.

Persian expedition, the Spartans became immersed in the most dissolute and scandalous debauchery; not the smallest vestige of their ancient purity of manners was now discernible. Agis, in attempting to revive and enforce the laws of Lycurgus, inflamed against himself the resentment of a people grown fond of immorality, and fell a victim to the artifice and fury of a degenerate age.

THE tragical fate of this prince, so calculated to cool the ardour of reformation, seems to have put the final stroke to the depression of Sparta; yet Cleomenes was not discouraged. In reality, though his views terminated in the same point, the track he pursued was so different, that there was less reason to apprehend the same catastrophe.

WHAT Agis attempted as a philosopher, Cleomenes prosecuted as an ambitious man. The one, enraptured with the perfection of Lycurgus's institutions, wished to recall them and their contemporary virtues, temperance, frugality, love of justice, and reverence for religion. The other disregarded laws, and paid as little respect to virtue, independently considered. If he was desirous to banish the

reigning vices of his country, it was from conviction that they enervated the Spartans, and rendered their republick contemptible to a prince who aimed at great and daring enterprizes. Nature had bestowed on Cleomenes an extensive genius, with a degree of resolute ambition superior to every obstacle. The first steps of his intended reformation were to separate the Ephori from being a part of the legislature, and banishing those affluent citizens whose interest would lead them to controvert his measures. These were followed by an equal division of lands—the abolition of debts; and taking advantage of the popular opinion, which considered him as the efficient cause of this revolution in property, he centered all authority in his own person; restoring some wise laws, under the sanction of a tyrant, dissembling, faithless, and iniquitous.

THIS address of the monarch, seconded by a kind of enthusiastic admiration in the subjects, empowered him to undertake a scheme of importance. The first object of his attention was to regain that pre-eminence in Greece, once the acknowledged right of Lacedæmon: this the Achaians now possessed:

ed: he therefore directed the force of his arms against them. Aratus immediately discerned that the powers in alliance with him could not be equally interested in supporting the league against Sparta, as against Macedon. It certainly was very immaterial to the kings of Syria and Egypt whether each of the Peloponnesian cities governed the rest in alternate succession, provided the affairs of Macedon suffered no revolution. Perhaps it would not have been bad policy in those princes to have favoured the designs of a republick, who by the re-instatement of her ancient authority and glory, must have been more capable of defending the independency of Greece from Macedon encroachments, than was in the power of the Achaian league to accomplish.

HAD the reliance of Aratus on the assistance of his allies been more sanguine than it was, what an expence of time must have been lost in negociation! Whilst the active, diligent, and indefatigable Cleomenes was pushing on the war with vigour and celerity—not suffering a moment to pass unemployed.

SUPPOSING even that the courts of Syria

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and Egypt had demonstrated their alacrity to assist the Achaians, it appears to me that Aratus would have acted very imprudently to invite foreign troops into Peloponnesus! Certain it is, the Macedonians could not have beheld their arrival without emotion.

THE presence of their avowed enemy in the heart of Greece must have occasioned an exertion of military strength: for inactivity, at such a crisis, had rendered them despicable, and been a tacit encouragement to subdue a defenceless adversary. The only method of preservation that good policy could have presented, was a close connection with Sparta. Thus the war had been again personal amongst the successors of Alexander, and Greece again exposed to the same rapine and devastation from which she was scarcely freed. The auxiliaries now become principals, whoever was successful, victory had certainly been abused in the oppression of the Lacedemonians, Achaians, or of Peloponnesus in general.

WE can hardly, I apprehend, be too lavish in our commendations of Aratus for having recourse to the assistance of Macedon

at

at this unfortunate conjuncture [*b*] Plutarch indeed thinks differently. “ Aratus, says
 “ he, ought to have ceded every thing to
 “ Cleomenes, rather than have filled Pelo-
 “ ponnesus a second time with Macedonian
 “ soldiers. Consider the origin of that
 “ prince—was he not a descendant of Her-
 “ cules? a native of Lacedemon? It had
 “ been more glorious for Peloponnesus to
 “ have obeyed the last of the Spartans than
 “ a king of Macedon!

BUT has not Plutarch too easily persuaded himself of the practicability of prevailing on the Achæians to acknowledge the power of

M 6 Cleomenes?

(*b*) Though Plutarch undoubtedly is one of the best historians of antiquity, and in many parts of his works inimitable, the learned reproach him with sometimes failing in recollection: nor can it be denied that he will relate the same fact in two different manners. Those who are conversant in political affairs, if I am not mistaken, will allow, that he was not a very refined politician. He gives a proof of this in his reflections on the conduct of Aratus. These I have undertaken to confute, nor shall I scruple taking the same liberty whenever there is occasion: a circumstance I am glad to inform the reader of, who by entertaining a false idea of the characters of some of the great men of Greece, from the observations of that historian, may be apt to accuse me of misrepresentation.

Cleomenes? Let us refer ourselves to the relation of Polybius, a writer almost contemporary, and the most sagacious and penetrating historian of antiquity. From him we learn that this prince, odious to Greece, was with reason considered as the tyrant of his country.

IN vain did his partisans, men whom he had rescued from the jaws of poverty, attempt his vindication, by the example of Lycurgus; who was obliged to have recourse to some degree of violence before he could establish a thorough reformation in the legislature and manners of Sparta. In Lycurgus we recognize the father of his country. Totally disinterested in this arduous enterprize, he was self-devoted to patriotism, and the task of rendering a people virtuous. How different was the character of Cleomens! a tyrant whose endeavour was not to eradicate, but alter the vices of the citizens, and who sacrificed the most valuable considerations to ambition and self-love.

HAD this prince even resembled the portrait Plutarch has drawn of his virtues, had he been magnanimous, eager in pursuit of glory,

glory, munificent, abhorring injustice, and regarding his subjects as his children, still the historian could never have pointed out a method of action sufficiently powerful to induce the Achaian confederacy to submit to his hero. I know not if there ever was a period when the influence of virtue was despotic over the minds of men! but under the prætorship of Aratus, the golden age was regarded as a fable of antiquity.

COULD Plutarch, so discerning an investigator of the human heart, be ignorant, that a free people will never make a voluntary resignation of their independency? and that rather than obey the commands of a usurping arbitrary invader, they will raise a domestic tyrant of their own? Such is the disposition of humanity! Add to this, that the Achaian league was composed of cities preferring rather to be buried in ruins, than suffer the mortifying vexation of renouncing their professed and inveterate hatred to Sparta. Polybius positively assures us, that if Aratus had not solicited an alliance with Macedon, the Messenians and Megalopolitans were determined upon the same step, previous to a separation from the confederates. But
supposing

supposing Aratus, as impolitic as the writer who accuses him, had sown dissention in the league by a proposal of vesting sovereign authority in Cleomenes, the consequence of his fruitless efforts to conciliate the minds of the citizens and preserve unanimity must have terminated in a civil war. Would the king of Macedon, even if not one city had applied for protection, have remained an unconcerned spectator of the quarrel? such credulity is absurd! He would undoubtedly have taken the apparent advantage of a circumstance so favourable to his ambition: and, by offering to become an umpire, in her exhausted state, have made himself master of Greece.

WHAT principally seems to have misled Plutarch's judgment in this affair seems to be, that Antigonus, [*i*] surnamed Doson, after the total defeat of Cleomenes at Telefia, which ruined the [*k*] Lacedemonians, invaded

(*i*) This prince, on whom most historians bestow the title of king, assumed only that of regent of the kingdom during the minority of Philip, the son of Demetrius.

[*k*] Cleomenes, destitute of farther resources in Laconia, was obliged to take refuge in Egypt, where
his

ed in some measure the rights of Peloponnesus, by placing garrisons at Corinth and Orchomenus. This no doubt endangered the liberty of the Achæians, but is that a sufficient motive for our condemnation of Aratus? So unfortunate is the situation of a statesman, that his political conduct is frequently arraigned, though he has sometimes no choice to make but between two uneligible plans of action. Aratus prevented the destruction of his country, and is censured because the Achæians, to avoid ruin, sought an alliance with the court of Macedon!

THE treaty ratified between this able politician and Antigonus Doson, will be regarded as the most desirable circumstance for Greece as well as Macedon, if we are attentive to the approaching alteration in their

his life ended deplorably. His flight was succeeded by the return of the exiles; and a re-establishment of the Ephori: a man, whose name was Lycurgus, not one of the Heraclidæ, bought the crown at the price of a talent to each of those magistrates. The republic, says Polybius, oppressed with calamities, torn with intestine disorders—its property confused with frequent divisions of land, and the banishment of its citizens, at length yielded to the tyranny of Nabis.

their political interest. From the time of Hannibal's penetrating into Italy to prosecute a war which was to decide the fate of Rome and Carthage, emulation and contention ought to have subsided in the two rival republicks—solicitude for selfish advantages, or extension of conquest, ought to have been lost in their contemplation of Hannibal as a common enemy, whose aggrandizement would be equally fatal to the liberties of Greece with the victories of Cyrus, in former ages. These reciprocal apprehensions ought to have been productive of reciprocal concord. Agelas of Naupactum, observing the uninterested curiosity with which the Greeks beheld the second Punic war, exclaimed, "How earnestly is it to be wished that the Gods would now inspire us with sentiments of harmony and unanimity; such as by a conjunction of strength, freedom, and country, might raise a bulwark capable of repelling the incursions of these barbarians. It does not require great political talents to foresee that the conqueror, whether Roman, or Carthaginian, will hardly restrain his ambition within the limits of Italy and Sicily!—The circle is too contracted—He will penetrate into

“ Greece—and if the cloud which threatens
 “ from the Western hemisphere should burst
 “ over our heads, freedom of choice is no
 “ more—we can neither make war nor
 “ peace but in obedience to our master.”

To justify the well-grounded predictions of Agelas, the Roman genius is to be considered, and the causes of the grandeur of that ambitious people investigated; who soaring from the most abject, to the most elevated state of human glory, from the nature and principles of their government, were stimulated to extend their empire: and whose restless spirit never ceased to conquer whilst the earth afforded any nations to subdue, or till they themselves became vanquished by prosperity. Universal monarchy was in reality the point at which they aimed.

THE tendency of all their institutions was the formation of a martial race, abhorrent of repose; because war, far from exhausting their strength, invigorated their troops, and multiplied their riches. From infancy they contracted a habitude of intermeddling in the affairs of nations with whom they were entirely unconnected.

To

To have them for a neighbour or an enemy were synonymous terms; and the methods they pursued in the reduction of Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia, made it evident no considerations could restrain that lust of dominion which impelled them to conquer Greece and Macedonia, after the destruction of Carthage.

“ NEITHER Macedon nor Greece, continued Agelas, addressing himself to Philip, can ever, separately, resist the arms of the victor: We have occasion for your assistance against these barbarian nations. The Gods have appointed you the protector of our liberty—take advantage of their favour—but, in defending Greece, remember you are defending Macedon! That kingdom will reap, in its turn, reciprocal blessings from a friendship necessary to its grandeur and reputation. Good faith is the only policy worth regarding. Should the Greeks once suspect you of supinely beholding their country ravaged by foreigners, from an expectation of finding it afterwards an easy prey to your own ambition, I will venture to pronounce the sentence of your destruction.

“ The

“ The bond of amity once broken, our
 “ cities will contract alliances with the bar-
 “ barians. — The sweetness of revenge will
 “ urge them to facilitate their own ruin,
 “ that they may enjoy the completion of
 “ yours.”

IN this critical conjuncture, Philip should have made Themistocles his model. For though he had not a Xerxes, a Mardonius, or effeminate Asiatic squadrons to oppose, he commanded an army of soldiers whose military talents were capable of striking even Roman legions with astonishment, had he persevered in those maxims of prudence and moderation inculcated by Antigonus Dofon; maxims that rendered the commencement of his reign illustrious.

NATURE, says the historians of that age, assembled in Philip all the virtues that do honour to a throne. His understanding was penetrating, lively and comprehensive. The courage of the hero was so tempered with the affability of the man, that he pleased and enchanted the hearts of his people, and was equally the object of their love and admiration. Fond of glory to excess, he yet
 believed

believed it incompatible with injustice. The wise moderation of his conduct prevented every suspicion that might have awakened the vigilance of the Greeks. Amazing, that such a constellation of virtues should disappear so instantaneously! a phenomenon (if I may be allowed the expression) so much the more astonishing, as this prince's firmness of character had been proved when surrounded with courtiers whose despicable morals were an invincible obstacle to their advancement, till they could debase the sentiments of their master to a level with their own.

DEMETRIUS of Phares flattered the ambition of Philip, by representing the conquest of Italy as an easy acquisition after the battle of Cannæ. The Romans, were he to be credited, could never recover the blow their arms had sustained; whilst it was impossible for the general of a republick so ill-governed as that of Carthage, to make the proper advantages of victory. Philip, solely engrossed by this idea, neglected his conquests in Ætolia. Instead of laying waste a country of which he was entirely master, and razing the cities of a nation detestable

testable to Greece, ever fraudulent in treaties, and from its situation capable of interrupting the good intelligence subsisting between Peloponnesus and Macedon, this monarch eagerly offered terms of accommodation. A peace with Ætolia was hastily concluded, that he might be at liberty to pursue his project in Italy.

THUS detached from the interests of Greece, Philip could not have taken a more sagacious step than to connect himself with Hannibal. For it certainly corresponded with his own views that this general should subvert the Roman empire; or at least reduce it to such a state of humiliation, as might prevent its interference with other powers. It was policy to favour the least dangerous, and least enterprizing enemy, whose success evidently appeared dependant on the genius of Hannibal. In a government defective in manners, order, and wisdom, the same degree of power might be lodged in hands unequal to the enterprize.

If considerations like these determined Philip to form an alliance with Hannibal, they ought likewise to have prevented his
being

being intimidated by the menaces of the Romans, on hearing of this treaty. Their resentment should have pointed out more forcibly the interest he had in facilitating their destruction, in seconding the designs of Hannibal, and even supplying him with those succours the dilitary councils of the Carthaginians neglected to furnish.

BUT intoxicated with the expectation of a facile establishment in Italy, the insults of a Roman fleet convinced him of his error. Fear succeeded to confidence. He repented the engagements with Hannibal—renounced them without substituting any thing more eligible. He even pursued measures the most pernicious to his crown. Apprehending an attack from the Romans, instead of preparations of defence, he forgot the wise remonstrances of Agelas, and fancied the reduction of Greece, the only method of augmenting his strength. He was industrious in sowing new dissensions in her cities, and inflaming the former ones, till he could meet with a favourable moment to enslave them.

FINDING the Messenians perplexed with domestic contests,—“Have not you laws, would

“ would he say to the nobles, to restrain
 “ the tide of popular insolence? Are your
 “ arms enfeebled, addressing himself to the
 “ multitude, that they refuse to do you
 “ justice on your tyrants?” Universal com-
 plaints broke forth against the perfidy of
 Macedon. Her allies were converted into
 enemies. The Achæians took the field un-
 der the conduct of that great general, Phi-
lopoemon, who was styled the last of the
Greeks, and defended their liberties more
 courageously than Greece had reason to ex-
 pect. Philip, finding insurmountable im-
 pediments to the execution of his project, is
 reduced to abandon Italy to the Carthagini-
 ans, and direct his attention to the turn
 of affairs in Greece. He foresees himself ine-
 vitably exposed to the attacks of two for-
 midable adversaries — The sad reverse of
 Fortune embitters his soul — He hearkens
 only to the suggestions of rage, and becomes,
 by degrees, the most insupportable of
 tyrants!

THE Romans still preserved that inflexible
 strictness of manners which had rendered
 their name so illustrious, when the Ætolians,
 misguided by aversion to Philip, as well as
 to

to the Athenians and Achaïans, invited them to revenge the oppressions they suffered from Macedon. Enriched with the spoils of Carthage, Rome had a fund sufficient to support the most distant and extensive war.

POVERTY, and the laws were respected by her citizens; the most perfect unanimity subsisted among their different ranks; the impending danger they had escaped by the defeat of *Hannibal*, added new force to the springs of government; the *Romans*, in fine, were more than ever convinced that no difficulties were really insurmountable to troops, actuated by the love of glory, true valour, and unwearied patience. Whoever has the slightest knowledge of the second *Punic* war, must be sensible of the vast disproportion of a *Roman* army, re-inforced by some of the *Grecian* states, opposed to the forces of *Philip*! That prince was entirely defeated, and constrained to subscribe to terms of peace that deprived him of all his acquisitions in *Greece*, and left him destitute of ships, and money.

FROM this æra, the *Romans* in their intercourse

course with the republicks of Greece, exerted all the arts of that refined and sagacious policy which had already deceived and betrayed so many nations. Under the pretext of re-instituting each city in its ancient laws and government, they in reality destroyed all possibility of a general association. They employed the Greeks themselves to enslave Greece; and suffered their own vices to undermine the foundations of liberty, before they overturned it by military force. They had zealous partizans in every state, whom gold seduced, and attached to their interest.

HISTORY has transmitted to us the names of several of these infamous traitors, who successively betrayed the interests of their fellow citizens and of their country; became the architects of tyranny; publicly declaring the Romans to be the sole arbiters of justice, laws, manners and customs. In every petty dissension that arose, the republick of Rome offered its meditation, recommending peace, because it reserved to itself the sole privilege of making war; favoured them with counsel; ventured sometimes even to prescribe it; but always carefully conceal-

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ed the motives of ambition under the specious appearance of publick good.

THE Ætolians, who had flattered themselves with the prospect of great advantages, in favouring the Roman arms against Philip, too late perceived they were likely to gain no other recompense than a prohibition of longer disturbing the tranquility of Greece, by their depredations. To be reduced to the necessity of either perishing by famine, or submitting to the task of honest industry and labour, for supplying the loss of plunder, appeared to them an insupportable as well as tyrannical alternative.

BUT the yoke being already too heavy to be shaken off without foreign assistance, they dispatched emissaries to the court of Syria to engage Antiochus to take arms against the Romans. The loss of Asia-Minor was the consequence of his defeat; and the Greeks, destitute of resources, were from that time, encompassed by Roman provinces on every side.

THE first use the conquerers made of
their

their victory was to crush the Ætolians—to whom they granted peace on the following conditions: That their forces should always be ready to march in obedience to the commands of Rome; that they should never directly, or indirectly, assist her enemies, or those of her allies. The Ætolian league engaged to pay the Romans two hundred talents, and were bound in the farther payment of three hundred more, within six years. Forty of the principal citizens were sent to Rome, and the selection of magistrates was restrained within the circle of these hostages.

THOSE cities in the confederacy that had disapproved the alliance with Antiochus were declared free. The Romans also granted to the Acarnanians, as a reward of their fidelity, the city and territories of the Æniades. Incapacitated to invade their neighbours, the Ætolians, says Polybius, turned their fury against each other, and carried their domestick discord to the extreme degree of violence. In this manner revenging their inhumanity to the Greeks, by

making their own country the scene of injustice, confusion, slaughter and assassination.

THE overthrow of Perseus was a parallel misfortune to Greece and rivetted still closer the fetters of slavery, It became customary for the Roman senate to cite before it such cities as were at variance with each other; the advice offered was couched in the most amicable and modest terms, but the Greeks soon experienced disapprobation was an unpardonable offence. In the midst of this universal subjection, the republick of Achaia was singular in picquing itself on some vestiges of liberty and independency, still regulating its civil affairs, and even daring to form alliances without consulting Rome.

“ If what the Romans required of us, said
 “ the Achaians who had caught the spirit of
 “ Philopœmon, is conformable to the laws,
 “ to justice, and to the faith of subsisting
 “ treaties, let us not hesitate a moment to
 “ pay them a proper deference! But if their
 “ pretensions wound our customs and liberties,
 “ ties, let us explain the reasons why we
 “ cannot submit to their opinion. Should
 “ remonstrance, supplication, — civil rights
 “ —all

“ —all prove inefficacious, let us invoke
 “ the Gods to witness their injustice. But
 “ let us, my countrymen, persevere in
 “ our integrity, and cede to compulsion
 “ alone! ”

THIS compound of submission and firmness, of timidity and courage, raised suspicions concerning the conduct of the Achaians; and in the nourishment of a passion for unexisting liberty, without supplying materials to rekindle its ashes, only accelerated their ruin. The Romans no sooner foresaw the slightest appearance of danger, than they guarded against the fickleness of fortune. They apprehended that the loftiness of the Achaians, if not suppressed, might become contagious in Greece, and revive the flame of its ancient freedom. Besides, the Roman republick was arrived at too exalted a point of elevation, not to confound remonstrances with revolt;—to complain was a failure of respect—Such citizens of Achaia as were distinguished by inflexible integrity, and an unshaken attachment to the interests of their country, were condemned to banishment.

THIS example of severity, calculated to root out opposition, or at least suppress its murmurs, on the contrary, inflamed the minds of the Peloponnesians. They broke into loud exclamations of sorrow and discontent; and, as if desirous of progressively opposing the Romans, they familiarized themselves to speak of them in terms of derision; attributing their greatness to the caprice of fortune—not to their own conduct. This opinion, however irrational, was very extensive in its influence, and soon perceptible in the subsequent quarrel between Sparta and Achaia.

THE republick of Rome appointed commissioners to examine into the cause of this disagreement; whose instructions authorized them to weaken the Achaians, by detaching from their alliance as many cities as would be influenced by their representations; particularly Sparta, Argos, Corinth, Orchomenus, and Heraclea. The haughtiness of the Achaians induced them to treat the Roman deputies with some degree of contempt. Their republick, whose refined policy so well understood the art of precipitating

precipitating the wisest and most circumspect nations down the steep, whilst it feigned to support them with the arm of friendship, dissembled all the resentment of this affront. Other commissioners were nominated, who had orders to behave with the utmost mildness; and by gentle persuasions invite the Achaians to recall their troops and forbear hostilities, already commenced, in the territories of Sparta.

By this excess of moderation, Rome sought to throw the whole odium of rupture upon the Achaians, as a justification of the rigorous severity they meditated. The conduct of the one was artful dissimulation, of the other open insolence. Dicus, and Critolaus were then chief magistrates, and are represented by Polybius as worthless men, whose empire was absolute over the minds of those citizens contemptible for depravity of manners; or whose extravagance reduced them to a state of penury that had nothing to fear from a revolution. These two persons persuaded their countrymen that the affected gentleness of the Romans was the production of fear; that occupied with a

third war, against a nation so powerful as the Carthaginian, they first endeavoured to impose on Greece by a superb embassy—but this method not availing, a second commission was appointed, whose proceedings plainly evinced they did not dare run the hazard of new enemies, and even repented having weakened by their tyranny the influence they had acquired in Greece. “ Since “ Rome trembles, said these men, this is the “ moment of resistance! We must either “ irrecoverably bid adieu to liberty, or “ snatch this opportunity to confirm and “ strengthen it.” These sentiments penetrated the hearts of their auditors, and the second deputation was equally unsuccessful with the first.

METELLUS, who commanded in Macedonia, did every thing to dissipate the mist that blinded the Achaïans, and recall them to submission; but finding his efforts fruitless, he ordered his legions to march. Unprepared as Achaia was for war, the two armies came to an engagement in Locrida: notwithstanding the great shock the Achaïans sustained, they did not despair. Critolaus
was

was slain, and Dicus his colleague assumed the command of the army; collected its scattered, vanquished remains, marshalled the slaves, and thought himself yet in a state of courting Fortune once more in the field.

METELLUS, who continued his march towards Corinth, was indefatigable in offering the the Achaïans fresh propositions of peace, till the command of the forces devolved on Mummius.

THAT consul, as memorable for the rusticity of his manners, and ignorance in the polite arts that captivated Greece, as for his ferocious treatment of his inhabitants, gained a complete victory.

THE general consternation after the battle, was equal to the rash confidence and impatience that instigated the Achaïans to engage an enemy so superior in strength. The most eligible step remaining for the fugitive troops, was to have thrown themselves into Corinth, regarded as the key to Peloponnesus, where by a vigorous resistance, there was a chance
of

of obtaining an honourable capitulation. But the Achaian soldiers, fearing the proximity of the victor, in the confusion fled toward the interior parts of Peloponnesus; whilst the Corinthians, infected by their panic, abandoned their own city. Mummius delivered it up to pillage—the remaining cities were put to the sword—their wives and children sold for slaves—the magnificent city of Corinth was reduced to ashes—and the liberty of the Greeks entombed beneath its ruins. The walls and fortifications of the cities engaged in this last struggle were demolished—popular government was universally abolished—Greece became a province to Rome—governed by a prætor—and henceforth styled the province of Achaia. Such was the catastrophe of, perhaps, the most illustrious nation of antiquity, whose reputation excited the jealousy of the Romans themselves!

SURELY no institution ever presented human reason with a more noble or more sublime spectacle than the republick of Lacedæmon! For the space of six hundred years the laws of Lycurgus were observed with the most religious

religious fidelity. Where shall we find a race of men so attached to virtue as the Spartan? that ever exhibited such a succession of glorious examples of moderation, patience, fortitude, justice, and patriotism! In reading the history of that people we catch their elevation of soul—our faculties seem to expand beyond those narrow limits in which the degeneracy of the age restrains our feeble virtues.

NOTWITHSTANDING what has been advanced by the judicious Sallust, who, studious to diminish the glory of the Greeks, attributes its principal lustre to the genius and embellishments of those [1] eminent writers who had eternized the actions of their heroes; can we regard the commonalty of Greece without acknowledging repeated instances of more than human fortitude?

THE

[1] Atheniensium res gestæ sicuti ego existimo, satis amplæ magnificæque tuere, verum aliquanto minores tamen quam famâ feruntur. Sed quia provenere ibi scriptorum magna ingenia per terrarum orbem facta pro maximis celebrantur, ita eorum qui ea fecere virtus tanta habetur, quantum verbis eam potuere extollere præclara ingenia. *Sal: in conj. Cal.*

THE battles of Marathon, Thermopylæ, Salamin, Plataea, Mycale—the retreat of the ten thousand—and that inexhaustible series of heroic actions springing from the bosom of Greece, during the course of her intestine wars, are they not superior to all the eulogiums of historians? But the peculiar obligation we owe to Greece, is for furnishing history with those sublime characters which are its greatest ornament, and whose memory ought to be eternal as their glory. -

I do not except the republick of Rome, a government in all its constituent parts so admirably calculated to inspire the ardour of genius—to animate talents into action—and place them in the most dazzling point of lustre and observation! Yet whom have they to compare with a Lycurgus—a Themistocles—an Epaminondas? Properly speaking, the grandeur of Rome was fabricated by that republick, considered collectively. There are no instances of any single Roman superior to the manners of his country, or the wisdom of its legislature! No exalted spirit who strikes out new lights, and establishes new systems.

EACH

EACH individual of Rome borrows his sagacity and magnanimity from those of the state—he pursues the beaten track—and the greatest men among them only advance a few paces beyond their compatriots. But in Greece how obvious the difference! There I frequently behold those amazingly powerful, creative geniuses whose undaunted resolution repels the torrent of custom—whose discernment sees, and provides for the various exigencies of state—who open to themselves an untracked road to Fame—penetrating into futurity, and by a kind of intuitive glance becoming masters of all events!

HAD extraordinary talents and merit been less diffused among the Greeks, the part they acted in the political theatre of the world might have been more considerable. Had only one commonwealth of Greece possessed the dispositions that rendered a people lofty, courageous, powerful, ambitious, and formed for dominion, she would have reduced the neighbouring states, as Rome did Italy, and had probably shone


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as conspicuously in the annals of glory. But as several of their institutions were almost equal in wisdom, and every republick enjoyed independency, their situation led them to comparative views of internal strength and vigour that are inseparable from a love of power. Solely engrossed by civil contentions, they exhausted and ruined one another, from that balance of military excellence and experience, apparent in their soldiers, generals, and statesmen. The Romans, it is true, conquered the world; but would they ever have emerged from their primæval obscurity, it, in their first essays, they had been opposed by a republick equal to Sparta and Athens?

IN passing under the Roman dominion, Greece still preserved a very honourable ascendancy over her conquerors — Her knowledge of the arts, and taste for polite literature, amply revenged the defeat of her arms, and, in their turn, subdued the pride of the Romans. The victors condescended to become the disciples of the vanquished, in the study of a language enriched by Homer, Pindar

Pindar, Thucydides, Xenophon, Demosthenes, Plato, and Euripides, with all the embellishments and graces of their enlarged ideas. Some of the Roman orators, who had already unfolded to their countrymen the charms of eloquence, now sought to extract from Greece that refined and delicate taste which regulates genius — those secret rules of art that encrease its energy in correcting its luxuriance. The model of perfection was completely formed in those seminaries of philosophy, where the most distinguished citizens of Rome, divesting themselves of prejudice, learned to honour the Greeks — transporting into their own country that gratitude and admiration which induced the republick to lighten the weight of bondage, fearing to abuse the rights of victory, they favoured them with distinguished privileges and immunities beyond any of the conquered provinces. What a triumph for erudition to have preserved the peculiar spot of its cultivation sacred from calamity, when Legislators — Magistrates — Generals, were unable to defend it! What a glorious exultation over the insolent scorn of ignorance!

rance! and what a demonstrative proof that science will ever be venerated by men as accurate and competent judges of its merit as the Romans.



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